Competitive auctions for multiple digital goods

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2161, Issue , 2001, Pages 416-427

  Goldberg, Andrew V ^a   Hartline, Jason D ^b  

^a Inter Trust Technologies Corp   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER SCIENCE; COMPUTERS;

AUCTION MECHANISMS; DIGITAL GOODS; MARKET ANALYSIS; MULTIPLE ITEMS; OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS; SAMPLING PROBLEMS; UTILITY VALUES;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84943226429     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-44676-1_35     Document Type: Conference Paper

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