Replacement cost endorsement and opportunistic fraud in automobile insurance

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 213-230

  Dionne, Georges ^a   Gagné, Robert ^a  

^a HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Automobile insurance; Ex post moral hazard; Insurance fraud; Replacement cost endorsement

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036270028     PISSN: 08955646     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1015683401986     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (30)

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