Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 112, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 35-65

  Conlon, John R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemmas; Rational learning; Recurrent games; Reputation; Speed of learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041760757     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00073-5     Document Type: Article

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