Bargaining on Behalf of a Constituency

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 92, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 234-273

  Cai, Hongbin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; delegation; principal agent; delay

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007107864     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2631     Document Type: Article

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