Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies

Economic Theory

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 485-509

  Hahn, Guangsug ^a   Yannelis, Nicholas C ^b  

^a Korea Economic Research Institute   (South Korea)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperative games; Differential information; Implementation; Incentive compatibility; Interim private core; Interim private value

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035537116     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/PL00004196     Document Type: Article

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