Political Markets, Bond Markets, and the Effects of Uncertainty: A Cross-National Analysis

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 131-159

  Perry, Robert L ^a   Robertson, John D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL MARKET; DEMOCRACY; MARKET CONDITIONS;

EID: 0032229953     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0020-8833.00072     Document Type: Article

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