The firm as a multicontract organization

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 201-234

  Laffont, Jean Jacques ^a   Martimort, David ^b  

^a TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

^b Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031535112     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/105864097567084     Document Type: Article

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