Bounded rationality in the economics of organization: Present use and (Some) future possibilities

Journal of Management and Governance

Volumn 5, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 401-425

  Foss, Nicolai J ^a  

^a Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012127968     PISSN: 13853457     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1014007330294     Document Type: Article

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