Revitalizing privatized Russian enterprises

Academy of Management Executive

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 74-85

  Wright, Mike ^a   Hoskisson, Robert E ^b   Filatotchev, Igor ^a   Buck, Trevor ^a,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA   (United States)

^c School's Center for Research on Enterprise in Emerging Markets

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002000739     PISSN: 10795545     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/ame.1998.650518     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. See M. Y. Yu & H. Chen. 1996. An Empirical Analysis of Factors Explaining Foreign Joint Venture Performance in China. Journal of Business Research. 35:165-173.
2. See I. Filatotchev, T. Buck & M. Wright. 1992. Privatization and Buy-outs in the USSR. Soviet Studies. 44(2):265-282.
3. For a fuller explanation of the privatization methods see M. Boycko, A. Shleifer & R. Vishny. 1993. Privatizing Russia. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 2, 139-192.
4. M. Peng & P. Heath. 1996. The Growth of the Firm in Planned Economies in Transition: Institutions, Organizations and Strategic Choice, Academy of Management Review, 21(2), 492-528.
5. S. Puffer. 1994. Understanding the Bear: A Portrait of Russian Business Leaders. Academy of Managemenf Executive, 8, 41-54.
6. S. Puffer, Academy of Managemenf Executive, op.cit.
7. C. Walck. 1994. Comment on Puffer, Academy of Management Executive, 8(1), 56-69.
8. See M. Wright, I. Filatotchev, T. Buck & K. Robbie (eds). 1993. Management and Employee Buy-Outs in Central and Eastern Europe. EBRD Technical Note, EBRD/CEEPN, London/Ljubljana.
9. C. Ennew, I. Filatotchev, T. Buck & M. Wright. 1993. Constraints on the Adoption of the Marketing Concept: The Case of the Former Soviet Union. European Journal of Marketing, 27(11/12), 21-34.
10. D. McCarthy, S. Puffer & S. Shekshnia. 1993. The Resurgence of an Entrepreneurial Class in Russia. Journal of Management Inquiry, 2(2), 125-137.
11. See Peng & Heath, Journal of Management Inquiry, op.cit.
12. For discussion of this problem see I. Filatotchev, T. Buck & M. Wright. 1993. Soviet All-Union Enterprises as New Multinationals of the CIS. The International Executive, 35(6), 525-538
13. T. Buck, I. Filatotchev & M. Wright. 1995. The Re-Integration of State Enterprises of the Former USSR, Journal of East-West Business, 1(2), 5-27.
14. Reliable information is obviously difficult to obtain, with figures for the MIC ranging from an official 8.4% of GNP in 1987 to an unofficial estimate of 21-26% for 1988 by the CIA (The Economist, 15.12.90, p20.).
15. See I. Filatotchev, T. Buck & M. Wright. 1993. The Military-Industrial Complex of the Soviet Union - Asset or Liability? Communist Economies and the Economics of Transition, 5(2), 187-204.
16. Before 1994, private individuals held one percent and zero afterwards. The state retained a 30 percent stake as the company is part of the MIC.
17. These received almost the maximum average score, 6.8 and 6.6 respectively on a seven point scale where 7 = very important.
18. Average score was 6.7 on the same seven point scale as above.
19. This is less than has taken place following the privatization of Russian shops. See N. Barberis, M. Boycko, A. Shleifer & N. Tsukanova. 1996. How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops. Journal of Political Economy. 104(4): 764-790.
20. i.e. with a score of 6 or 7 on α 7-point scale where 1 = not important through 7 = very important.
21. I. Filatotchev, R. E. Hoskisson, T. Buck & M. Wright. 1996. Corporate Restructuring in Russian Privatizations: Implications for US Investors. California Management Review, 38(2): 87-105.
22. This evidence is consistent with that for venture capital firms in Hungary, which also indicates a greater emphasis on financial controls and less involvement in other aspects than may be expected in the West. See J. Karsai, M. Wright & I. Filatotchev. 1997. Venture Capital in Transition Economies: The Case of Hungary. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, forthcoming.
23. I.e., with scores of 6 and 7 on a 7 point scale where 1 = not important/no action through 7 = very important.
24. K. Pope. 1996. A Steelmaker Built Up By Buying Cheap Mills Finally Meets Its Match. Wall Street Journal, May 2, A4, A6.
25. For a parallel example in China see "Matushita's Chinese Burn" (Economist, September 9, 1997, 115-6).
26. T. Buck, I. Filatotchev, P. Nolan & M. Wright. 1996. Industrial Reform in Russia and China: Privatization and Governance versus Inward FDI and Restructuring Through Joint Ventures. Proceedings of the Academy of International Business Conference, Banff, Canada, September 26-29.
27. For example, the authors have seen Russian JVs comprising entirely new, separate plants or existing single factories quite distinct from the Russian partner's main operations or even as one floor in an existing factory.
28. For a detailed comparison of managerial approaches to conducting business in the US, Japan, Russia, and China, see e.g., D. Ralston, D. Holt, R. Terpstra & Yu Kai-Cheng. 1997. The Impact of National Culture and Economic Ideology on Managerial Work Values: A Study of the United States, Russia, Japan and China. Journal of International Business Studies, 28: 177-208;
29. See also, S. M. Puffer, D. J. McCarthy, & A. I. Naumov, 1997. Russian Managers' Beliefs about work: Beyond the Stereotypes. Journal of World Business, 32(2): 258-275.
30. Financial Times, September 30, 1997.
31. C. F. Fey. 1997. Doing Business in Russia Using Joint Ventures. European Management Journal, forthcoming.