Is the efficiency wage efficient? The social norm and organizational corruption

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 104, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 27-47

  Chang, Juin jen ^a   Lai, Ching chong ^a  

^a ACADEMIA SINICA   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Efficiency wages; Organizational corruption; Social interaction; Social norm

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; MODELING; ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK; WAGE;

EID: 0036005277     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00270     Document Type: Article

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