Another look at "parties, voters, and the use of force abroad"

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 46, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 572-596

  Fordham, Benjamin O ^a  

^a STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036338464     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002702046004005     Document Type: Review

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