Chinese apprehensions about revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance

Asian Survey

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 383-397

  Garrett, Banning ^a   Glaser, Bonnie ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEFENSE POLICY; GEOPOLITICAL RELATIONS; REGIONAL POLITICS; SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS; US-JAPANESE RELATIONS;

CHINA; JAPAN; USA;

EID: 0031431124     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/as.1997.37.4.01p0240y     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. The assessment of Chinese views in this report is based primarily on discussions with Chinese government officials as well as analysts from civilian and military research institutes during four visits to China in Fall 1995, Spring and Fall 1996, and Winter 1996-97. Since the individuals engaged in these discussions based on an understanding that they would not be quoted by name, their remarks remain anonymous.
2. China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) researcher Xu Zhixian has predicted an "increasingly intense" rivalry between the U.S. and Japan for domination in the Asia-Pacific region. Xu described U.S.-Japanese relations as in the midst of a "historic change," which is likely to be characterized by increasing conflict and tension. Nevertheless, Xu forecast that Japan would maintain its partnership and cooperative relationship with the U.S. for the time being because it "is still not able to contend openly" with Washington. Xu Zhixian, "Northeast Asia Develops Amid Dialogue and Cooperation," January 20, 1995, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, published by CICIR and summarized in FBIS, DR/CHI, April 5, 1995. CICIR journal articles are often "sanitized" versions of reports written for the Chinese leadership and reflect the Institute's analysis rather than propaganda.
3. China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) researcher Xu Zhixian has predicted an "increasingly intense" rivalry between the U.S. and Japan for domination in the Asia-Pacific region. Xu described U.S.-Japanese relations as in the midst of a "historic change," which is likely to be characterized by increasing conflict and tension. Nevertheless, Xu forecast that Japan would maintain its partnership and cooperative relationship with the U.S. for the time being because it "is still not able to contend openly" with Washington. Xu Zhixian, "Northeast Asia Develops Amid Dialogue and Cooperation," January 20, 1995, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, published by CICIR and summarized in FBIS, DR/CHI, April 5, 1995. CICIR journal articles are often "sanitized" versions of reports written for the Chinese leadership and reflect the Institute's analysis rather than propaganda.
4. The text of the Declaration was printed in FBIS, DR/EAS, April 17, 1996. One Chinese analyst, Yang Bojiang, deputy director of CICIR's Division of Japanese Studies, contends that the revised U.S.-Japan alliance will be a "strong shock to the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region." He asserts that "the U.S.-Japan pursuit of domination of regional affairs through the strengthened bilateral alliance amounts to building their own security upon the insecurity of other countries through creation of artificial barriers among nations and classification of the regional countries into different categories. Such behavior clearly works against reduction of regional tensions." "Why U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance?" Contemporary International Relations, 6:5 (May 1996), p. 8.
5. The text of the Declaration was printed in FBIS, DR/EAS, April 17, 1996. One Chinese analyst, Yang Bojiang, deputy director of CICIR's Division of Japanese Studies, contends that the revised U.S.-Japan alliance will be a "strong shock to the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region." He asserts that "the U.S.-Japan pursuit of domination of regional affairs through the strengthened bilateral alliance amounts to building their own security upon the insecurity of other countries through creation of artificial barriers among nations and classification of the regional countries into different categories. Such behavior clearly works against reduction of regional tensions." "Why U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance?" Contemporary International Relations, 6:5 (May 1996), p. 8.
6. AFP, April 18, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 18, 1996; Steve Mufson, "U.S.-Japan Accord Fans China's Fears," Washington Post, April 19, 1996. Chinese analysts said privately in May 1996 that the Chinese government's response to the Joint Declaration had been muted because the Declaration's only explicit reference to China was the statement that the two leaders had "emphasized that it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China play a positive and constructive role, and in this context, stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation with China."
7. AFP, April 18, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 18, 1996; Steve Mufson, "U.S.-Japan Accord Fans China's Fears," Washington Post, April 19, 1996. Chinese analysts said privately in May 1996 that the Chinese government's response to the Joint Declaration had been muted because the Declaration's only explicit reference to China was the statement that the two leaders had "emphasized that it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China play a positive and constructive role, and in this context, stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation with China."
8. This theme is widely represented in published articles. See, for example, Japan expert Zhou Jihua from the CASS Institute of Japanese Studies, "A New Starting Point of Japan-U.S. Military Alliance," International Strategic Studies, no. 2, 1996, pp. 24-29. The journal is published by the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, which is under the General Staff Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Zhou asserts that under the revised U.S.-Japan alliance, "China is taken as a strategic opponent in the 21st century," p. 28. Zhou claims the U.S. sees China as "closing rapidly to the status of a 'superpower'," and likely to become the "most difficult competitor" for the U.S. to cope with in the 21st century.
9. This theme is widely represented in published articles. See, for example, Japan expert Zhou Jihua from the CASS Institute of Japanese Studies, "A New Starting Point of Japan-U.S. Military Alliance," International Strategic Studies, no. 2, 1996, pp. 24-29. The journal is published by the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, which is under the General Staff Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Zhou asserts that under the revised U.S.-Japan alliance, "China is taken as a strategic opponent in the 21st century," p. 28. Zhou claims the U.S. sees China as "closing rapidly to the status of a 'superpower'," and likely to become the "most difficult competitor" for the U.S. to cope with in the 21st century.
10. A Chinese commentator suggested that by maintaining the bilateral defense treaty as the "foundation of peace and prosperity in the region," the U.S. and Japan have given the impression that they will "work hand-in-hand to dominate the Asia-Pacific region." Zhang Guocheng, International Forum column, "Japan's Constitution Is Facing a Test," Renmin ribao, April 23, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 29, 1996. Another reporter suggested that the new direction for the alliance set by the Tokyo Declaration sends a "dangerous signal that Japan has been brought into the U.S. global military strategy and will gradually strengthen coordination with U.S. troops' actions in the Asia-Pacific region." Chen Zhijiang, "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security - A Dangerous Signal," Guangming ribao, April 18, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 23, 1996.
11. A Chinese commentator suggested that by maintaining the bilateral defense treaty as the "foundation of peace and prosperity in the region," the U.S. and Japan have given the impression that they will "work hand-in-hand to dominate the Asia-Pacific region." Zhang Guocheng, International Forum column, "Japan's Constitution Is Facing a Test," Renmin ribao, April 23, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 29, 1996. Another reporter suggested that the new direction for the alliance set by the Tokyo Declaration sends a "dangerous signal that Japan has been brought into the U.S. global military strategy and will gradually strengthen coordination with U.S. troops' actions in the Asia-Pacific region." Chen Zhijiang, "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security - A Dangerous Signal," Guangming ribao, April 18, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 23, 1996.
12. A Chinese commentator suggested that by maintaining the bilateral defense treaty as the "foundation of peace and prosperity in the region," the U.S. and Japan have given the impression that they will "work hand-in-hand to dominate the Asia-Pacific region." Zhang Guocheng, International Forum column, "Japan's Constitution Is Facing a Test," Renmin ribao, April 23, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 29, 1996. Another reporter suggested that the new direction for the alliance set by the Tokyo Declaration sends a "dangerous signal that Japan has been brought into the U.S. global military strategy and will gradually strengthen coordination with U.S. troops' actions in the Asia-Pacific region." Chen Zhijiang, "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security - A Dangerous Signal," Guangming ribao, April 18, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 23, 1996.
13. A Chinese commentator suggested that by maintaining the bilateral defense treaty as the "foundation of peace and prosperity in the region," the U.S. and Japan have given the impression that they will "work hand-in-hand to dominate the Asia-Pacific region." Zhang Guocheng, International Forum column, "Japan's Constitution Is Facing a Test," Renmin ribao, April 23, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 29, 1996. Another reporter suggested that the new direction for the alliance set by the Tokyo Declaration sends a "dangerous signal that Japan has been brought into the U.S. global military strategy and will gradually strengthen coordination with U.S. troops' actions in the Asia-Pacific region." Chen Zhijiang, "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security - A Dangerous Signal," Guangming ribao, April 18, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 23, 1996.
14. Gang Ye, "The Japan-U.S. Military Alliance that Is Cause for Concern," Xinhua, April 18, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 19, 1996.
15. See, for example, Yu Qing, "What Is the Aim of Strengthening U.S.-Japan Security?" interview with Zhang Guocheng, Renmin ribao Japan-based correspondent, Renmin ribao, April 19, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 25, 1996.
16. See, for example, Yu Qing, "What Is the Aim of Strengthening U.S.-Japan Security?" interview with Zhang Guocheng, Renmin ribao Japan-based correspondent, Renmin ribao, April 19, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 25, 1996.
17. Concern about Japanese military intervention in the South China Sea was expressed as early as mid-1994. Unimpeded sea routes through the South China Sea have "a great bearing" on Japan's national economy since Japan "has to ship 80% of its oil imports through the South China Sea," which could lead Japan to decide to become involved in a conflict over the Spratlys. Japan's navy already "is strong enough to enter the South China Sea." Lin Mu, "The Aviation Dream of the Chinese People," Shidian, no. 7, July 8, 1994, FBIS, DR/CHI, August 24, 1994.
18. Concern about Japanese military intervention in the South China Sea was expressed as early as mid-1994. Unimpeded sea routes through the South China Sea have "a great bearing" on Japan's national economy since Japan "has to ship 80% of its oil imports through the South China Sea," which could lead Japan to decide to become involved in a conflict over the Spratlys. Japan's navy already "is strong enough to enter the South China Sea." Lin Mu, "The Aviation Dream of the Chinese People," Shidian, no. 7, July 8, 1994, FBIS, DR/CHI, August 24, 1994.
19. Zhou Jihua warned that the April 17, 1996, Joint Declaration on the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance has "opened the door for Japan speeding up the steps to 'build the forces in quality' . . . thus facilitating the Japanese forces to be armed with more sophisticated equipment and further strengthening their fighting capacity." "A New Starting Point of Japan-U.S. Military Alliance," pp. 27-28.
20. Zhang Guocheng, International Forum column, "Japan's Constitution Is Facing a Test."
21. Qian's comments were paraphrased by Chu Hsing-fu, "China and the United States Have Increased Mutual Understanding," Wen Wei Po, April 21, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 22 1996; "NHK News," April 22, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 23, 1996.
22. Qian's comments were paraphrased by Chu Hsing-fu, "China and the United States Have Increased Mutual Understanding," Wen Wei Po, April 21, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 22 1996; "NHK News," April 22, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 23, 1996.
23. Qian's comments were paraphrased by Chu Hsing-fu, "China and the United States Have Increased Mutual Understanding," Wen Wei Po, April 21, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 22 1996; "NHK News," April 22, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, April 23, 1996.
24. Chinese concern about the U.S.-Japan alliance was further exacerbated by the issuing on July 27, 1996, of the U.S.-Australia joint security declaration signed by Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and Defence Minister Ian McLachlan and their American counterparts, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense William Perry. A prominent Chinese institute director and Asia expert noted that the joint declaration was interpreted by Beijing as a strengthening of the U.S.-Australia alliance with the aim of restraining possible aggressive Chinese behavior in the South China Sea. He added that "you can draw a line through the [Asian] states with which the U.S. has alliances and military arrangements-they form an arc around China." 14. The Chinese apparently first raised the TMD issue directly with the Japanese government in January 1996. Japanese officials said in Beijing on January 15, 1996, that Chinese officials had urged Tokyo to exercise caution in its research program on defense against ballistic missiles during Sino-Japanese bilateral security talks that had just been held. Kyodo, January 15, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, January 16, 1996.
25. This concern was voiced in February 1995 by an unnamed senior Foreign Ministry official in an interview with Patrick Tyler of the New York Times, "China Warns Against 'Star Wars' Shield for U.S. Forces in Asia," February 18, 1995.
26. See Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control," International Security, 20:3 (Winter 1995/96), p. 73, fn. 39. One Chinese ballistic missile engineer maintained at an international conference in early 1996 that if THAAD can reliably engage targets with reentry velocities of 5 km/sec. - correspoonding to 3,000 km range missiles, which comprise nearly 80% of China's "strategic" arsenal - then from a technical standpoint, the system will have the ability to intercept targets traveling at 7 km/sec., that is ICBMs, including those of China.
27. Some Chinese commentators see the TMD proposal as part of a global BMD system similar to the SDI program initiated by the Reagan administration. Zhang Liang, for example, argues that "the present U.S. 'theater missile defense plan' represents an important link in the Clinton administration's security strategy, which will develop into a defense system similar to the 'Star Wars' program." "U.S. 'Star Wars' Program - Repeated Adjustments Carried Out to Ensure Nuclear Supremacy," Renmin ribao, July 15, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, 96-150.
28. Some Chinese commentators see the TMD proposal as part of a global BMD system similar to the SDI program initiated by the Reagan administration. Zhang Liang, for example, argues that "the present U.S. 'theater missile defense plan' represents an important link in the Clinton administration's security strategy, which will develop into a defense system similar to the 'Star Wars' program." "U.S. 'Star Wars' Program - Repeated Adjustments Carried Out to Ensure Nuclear Supremacy," Renmin ribao, July 15, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, 96-150.
29. See Liu Huaqiu, "Evaluation and Analysis of China's Nuclear Arms Control Policy," Xiandai Junshi, November 11, 1995, FBIS, DR/CHI, December 22, 1995, cited by Robert S. Ross, "Managing a Changing Relationship: China's Japan Policy in the 1990s," paper prepared for "Strategic Partner and . . . or Peer Competitor?" U.S. Army War College Annual Strategy Conference, Carlisle Barracks, April 23-25, 1996. Liu is the director of the arms control program in the Commission on Science and Technology in the National Defense (COSTIND). An unconfirmed report in the Japanese press in May 1996 claimed that in response to the U.S.-led TMD project for the region and especially the prospect of Taiwan developing its own missile capability against the mainland as well as acquiring TMD from the U.S., the Chinese leadership had decided to begin development of a Chinese TMD system. Masaur Soma, "Source on Developing Multistage Air Defense System," Sankei Shimbun, May 30, 1996, FBIS, DR/EAS, June 3, 1996.
30. See Liu Huaqiu, "Evaluation and Analysis of China's Nuclear Arms Control Policy," Xiandai Junshi, November 11, 1995, FBIS, DR/CHI, December 22, 1995, cited by Robert S. Ross, "Managing a Changing Relationship: China's Japan Policy in the 1990s," paper prepared for "Strategic Partner and . . . or Peer Competitor?" U.S. Army War College Annual Strategy Conference, Carlisle Barracks, April 23-25, 1996. Liu is the director of the arms control program in the Commission on Science and Technology in the National Defense (COSTIND). An unconfirmed report in the Japanese press in May 1996 claimed that in response to the U.S.-led TMD project for the region and especially the prospect of Taiwan developing its own missile capability against the mainland as well as acquiring TMD from the U.S., the Chinese leadership had decided to begin development of a Chinese TMD system. Masaur Soma, "Source on Developing Multistage Air Defense System," Sankei Shimbun, May 30, 1996, FBIS, DR/EAS, June 3, 1996.
31. See Liu Huaqiu, "Evaluation and Analysis of China's Nuclear Arms Control Policy," Xiandai Junshi, November 11, 1995, FBIS, DR/CHI, December 22, 1995, cited by Robert S. Ross, "Managing a Changing Relationship: China's Japan Policy in the 1990s," paper prepared for "Strategic Partner and . . . or Peer Competitor?" U.S. Army War College Annual Strategy Conference, Carlisle Barracks, April 23-25, 1996. Liu is the director of the arms control program in the Commission on Science and Technology in the National Defense (COSTIND). An unconfirmed report in the Japanese press in May 1996 claimed that in response to the U.S.-led TMD project for the region and especially the prospect of Taiwan developing its own missile capability against the mainland as well as acquiring TMD from the U.S., the Chinese leadership had decided to begin development of a Chinese TMD system. Masaur Soma, "Source on Developing Multistage Air Defense System," Sankei Shimbun, May 30, 1996, FBIS, DR/EAS, June 3, 1996.
32. See Liu Huaqiu, "Evaluation and Analysis of China's Nuclear Arms Control Policy," Xiandai Junshi, November 11, 1995, FBIS, DR/CHI, December 22, 1995, cited by Robert S. Ross, "Managing a Changing Relationship: China's Japan Policy in the 1990s," paper prepared for "Strategic Partner and . . . or Peer Competitor?" U.S. Army War College Annual Strategy Conference, Carlisle Barracks, April 23-25, 1996. Liu is the director of the arms control program in the Commission on Science and Technology in the National Defense (COSTIND). An unconfirmed report in the Japanese press in May 1996 claimed that in response to the U.S.-led TMD project for the region and especially the prospect of Taiwan developing its own missile capability against the mainland as well as acquiring TMD from the U.S., the Chinese leadership had decided to begin development of a Chinese TMD system. Masaur Soma, "Source on Developing Multistage Air Defense System," Sankei Shimbun, May 30, 1996, FBIS, DR/EAS, June 3, 1996.
33. See Liu Huaqiu, "Evaluation and Analysis of China's Nuclear Arms Control Policy," Xiandai Junshi, November 11, 1995, FBIS, DR/CHI, December 22, 1995, cited by Robert S. Ross, "Managing a Changing Relationship: China's Japan Policy in the 1990s," paper prepared for "Strategic Partner and . . . or Peer Competitor?" U.S. Army War College Annual Strategy Conference, Carlisle Barracks, April 23-25, 1996. Liu is the director of the arms control program in the Commission on Science and Technology in the National Defense (COSTIND). An unconfirmed report in the Japanese press in May 1996 claimed that in response to the U.S.-led TMD project for the region and especially the prospect of Taiwan developing its own missile capability against the mainland as well as acquiring TMD from the U.S., the Chinese leadership had decided to begin development of a Chinese TMD system. Masaur Soma, "Source on Developing Multistage Air Defense System," Sankei Shimbun, May 30, 1996, FBIS, DR/EAS, June 3, 1996.
34. "China Warns Against 'Star Wars' Shield."
35. Deputy director of the CICIR Northeast Asian Studies Division, Yang Bojiang, wrote that "it is evident that Japan is already on the road to becoming a high-tech conventional military power. Such a buildup," Yang added, "will produce a significant impact on the strategic balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region," "Okinawan Incident Complicates U.S.-Japan Ties," Beijing Review. December 11-17, 1995, p. 11.
36. Chen Lineng, "The Japanese Self-Defense Forces Are Marching Toward the 21st Century," Guoji Zhanwang, February 8, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, May 1, 1996.
37. Chen Lineng, "The Japanese Self-Defense Forces Are Marching Toward the 21st Century," Guoji Zhanwang, February 8, 1996, FBIS, DR/CHI, May 1, 1996.
38. Yang Xuejun, a researcher at the Chinese Society for Strategy and Management Research, asserted that the passage of the 1992 PKO bill by the Japanese Diet marked a turningpoint in Japan's long-term strategy to become a "world military power." "China's Focus and Strategy Toward Japan in Recent Years" [Jin Nian Lai Zhongguo Fangmian Guanzhu de Riben Zhongda Wenti Jiqi Duice], unpublished paper, Fall 1995.
39. According to Kyodo, an internal Chinese government report that was circulated among minister-level cadres of the Party, government and military asserted that Japan's current military buildup is the result of Tokyo's concern over potential military threats from China and North Korea and that such a buildup could eventually lead to a Japanese nuclear weapons program. The Chinese document reportedly maintained that Japan believes that although the U.S. has extended its security umbrella to Tokyo, it is still difficult to contain effectively the use of nuclear weapons in the region and that thus "in the future, Japan cannot completely depend on the U.S nuclear umbrella and as a pretext to protect itself from nuclear attack, it may begin to develop its own nuclear force," Kyodo, July 1, 1995, FBIS, DK/CHI, July 3, 1995.