Bounded rationality in the economics of organization: "Much cited and little used"

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 245-264

  Foss, Nicolai J ^a  

^a Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Capabilities approach; Economics of organization

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037333772     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-4870(02)00206-4     Document Type: Article

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