Security, bargaining, and the end of interstate rivalry

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 157-184

  Bennett, D Scott ^a  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; GEOPOLITICAL THEORY; HISTORICAL THEORY; INTERSTATE RIVALRY; RIVALRY TERMINATION; SECURITY THREAT; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0030445175     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2600955     Document Type: Article

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