Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 309-321

  Montero, Maria ^a  

^a TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Apex games; Kernel; Non cooperative bargaining; Random proposers

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036869662     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00501-8     Document Type: Article

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