What is missed if we leave out collective choice in the analysis of taxation

National Tax Journal

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 373-389

  Winer, Stanley L ^a   Hettich, Walter ^b  

^a CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011151967     PISSN: 00280283     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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