Predatory accommodation: Below-cost pricing without exclusion in intermediate goods markets

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 22-43

  Marx, Leslie M ^a   Shaffer, Greg ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033424775     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2556044     Document Type: Article

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