Bounded rational learning in differential information economies: Core and value

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 373-391

  Koutsougeras, Leonidas ^b   Yannelis, Nicholas C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b Department of Economics ^*

Author keywords

Approximate notions; Dynamic economy; Private core; Private value allocations; Value allocations

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000021547     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00057-8     Document Type: Article

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