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Volumn 6, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 201-234

The firm as a multicontract organization

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EID: 0031535112     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/105864097567084     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (45)

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