On the design of optimal insurance policies under manipulation of audit cost

International Economic Review

Volumn 41, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 1049-1071

  Picard, Pierre ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347338087     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00095     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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15. _, "On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies under Manipulation of Audit Cost," mimeo, THEMA, University of Paris X-Nanterre, 1998.
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