Learning versus adaptation: Explaining change in Chinese arms control policy in the 1980s and 1990s

China Journal

Volumn , Issue 35, 1996, Pages 25-61

  Johnston, Alastair Iain ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 6244254202     PISSN: 13249347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2950275     Document Type: Article

References (128)

1. Bobby Herman, 'Norms and National Security: The Soviet Case', paper presented to SSRC Workshop on Norms and National Security, University of Minnesota, January 1994; Sarah E. Mendelson, 'Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan', World Politics, no.45 (April 1993); Emanuel Adler, 'The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control', International Organization, vol.46, no.1 (Winter 1992); Andrei Kortunov, 'Realism and Morality in Polities', in Anatoli Gromyko and Martin Hellman (eds), Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking (New York: Walker, 1988); Andrei Melville, 'Nuclear Revolution and the New Way of Thinking', in ibid.; Janice Gross Stein, 'Political Learning By Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp. 155-83.
2. Bobby Herman, 'Norms and National Security: The Soviet Case', paper presented to SSRC Workshop on Norms and National Security, University of Minnesota, January 1994; Sarah E. Mendelson, 'Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan', World Politics, no.45 (April 1993); Emanuel Adler, 'The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control', International Organization, vol.46, no.1 (Winter 1992); Andrei Kortunov, 'Realism and Morality in Polities', in Anatoli Gromyko and Martin Hellman (eds), Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking (New York: Walker, 1988); Andrei Melville, 'Nuclear Revolution and the New Way of Thinking', in ibid.; Janice Gross Stein, 'Political Learning By Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp. 155-83.
3. Bobby Herman, 'Norms and National Security: The Soviet Case', paper presented to SSRC Workshop on Norms and National Security, University of Minnesota, January 1994; Sarah E. Mendelson, 'Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan', World Politics, no.45 (April 1993); Emanuel Adler, 'The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control', International Organization, vol.46, no.1 (Winter 1992); Andrei Kortunov, 'Realism and Morality in Polities', in Anatoli Gromyko and Martin Hellman (eds), Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking (New York: Walker, 1988); Andrei Melville, 'Nuclear Revolution and the New Way of Thinking', in ibid.; Janice Gross Stein, 'Political Learning By Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp. 155-83.
4. Bobby Herman, 'Norms and National Security: The Soviet Case', paper presented to SSRC Workshop on Norms and National Security, University of Minnesota, January 1994; Sarah E. Mendelson, 'Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan', World Politics, no.45 (April 1993); Emanuel Adler, 'The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control', International Organization, vol.46, no.1 (Winter 1992); Andrei Kortunov, 'Realism and Morality in Polities', in Anatoli Gromyko and Martin Hellman (eds), Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking (New York: Walker, 1988); Andrei Melville, 'Nuclear Revolution and the New Way of Thinking', in ibid.; Janice Gross Stein, 'Political Learning By Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp. 155-83.
5. Bobby Herman, 'Norms and National Security: The Soviet Case', paper presented to SSRC Workshop on Norms and National Security, University of Minnesota, January 1994; Sarah E. Mendelson, 'Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan', World Politics, no.45 (April 1993); Emanuel Adler, 'The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control', International Organization, vol.46, no.1 (Winter 1992); Andrei Kortunov, 'Realism and Morality in Polities', in Anatoli Gromyko and Martin Hellman (eds), Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking (New York: Walker, 1988); Andrei Melville, 'Nuclear Revolution and the New Way of Thinking', in ibid.; Janice Gross Stein, 'Political Learning By Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp. 155-83.
6. Bobby Herman, 'Norms and National Security: The Soviet Case', paper presented to SSRC Workshop on Norms and National Security, University of Minnesota, January 1994; Sarah E. Mendelson, 'Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan', World Politics, no.45 (April 1993); Emanuel Adler, 'The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control', International Organization, vol.46, no.1 (Winter 1992); Andrei Kortunov, 'Realism and Morality in Polities', in Anatoli Gromyko and Martin Hellman (eds), Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking (New York: Walker, 1988); Andrei Melville, 'Nuclear Revolution and the New Way of Thinking', in ibid.; Janice Gross Stein, 'Political Learning By Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp. 155-83.
7. See Matthew Evangelista, 'Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy', in Philip Tetlock et al., Behaviour, Society and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Matthew Evangelista, 'The Paradox of State Strength: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet Union', International Organization, vol.49, no.1 (January 1995), pp.1-38; Stein, 'Political Learning'; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'.
8. See Matthew Evangelista, 'Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy', in Philip Tetlock et al., Behaviour, Society and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Matthew Evangelista, 'The Paradox of State Strength: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet Union', International Organization, vol.49, no.1 (January 1995), pp.1-38; Stein, 'Political Learning'; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'.
9. See Matthew Evangelista, 'Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy', in Philip Tetlock et al., Behaviour, Society and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Matthew Evangelista, 'The Paradox of State Strength: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet Union', International Organization, vol.49, no.1 (January 1995), pp.1-38; Stein, 'Political Learning'; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'.
10. See Matthew Evangelista, 'Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy', in Philip Tetlock et al., Behaviour, Society and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Matthew Evangelista, 'The Paradox of State Strength: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet Union', International Organization, vol.49, no.1 (January 1995), pp.1-38; Stein, 'Political Learning'; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'.
11. Learning theory is hot. In the last few years, the number of studies in the international relations field addressing learning has mushroomed. See Joseph S. Nye, 'Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes', International Organization, vol.41, no.3 (Summer 1987); Philip Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept', in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (eds), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Jack Levy, 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp.279-312; Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Celeste Wallander, Opportunity, Incrementalism, and Learning in the Extension and Retraction of Soviet Global Committments', Security Studies, vol.1, no.3 (Spring 1992); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Yaacov V. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Dan Reiter, 'Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past', World Politics, 46 (July 1994), pp.490-526; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Stein, 'Political Learning'; and Mendelson, 'Internal Battles'.
12. Learning theory is hot. In the last few years, the number of studies in the international relations field addressing learning has mushroomed. See Joseph S. Nye, 'Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes', International Organization, vol.41, no.3 (Summer 1987); Philip Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept', in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (eds), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Jack Levy, 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp.279-312; Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Celeste Wallander, Opportunity, Incrementalism, and Learning in the Extension and Retraction of Soviet Global Committments', Security Studies, vol.1, no.3 (Spring 1992); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Yaacov V. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Dan Reiter, 'Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past', World Politics, 46 (July 1994), pp.490-526; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Stein, 'Political Learning'; and Mendelson, 'Internal Battles'.
13. Learning theory is hot. In the last few years, the number of studies in the international relations field addressing learning has mushroomed. See Joseph S. Nye, 'Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes', International Organization, vol.41, no.3 (Summer 1987); Philip Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept', in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (eds), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Jack Levy, 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp.279-312; Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Celeste Wallander, Opportunity, Incrementalism, and Learning in the Extension and Retraction of Soviet Global Committments', Security Studies, vol.1, no.3 (Spring 1992); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Yaacov V. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Dan Reiter, 'Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past', World Politics, 46 (July 1994), pp.490-526; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Stein, 'Political Learning'; and Mendelson, 'Internal Battles'.
14. Learning theory is hot. In the last few years, the number of studies in the international relations field addressing learning has mushroomed. See Joseph S. Nye, 'Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes', International Organization, vol.41, no.3 (Summer 1987); Philip Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept', in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (eds), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Jack Levy, 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp.279-312; Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Celeste Wallander, Opportunity, Incrementalism, and Learning in the Extension and Retraction of Soviet Global Committments', Security Studies, vol.1, no.3 (Spring 1992); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Yaacov V. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Dan Reiter, 'Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past', World Politics, 46 (July 1994), pp.490-526; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Stein, 'Political Learning'; and Mendelson, 'Internal Battles'.
15. Learning theory is hot. In the last few years, the number of studies in the international relations field addressing learning has mushroomed. See Joseph S. Nye, 'Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes', International Organization, vol.41, no.3 (Summer 1987); Philip Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept', in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (eds), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Jack Levy, 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp.279-312; Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Celeste Wallander, Opportunity, Incrementalism, and Learning in the Extension and Retraction of Soviet Global Committments', Security Studies, vol.1, no.3 (Spring 1992); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Yaacov V. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Dan Reiter, 'Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past', World Politics, 46 (July 1994), pp.490-526; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Stein, 'Political Learning'; and Mendelson, 'Internal Battles'.
16. Learning theory is hot. In the last few years, the number of studies in the international relations field addressing learning has mushroomed. See Joseph S. Nye, 'Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes', International Organization, vol.41, no.3 (Summer 1987); Philip Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept', in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (eds), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Jack Levy, 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp.279-312; Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Celeste Wallander, Opportunity, Incrementalism, and Learning in the Extension and Retraction of Soviet Global Committments', Security Studies, vol.1, no.3 (Spring 1992); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Yaacov V. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Dan Reiter, 'Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past', World Politics, 46 (July 1994), pp.490-526; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Stein, 'Political Learning'; and Mendelson, 'Internal Battles'.
17. Learning theory is hot. In the last few years, the number of studies in the international relations field addressing learning has mushroomed. See Joseph S. Nye, 'Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes', International Organization, vol.41, no.3 (Summer 1987); Philip Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept', in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (eds), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Jack Levy, 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp.279-312; Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Celeste Wallander, Opportunity, Incrementalism, and Learning in the Extension and Retraction of Soviet Global Committments', Security Studies, vol.1, no.3 (Spring 1992); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Yaacov V. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Dan Reiter, 'Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past', World Politics, 46 (July 1994), pp.490-526; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Stein, 'Political Learning'; and Mendelson, 'Internal Battles'.
18. Learning theory is hot. In the last few years, the number of studies in the international relations field addressing learning has mushroomed. See Joseph S. Nye, 'Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes', International Organization, vol.41, no.3 (Summer 1987); Philip Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept', in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (eds), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Jack Levy, 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp.279-312; Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Celeste Wallander, Opportunity, Incrementalism, and Learning in the Extension and Retraction of Soviet Global Committments', Security Studies, vol.1, no.3 (Spring 1992); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Yaacov V. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Dan Reiter, 'Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past', World Politics, 46 (July 1994), pp.490-526; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Stein, 'Political Learning'; and Mendelson, 'Internal Battles'.
19. Learning theory is hot. In the last few years, the number of studies in the international relations field addressing learning has mushroomed. See Joseph S. Nye, 'Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes', International Organization, vol.41, no.3 (Summer 1987); Philip Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept', in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (eds), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Jack Levy, 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp.279-312; Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Celeste Wallander, Opportunity, Incrementalism, and Learning in the Extension and Retraction of Soviet Global Committments', Security Studies, vol.1, no.3 (Spring 1992); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Yaacov V. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Dan Reiter, 'Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past', World Politics, 46 (July 1994), pp.490-526; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Stein, 'Political Learning'; and Mendelson, 'Internal Battles'.
20. Learning theory is hot. In the last few years, the number of studies in the international relations field addressing learning has mushroomed. See Joseph S. Nye, 'Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes', International Organization, vol.41, no.3 (Summer 1987); Philip Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept', in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (eds), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Jack Levy, 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp.279-312; Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Celeste Wallander, Opportunity, Incrementalism, and Learning in the Extension and Retraction of Soviet Global Committments', Security Studies, vol.1, no.3 (Spring 1992); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Yaacov V. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Dan Reiter, 'Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past', World Politics, 46 (July 1994), pp.490-526; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Stein, 'Political Learning'; and Mendelson, 'Internal Battles'.
21. Learning theory is hot. In the last few years, the number of studies in the international relations field addressing learning has mushroomed. See Joseph S. Nye, 'Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes', International Organization, vol.41, no.3 (Summer 1987); Philip Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept', in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (eds), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Jack Levy, 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield', International Organization, vol.48, no.2 (Spring 1994), pp.279-312; Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Celeste Wallander, Opportunity, Incrementalism, and Learning in the Extension and Retraction of Soviet Global Committments', Security Studies, vol.1, no.3 (Spring 1992); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Yaacov V. I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); Dan Reiter, 'Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past', World Politics, 46 (July 1994), pp.490-526; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Stein, 'Political Learning'; and Mendelson, 'Internal Battles'.
22. Stein, 'Political Learning', pp.158-9; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'.
23. Stein, 'Political Learning', pp.158-9; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'.
24. This is essentially what the literature on democratic security communities argues - namely, that democracies identify other democracies as states which prefer to resolve conflicts through mediation and compromise, and hence are non-threatening. See Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
25. This is essentially what the literature on democratic security communities argues - namely, that democracies identify other democracies as states which prefer to resolve conflicts through mediation and compromise, and hence are non-threatening. See Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
26. On the policy process behind China's involvment in international economic and environmental institutions, see Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg, China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990) and Elizabeth Economy, 'Negotiating the Terrain of Global Climate Change Policy in the Soviet Union and China: Linking International and Domestic Decisionmaking Pathways', PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1994.
27. On the policy process behind China's involvment in international economic and environmental institutions, see Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg, China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990) and Elizabeth Economy, 'Negotiating the Terrain of Global Climate Change Policy in the Soviet Union and China: Linking International and Domestic Decisionmaking Pathways', PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1994.
28. The figure comes from the US Department of Defense, East Asia Strategy Review (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, February 1995).
29. 8 Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1987), pp.254-63.
30. The hard realpolitik and idealpolitik extremes correspond roughly to what Joe Hagan calls acquiescent and radical foreign policy orientations respectively. See Joe D. Hagan, 'Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness', Mershon International Studies Review, vol.38, no.2 (October 1994), pp.200-1.
31. I do not explore this incremental learning in this paper, as my interest here is whether the more substantive behavioural shifts in the 1980s and 1990s constitute learning on the basis of new information introduced by transnational linkages. In a later study I will examine the nature of the new information that might account for this slight shift in the Dengist central paradigm in the late 1970s and early 1980s. For a discussion of the sources of Maoist strategic culture, see Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Cultural Realism and Strategy in Mao's China', in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, forthcoming).
32. The literature emphasizes the role of expert communities in diffusing new cause-effect understandings of the world. The central paradigm is, in essence, a model of these causal understandings. See Adler, 'The Emergence of Cooperation'; Haas, When Knowledge is Power; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Evangelista, 'The Paradox of State Strength'; Peter Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and Internationa] Policy Coordination', International Organization, vol.46, no.1 (Winter 1992); and Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
33. The literature emphasizes the role of expert communities in diffusing new cause-effect understandings of the world. The central paradigm is, in essence, a model of these causal understandings. See Adler, 'The Emergence of Cooperation'; Haas, When Knowledge is Power; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Evangelista, 'The Paradox of State Strength'; Peter Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and Internationa] Policy Coordination', International Organization, vol.46, no.1 (Winter 1992); and Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
34. The literature emphasizes the role of expert communities in diffusing new cause-effect understandings of the world. The central paradigm is, in essence, a model of these causal understandings. See Adler, 'The Emergence of Cooperation'; Haas, When Knowledge is Power; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Evangelista, 'The Paradox of State Strength'; Peter Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and Internationa] Policy Coordination', International Organization, vol.46, no.1 (Winter 1992); and Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
35. The literature emphasizes the role of expert communities in diffusing new cause-effect understandings of the world. The central paradigm is, in essence, a model of these causal understandings. See Adler, 'The Emergence of Cooperation'; Haas, When Knowledge is Power; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Evangelista, 'The Paradox of State Strength'; Peter Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and Internationa] Policy Coordination', International Organization, vol.46, no.1 (Winter 1992); and Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
36. The literature emphasizes the role of expert communities in diffusing new cause-effect understandings of the world. The central paradigm is, in essence, a model of these causal understandings. See Adler, 'The Emergence of Cooperation'; Haas, When Knowledge is Power; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Evangelista, 'The Paradox of State Strength'; Peter Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and Internationa] Policy Coordination', International Organization, vol.46, no.1 (Winter 1992); and Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
37. The literature emphasizes the role of expert communities in diffusing new cause-effect understandings of the world. The central paradigm is, in essence, a model of these causal understandings. See Adler, 'The Emergence of Cooperation'; Haas, When Knowledge is Power; Herman, 'Norms and National Security'; Evangelista, 'The Paradox of State Strength'; Peter Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and Internationa] Policy Coordination', International Organization, vol.46, no.1 (Winter 1992); and Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
38. See, for instance, Zhuang Qubing, 'Meiguo xinqiu da zhan lihua pouxi' [Analysis of the US Star Wars Plan], Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], no.4 (October 1984); He Qizhi, 'Jiaqiang zhizhi waikong junbei jingai de falu cuoshi' [Strengthen the Legal Measures that Prevent an Arms Race in Space], Guoji wenti yanjiu, no.4 (October 1984); Wu Zhan, 'Shilun zhanlue jingong wuqi' [Preliminary Discussion of Strategic Offensive Weapons], Meiguo yanjiu cankao ziliao [Reference Materials on American Studies], no.7 (1985).
39. See, for instance, Zhuang Qubing, 'Meiguo xinqiu da zhan lihua pouxi' [Analysis of the US Star Wars Plan], Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], no.4 (October 1984); He Qizhi, 'Jiaqiang zhizhi waikong junbei jingai de falu cuoshi' [Strengthen the Legal Measures that Prevent an Arms Race in Space], Guoji wenti yanjiu, no.4 (October 1984); Wu Zhan, 'Shilun zhanlue jingong wuqi' [Preliminary Discussion of Strategic Offensive Weapons], Meiguo yanjiu cankao ziliao [Reference Materials on American Studies], no.7 (1985).
40. See, for instance, Zhuang Qubing, 'Meiguo xinqiu da zhan lihua pouxi' [Analysis of the US Star Wars Plan], Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], no.4 (October 1984); He Qizhi, 'Jiaqiang zhizhi waikong junbei jingai de falu cuoshi' [Strengthen the Legal Measures that Prevent an Arms Race in Space], Guoji wenti yanjiu, no.4 (October 1984); Wu Zhan, 'Shilun zhanlue jingong wuqi' [Preliminary Discussion of Strategic Offensive Weapons], Meiguo yanjiu cankao ziliao [Reference Materials on American Studies], no.7 (1985).
41. The data for Chinese participation in the First Committee are based on a list of First Committee resolutions and Chinese voting behaviour for 1980, 1985, 1990 put together by Alison Alten, 'Selected Assimilation: China's UN Diplomacy in the 1980s', MA thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1994.
42. These data derive from delegation name lists from 1980 to 1993.
43. I include here all articles whose main topic is arms control that appeared from 1983 to 1993 in four key international relations journals: Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], the journal of the Ministry of Foreign Affair's think-tank, the Institute of International Relations; Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], the journal of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the Ministry of State Security's think-tank; Guoji zhanlue [International Strategy], the journal of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies; and Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], the journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Science's Institute of World Economics and Politics.
44. I include here all articles whose main topic is arms control that appeared from 1983 to 1993 in four key international relations journals: Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], the journal of the Ministry of Foreign Affair's think-tank, the Institute of International Relations; Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], the journal of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the Ministry of State Security's think-tank; Guoji zhanlue [International Strategy], the journal of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies; and Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], the journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Science's Institute of World Economics and Politics.
45. I include here all articles whose main topic is arms control that appeared from 1983 to 1993 in four key international relations journals: Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], the journal of the Ministry of Foreign Affair's think-tank, the Institute of International Relations; Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], the journal of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the Ministry of State Security's think-tank; Guoji zhanlue [International Strategy], the journal of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies; and Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], the journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Science's Institute of World Economics and Politics.
46. I include here all articles whose main topic is arms control that appeared from 1983 to 1993 in four key international relations journals: Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], the journal of the Ministry of Foreign Affair's think-tank, the Institute of International Relations; Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], the journal of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the Ministry of State Security's think-tank; Guoji zhanlue [International Strategy], the journal of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies; and Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], the journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Science's Institute of World Economics and Politics.
47. This list includes the participants in the first major inter-agency conference on arms control held in October 1986, those who have attended the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO) arms control seminars in the 1990s, and those who participated in arms control-related meetings with the Natural Resource Defense Council, the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Federation of American Scientists, and the National Academy of Sciences. I have no doubt missed many international meetings with non-American specialists and still secret conferences. So this list is most likely a low estimate. This list included attendees only; as for those who work full time on arms control in Beijing, one Chinese arms control specialist who has played a critical role in building this arms control community puts this figure at just over 100.
48. Those on more than one list are only counted once. This does not figure in any deaths in this community. Any such number is hard to ascertain.
49. Obviously, this figure undercounts the total number of Chinese commentators on arms control, since I have not included articles prior to 1983. But the graph does give a sense of the growth of the number of analysts writing on the subject after the Chinese government began to develop more comprehensive, less dismissive, positions on global arms control after it entered the Conference on Disarmament in 1980.
50. According to a US government expert on China's arms control policy, the only office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose budget was increased in 1993-94 was the International Organization Division, and along with it the si chu (Interview, September 1994).
51. A few of the military experts on arms control served in the General Staff Department, had experience as foreign military attaches, and were attached at some point to the Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies. One can assume, then, that they were connected with the General Staffs military intelligence office, the Second Department (G-2). It appears that G-2 officers and other PLA personnel have been seconded to the Fourth Division to gain expertise on arms control (Interviews, July 1994, October 1995).
52. The following discussion relies heavily on personal interviews and conversations with Chinese arms controllers associated with China's nuclear weapons program.
53. The conference drew together experts from the Institute of World Economics and Politics, the Strategic Studies Institute at the National Defense University, the Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies, the State Council's Centre for International Studies, COSTIND's Information Centre, and the Academy of Military Science's Operations Research Institute. Apparently smaller scale, higher level inter-agency groups dealing with arms control did exist in the early 1980s. One source claimed that China's June 1982 proposal that the US and Soviet governments agree to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads by 50 per cent before China would consider entering multilateral strategic arms control negotiations was developed by the PLA General Staff Department's G-2, but approved by an inter-agency group consisting of representatives from the General Staff, National Defense Science and Technology Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interview, June 1994).
54. For instance, according to Wang Shuzhong from the Institute of World Economics and Politics, China's 'leftist' denunciations of arms control in the past had led to poor analysis. As a result China's policies in the 1970s had been 'limited to a few basic principles and lacked initiative and flexibility'. See Wang, 'Caijun douzheng yu ji ge renshi wenti' [Disarmament Struggle and a Few Questions of Understanding], in Guoji caijun douzheng yu Zhongguo [The International Disarmament Struggle and China] (Beijing: Shishi Press, 1987), p.86. These policies had hindered China from developing reponses to the widening array of arms control issues it was forced to confront as a result of its engagement in multilateral institutions like the Conference on Disarmament. Ibid., p.69.
55. For instance, according to Wang Shuzhong from the Institute of World Economics and Politics, China's 'leftist' denunciations of arms control in the past had led to poor analysis. As a result China's policies in the 1970s had been 'limited to a few basic principles and lacked initiative and flexibility'. See Wang, 'Caijun douzheng yu ji ge renshi wenti' [Disarmament Struggle and a Few Questions of Understanding], in Guoji caijun douzheng yu Zhongguo [The International Disarmament Struggle and China] (Beijing: Shishi Press, 1987), p.86. These policies had hindered China from developing reponses to the widening array of arms control issues it was forced to confront as a result of its engagement in multilateral institutions like the Conference on Disarmament. Ibid., p.69.
56. These meetings were variously sponsored by the IAPCM, the Beijing Institute for Systems Engineering and the Arms Control Program in COSTIND's Information Centre.
57. These have drawn on experts from from the Institute of International Relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the PLA's Strategic Missile Forces, the Ninth Academy, the Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering, the IAPCM, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Program in the COSTIND Information Centre (Interviews, April, June and August 1994).
58. These take the form of 'preliminary meetings', or VVM xu hui. These are inter-agency meetings called to discuss the implications of a new international issue as the first step in devising a policy response. These particular wu xu hui usually included about 30-40 people from different agencies (Interview, June 1993).
59. Wang Yang (ed.), Mei Su junbei jingsai yu kongzhi yanjiu [Research in the US-Soviet Arms Race and Arms Control] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 1993), pp.292, 349.
60. Chinese arms controllers specifically called for establishing these linkages in the mid-1980s. At the 1986 inter-agency conference, for instance, CICIR researchers recommended that China create a cadre of arms control specialists with expanded contacts with foreign experts, and that to this end they should also dispatch a small number of researchers to Western arms control institutes for training. Huang and Song, 'Dang qian guoji caijun douzheng', p.7.
61. In 1984, for instance, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency officials inaugurated regular briefings of Chinese Foreign Ministry and military officials on the US-Soviet arms control process. Not to be outdone, in 1986 the Soviets began dispatching arms control officials to brief the Chinese as well. See Jag Mohan Malik, 'Chinese National Security and Nuclear Arms Control 1978-1988', PhD dissertation, Australia National University, Canberra, 1990, pp.49-50. Since the June 1989 crackdown there have been limited contacts between arms controllers in the American and Chinese nuclear weapons labs. Experts on verification and non-proliferation from Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos have attended arms control seminars in China that are also attended by most of the arms controllers within the Ninth Academy system. The US government continues an ongoing dialogue with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the missile technology control regime and other non-proliferation regimes.
62. Three of these entailed the participation of NRDC scientists in the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO) arms control seminars held in Beijing in 1990, 1992, and 1994, and one an NRDC-sponsored meeting with Chinese nuclear scientists in June 1993 to discuss the Comprehensive Test Ban. One of the NRDC's goals in these contacts is to recreate the same process of technical cooperation that it managed with the Soviets in the late 1980s.
63. These activities have been funded in part by a grant to the IAPCM from the U.S.-based MacArthur Foundation precisely for this kind of transnational network building.
64. Federation of American Scientists, Public Interest Report: Arms Control in South Asia, vol.47, no.2 (March/April 1994). A follow-up conference was held in India in December 1994 at which a compendium of specific steps for regional and global nuclear arms control was discussed.
65. While one senior Chinese specialist objected that the radius of the freeze would include terrain useful for hiding Chinese missiles, another younger expert expressed an interest in exploring the idea further (Interview, June 1994).
66. Huang and Song, 'Dangqian guoji caijun douzheng', p.7; Pan, 'Dangqian guoji caijun douzheng xingshi', p.25.
67. Huang and Song, 'Dangqian guoji caijun douzheng', p.7; Pan, 'Dangqian guoji caijun douzheng xingshi', p.25.
68. This refers to Deng's 'strategic decision' in 1985 to shift the guiding doctrine of China's military modernization from preparation for an 'early, large scale and nuclear war' to preparation for a somewhat more peaceful environment where conflict would be limited to local, small-scale wars.
69. Jin Min, 'Shilun caijun tanpan de juece kexuehua' [Preliminary Discussion of Scientization of Decisions in Disarmament Negotiations], in Guoji caijun douzheng yu Zhongguo [The International Disarmament Struggle and China] (Beijing: Shishi Press, 1987), p.261;
70. Dian Weiguo 'Dui Sulian Yazhou caijun de chubu fenxi' [Preliminary Analysis of the Soviet Union's Disarmament in Asia] in Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], no.9 (1987), p.44.
71. See Pan, 'Dangqian guoji caijun douzheng xingshi', p.27.
72. Jin Min, 'Shilun caijun tanpan', p.262.
73. 'New world order' is also too close to George Bush's term, and thus connotes a system in which a hegemon is the primary impetus behind this order. So, too, Chinese analysts do not like the term 'new thinking' (xin siwei), as it is too closely identified with Gorbachev's dismantling of Communist rule in the Soviet Union. See the talk given by Gao Di, editor of Renmin ribao, to CCP cadres shortly after the 1991 coup attempt in the USSR. Gao Di, 'Problems Posed by the Soviet Situation', translated in The China Quarterly, no.130 (June 1992), p.483.
74. Li Shisheng, 'Guanyu guoji xin zhixu jige wenti de tantao' [Discussion of Several Questions Relating to the New International Order], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.10 (1992) pp.43-4.
75. Zhao Huaipu and Lu Yang, 'Quanli zhengzhi yu xianghu yicun' [Power politics and interdependence] in Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.7 (1993), pp.36-41; Gu Yan, 'Duli zizhu shi Mao Zedong waijiao sixiang de linghun' [Independence and Self-Reliance are the Spirit of Mao Zedong's Foreign Policy Thinking], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.2 (1994), pp.30-3. Another form of this attack on new thinking is a criticism of the idea that the interests of humankind should take precedence over class, group and national interests. See Liu Kaitong, 'Suo wei he shidai luoji yu dang jin shijie xianshi' [So-Called Logic of the Nuclear Age and the Realities of the Present World], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.12 (1990), pp.31-5. For an insightful discussion of the Westphalian hyper-sovereignist principles at the core of Chinese foreign policy, see Samuel S. Kim, 'China In and Out of the Changing World Order', World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No.21, Princeton University (1991). This is not to deny there are debates within China's international relations community between realpolitik and more interdependent views of world politics. See Wang Jianwei and Lin Zhimin, 'Chinese Perceptions in the Post-Cold War Era', Asian Survey, vol.32, no.10 (October 1992), pp.902-17 for a summary of the range of views.
76. Zhao Huaipu and Lu Yang, 'Quanli zhengzhi yu xianghu yicun' [Power politics and interdependence] in Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.7 (1993), pp.36-41; Gu Yan, 'Duli zizhu shi Mao Zedong waijiao sixiang de linghun' [Independence and Self-Reliance are the Spirit of Mao Zedong's Foreign Policy Thinking], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.2 (1994), pp.30-3. Another form of this attack on new thinking is a criticism of the idea that the interests of humankind should take precedence over class, group and national interests. See Liu Kaitong, 'Suo wei he shidai luoji yu dang jin shijie xianshi' [So-Called Logic of the Nuclear Age and the Realities of the Present World], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.12 (1990), pp.31-5. For an insightful discussion of the Westphalian hyper-sovereignist principles at the core of Chinese foreign policy, see Samuel S. Kim, 'China In and Out of the Changing World Order', World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No.21, Princeton University (1991). This is not to deny there are debates within China's international relations community between realpolitik and more interdependent views of world politics. See Wang Jianwei and Lin Zhimin, 'Chinese Perceptions in the Post-Cold War Era', Asian Survey, vol.32, no.10 (October 1992), pp.902-17 for a summary of the range of views.
77. Zhao Huaipu and Lu Yang, 'Quanli zhengzhi yu xianghu yicun' [Power politics and interdependence] in Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.7 (1993), pp.36-41; Gu Yan, 'Duli zizhu shi Mao Zedong waijiao sixiang de linghun' [Independence and Self-Reliance are the Spirit of Mao Zedong's Foreign Policy Thinking], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.2 (1994), pp.30-3. Another form of this attack on new thinking is a criticism of the idea that the interests of humankind should take precedence over class, group and national interests. See Liu Kaitong, 'Suo wei he shidai luoji yu dang jin shijie xianshi' [So-Called Logic of the Nuclear Age and the Realities of the Present World], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.12 (1990), pp.31-5. For an insightful discussion of the Westphalian hyper-sovereignist principles at the core of Chinese foreign policy, see Samuel S. Kim, 'China In and Out of the Changing World Order', World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No.21, Princeton University (1991). This is not to deny there are debates within China's international relations community between realpolitik and more interdependent views of world politics. See Wang Jianwei and Lin Zhimin, 'Chinese Perceptions in the Post-Cold War Era', Asian Survey, vol.32, no.10 (October 1992), pp.902-17 for a summary of the range of views.
78. Zhao Huaipu and Lu Yang, 'Quanli zhengzhi yu xianghu yicun' [Power politics and interdependence] in Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.7 (1993), pp.36-41; Gu Yan, 'Duli zizhu shi Mao Zedong waijiao sixiang de linghun' [Independence and Self-Reliance are the Spirit of Mao Zedong's Foreign Policy Thinking], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.2 (1994), pp.30-3. Another form of this attack on new thinking is a criticism of the idea that the interests of humankind should take precedence over class, group and national interests. See Liu Kaitong, 'Suo wei he shidai luoji yu dang jin shijie xianshi' [So-Called Logic of the Nuclear Age and the Realities of the Present World], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.12 (1990), pp.31-5. For an insightful discussion of the Westphalian hyper-sovereignist principles at the core of Chinese foreign policy, see Samuel S. Kim, 'China In and Out of the Changing World Order', World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No.21, Princeton University (1991). This is not to deny there are debates within China's international relations community between realpolitik and more interdependent views of world politics. See Wang Jianwei and Lin Zhimin, 'Chinese Perceptions in the Post-Cold War Era', Asian Survey, vol.32, no.10 (October 1992), pp.902-17 for a summary of the range of views.
79. Zhao Huaipu and Lu Yang, 'Quanli zhengzhi yu xianghu yicun' [Power politics and interdependence] in Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.7 (1993), pp.36-41; Gu Yan, 'Duli zizhu shi Mao Zedong waijiao sixiang de linghun' [Independence and Self-Reliance are the Spirit of Mao Zedong's Foreign Policy Thinking], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.2 (1994), pp.30-3. Another form of this attack on new thinking is a criticism of the idea that the interests of humankind should take precedence over class, group and national interests. See Liu Kaitong, 'Suo wei he shidai luoji yu dang jin shijie xianshi' [So-Called Logic of the Nuclear Age and the Realities of the Present World], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, no.12 (1990), pp.31-5. For an insightful discussion of the Westphalian hyper-sovereignist principles at the core of Chinese foreign policy, see Samuel S. Kim, 'China In and Out of the Changing World Order', World Order Studies Program Occasional Paper No.21, Princeton University (1991). This is not to deny there are debates within China's international relations community between realpolitik and more interdependent views of world politics. See Wang Jianwei and Lin Zhimin, 'Chinese Perceptions in the Post-Cold War Era', Asian Survey, vol.32, no.10 (October 1992), pp.902-17 for a summary of the range of views.
80. Wang, Met Su junbei jingsai, pp.231-2. The logic of this argument would suggest that China should support arms control that places asymmetrical restrictions on the capabilities of more technologically advanced states, and should only agree to substantive arms control commitments once it achieves technological parity with its primary rivals. In fact, this is a pretty good description of the Chinese approach to arms control. The term 'cooperative security' has entered the vocabulary of Chinese arms controllers, but according to one young arms controller in COSTIND, cooperative security begins with improvements in the bilateral relations between states and includes reciprocated unilateral actions. It does not involve multilateral conventions, nor transparency on the part of weaker states (like China). See Zheng Hua, 'Some Preliminary Reflections on Cooperative Security', paper presented to the Union of Concerned Scientists Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, Cambridge Mass., June 1993.
81. Wang, Met Su junbei jingsai, pp.231-2. The logic of this argument would suggest that China should support arms control that places asymmetrical restrictions on the capabilities of more technologically advanced states, and should only agree to substantive arms control commitments once it achieves technological parity with its primary rivals. In fact, this is a pretty good description of the Chinese approach to arms control. The term 'cooperative security' has entered the vocabulary of Chinese arms controllers, but according to one young arms controller in COSTIND, cooperative security begins with improvements in the bilateral relations between states and includes reciprocated unilateral actions. It does not involve multilateral conventions, nor transparency on the part of weaker states (like China). See Zheng Hua, 'Some Preliminary Reflections on Cooperative Security', paper presented to the Union of Concerned Scientists Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, Cambridge Mass., June 1993.
82. Conference on Disarmament Final Record (hereafter CD/PV), No.293 (6 February 1982), p.50.
83. Samuel S. Kim, 'Chinese Global Policy: An Assessment', in James Hsiung and Samuel S. Kim (eds), China in the Global Community (New York: Praeger, 1980), p.230.
84. Yu Zhiyong, 'Guanyu he bu kuosan tiaoyue ruogan wenti de zai renshi' [Additional Thoughts on Several Questions Relating to the Non-Proliferation Treaty], in Shijiejingji yu zhengzhi, no.6 (1988), pp.38-9.
85. Ibid., p.40.
86. Interview, April 1994.
87. See Huang Zhijian, 'He kuosan - yi ge riyi yingi shijie ren guangzhu de wenti' [Nuclear non-proliferation - a question that increasingly draws the attention of the people of the world], Shijie jingi yu zhangzhi, no.7 (1992), p.48.
88. Indefinite extension was favoured by Western states, including the nuclear powers. The argument was that the principles of non-proliferation would be institutionalized for all time. A finite extension of 25 years was favoured by several key developing states which argued that states needed the opportunity to review the treaty regularly to see how well the nuclear states were living up to their commitment under Article VI to reduce their nuclear arsenals. On various extension proposals, see Acronym, no.3 (September 1994). For a discussion of the issues behind the treaty's extension, see George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev, 'Avoiding the "Definition" Pitfall to a Comprehensive Test Ban', Arms Control Today (May 1993), pp.15-18; Lewis A. Dunn, 'NPT 1995: Time to Shift Gears', Arms Control Today (November 1993), pp.14-19. For an account of China's position during the review conference, see Acronym, no.4 (September 1994), 'NPT Update # 3' (19 April 1995) and 'NPT Update # 20 (12 May 1995), in Nuclear Proliferation News, no.25 (24 May 1995).
89. Indefinite extension was favoured by Western states, including the nuclear powers. The argument was that the principles of non-proliferation would be institutionalized for all time. A finite extension of 25 years was favoured by several key developing states which argued that states needed the opportunity
90. Indefinite extension was favoured by Western states, including the nuclear powers. The argument was that the principles of non-proliferation would be institutionalized for all time. A finite extension of 25 years was favoured by several key developing states which argued that states needed the opportunity to review the treaty regularly to see how well the nuclear states were living up to their commitment under Article VI to reduce their nuclear arsenals. On various extension proposals, see Acronym, no.3 (September 1994). For a discussion of the issues behind the treaty's extension, see George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev, 'Avoiding the "Definition" Pitfall to a Comprehensive Test Ban', Arms Control Today (May 1993), pp.15-18; Lewis A. Dunn, 'NPT 1995: Time to Shift Gears', Arms Control Today (November 1993), pp.14-19. For an account of China's position during the review conference, see Acronym, no.4 (September 1994), 'NPT Update # 3' (19 April 1995) and 'NPT Update # 20 (12 May 1995), in Nuclear Proliferation News, no.25 (24 May 1995).
91. Indefinite extension was favoured by Western states, including the nuclear powers. The argument was that the principles of non-proliferation would be institutionalized for all time. A finite extension of 25 years was favoured by several key developing states which argued that states needed the opportunity to review the treaty regularly to see how well the nuclear states were living up to their commitment under Article VI to reduce their nuclear arsenals. On various extension proposals, see Acronym, no.3 (September 1994). For a discussion of the issues behind the treaty's extension, see George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev, 'Avoiding the "Definition" Pitfall to a Comprehensive Test Ban', Arms Control Today (May 1993), pp.15-18; Lewis A. Dunn, 'NPT 1995: Time to Shift Gears', Arms Control Today (November 1993), pp.14-19. For an account of China's position during the review conference, see Acronym, no.4 (September 1994), 'NPT Update # 3' (19 April 1995) and 'NPT Update # 20 (12 May 1995), in Nuclear Proliferation News, no.25 (24 May 1995).
92. Indefinite extension was favoured by Western states, including the nuclear powers. The argument was that the principles of non-proliferation would be institutionalized for all time. A finite extension of 25 years was favoured by several key developing states which argued that states needed the opportunity to review the treaty regularly to see how well the nuclear states were living up to their commitment under Article VI to reduce their nuclear arsenals. On various extension proposals, see Acronym, no.3 (September 1994). For a discussion of the issues behind the treaty's extension, see George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev, 'Avoiding the "Definition" Pitfall to a Comprehensive Test Ban', Arms Control Today (May 1993), pp.15-18; Lewis A. Dunn, 'NPT 1995: Time to Shift Gears', Arms Control Today (November 1993), pp.14-19. For an account of China's position during the review conference, see Acronym, no.4 (September 1994), 'NPT Update # 3' (19 April 1995) and 'NPT Update # 20 (12 May 1995), in Nuclear Proliferation News, no.25 (24 May 1995).
93. CD/172 (2 April 1981), p.2.
94. Huang Hua, 'Lianheguo da hui di shier jie tebie huiyi' [The 12th Special Meeting of the UN General Assembly], in Zhongguo daibiaotuan chuxi Lianheguo youguan huiyi wenjian ji [Collected Documents Relating to the Chinese Delegations' Attendance at UN Meetings] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Press, 1983), p.20.
95. Zhao Ziyang, 'Zhao Ziyang zongli de jiang hua' [Speech by Premier Zhao Ziyang], in Weile heping yu renlei de weilai: jinian guoji heping nian [For Peace and the Future of Humankind: Commemorating the International Year of Peace] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Press, 1986), p. 14.
96. CD/PV.365 (26 June 1986) p. 10. It is hard to pinpoint exactly when the 50 per cent reduction position died. Clearly, it was not a clean death. In February 1986, China's ambassador for disarmament Qian Jiadong referred to the proposal in the present tense in his remarks to the Conference on Disarmament plenary session (CD/PV.339 [13 February 1986], pp.31-2). The figure was gone from Qian's remarks in March 1986, after Zhao's announcement of his nine-point proposal (CD/PV.350 [25 March 1986], p.6). It was also gone from the plenary remarks of Qian's successor, Fan Guoxiang, in June 1987 (CD/PV.416 [25 June 1987], p.18), but reappeared in his remarks in February 1988 (CD/PV.442 [23 February 1988], p.9). It disappeared completely after that.
97. See CD/PV.525 (10 August 1989), p.23.
98. See Hua Di, 'Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control from a Chinese Point of View', paper presented to the Association for the Advancement of Science Annual Conference, February 1988, p.13. In discussions between the US National Academy of Science and the Scientists Group on Arms Control from the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament in October 1991, Qian Jiadong, at one time China's ambassador on disarmament at the UN, used the term '1000 to a few hundreds'. This position has been repeated by Chinese scientists in discussions with the Natural Resources Defense Council and at the ISODARCO arms control seminars in Beijing. One long-time arms control expert used the term 'comparability' rather than parity to describe the desired levels. Wu Zhan, 'Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament', paper presented to 2nd ISODARCO Beijing Arms Control Seminar, Beijing, October 1992, p. 12.
99. See Hua Di, 'Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control from a Chinese Point of View', paper presented to the Association for the Advancement of Science Annual Conference, February 1988, p.13. In discussions between the US National Academy of Science and the Scientists Group on Arms Control from the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament in October 1991, Qian Jiadong, at one time China's ambassador on disarmament at the UN, used the term '1000 to a few hundreds'. This position has been repeated by Chinese scientists in discussions with the Natural Resources Defense Council and at the ISODARCO arms control seminars in Beijing. One long-time arms control expert used the term 'comparability' rather than parity to describe the desired levels. Wu Zhan, 'Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament', paper presented to 2nd ISODARCO Beijing Arms Control Seminar, Beijing, October 1992, p. 12.
100. This aversion to constraints is in line with an evolving concept of limited deterrence OOH xian he weishe). A growing number of Chinese nuclear strategists explicitly reject minimum deterrence (zui di he wei she) as a guide for Chinese nuclear force development and deployment. Minimum deterrence, in their view, refers to a small, purely counter-value second strike capability. Limited deterrence, on the other hand, refers essentially to flexible response, whereby China should have a range of strategic and sub-strategic capabilities to deter any level of nuclear conflict, and in a nuclear war to contain escalatory pressures. These capabilities should be able to hit a range of counter-value and counter-force targets. If limited deterrence, which China apparently does not yet possess, is the guide for Chinese nuclear development, then one can assume that Chinese nuclear planners would prefer not to see any restrictions on China's ability to develop it. This calculus, however, depends on an intellectual rejection of the validity of minimum deterrence. Thus the Chinese position is not a 'natural' reflection of a weak state's preferences, since if Chinese strategists truly believed in the validity of minimum deterrence, then beyond ensuring the survivability of a small number of retaliatory warheads, relative nuclear capabilities should not matter much. For an explication of limited deterrence thinking, see Alastair Iain Johnston, 'China's New "Old Thinking": The Concept of Limited Deterrence', International Security, vol.20, no.3 (Winter 1995/96).
101. Mu Youlin, 'Nuclear Test Ban', Beijing Review, no.38 (20 September 1982).
102. CD/PV.292 (19 February 1985), p.32.
103. Cited in Liu Yong, 'Preventing China's Next Nuclear Test', Center for Energy and Environment, Princeton University, unpublished mimeo (1993), p.2.
104. See the UN Annual Reports on the Conference On Disarmament from 1987 to 1993 for a list of working papers on test ban issues submitted to the conference and of Chinese statements on test bans. Arms control specialists in China's nuclear weapons labs, however, were writing technical papers on the problems of on-site and seismic verification. See Li Hua, Hu Side and Du Shuhua, 'Verification Problems of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban', paper presented to the Union of Concerned Scientists Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, June 1993. In 1994 and 1995, as negotiations sped up, the Chinese delegation began to submit working papers on topics ranging from the scope of the treaty to its entry into force to verification.
105. This assumes that China would need explosive tests to develop new warhead designs. Chinese weapons designers are apparently investigating so-called hydro-nuclear testing procedures for testing weapons yields in a laboratory, possibly in anticipation of a test ban treaty.
106. Chen Xueyin, 'Comprehensive Test Ban Objectives, Definitions and Related Issues', Joint Publications Research Service, TND-93-026, 10 August 1993.
107. Ibid.
108. Initially, China called for separate negotiations on no-first-use, arguing these would be more effective than test bans in shoring up the non-proliferation regime. See the statement released after one of China's underground tests (Xinhua, 5 October 1993). Later, as negotiations on the test ban treaty got underway, China proposed that no-first-use language be placed in both the preamble and in a separate article. See CD/NTB/WP.122 (20 June 1994); CD/NTB/WP.124 (20 June 1994); Interview, September 1994; and Rebecca Johnson and Sean Howard, 'A Comprehensive Test Ban Within Reach', Acronym, no.1 (May 1994). One explanation is that formal no-first-use statements will help reinforce the norm of non-use among the nuclear weapons states. Another charitable view is that Chinese officials genuinely believe no-first-use statements will help morally to stigmatize nuclear weapons, thus reducing their status and security value among non-nuclear states. This would certainly not be inconsistent with a learning explanation, since it is precisely status and security that motivated China's acquisition of nuclear weapons in the first place. An alternative view is that the no-first-use proposal may be used to delay the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, because none of the other nuclear powers officially supports an unconditional pledge.
109. Initially, China called for separate negotiations on no-first-use, arguing these would be more effective than test bans in shoring up the non-proliferation regime. See the statement released after one of China's underground tests (Xinhua, 5 October 1993). Later, as negotiations on the test ban treaty got underway, China proposed that no-first-use language be placed in both the preamble and in a separate article. See CD/NTB/WP.122 (20 June 1994); CD/NTB/WP.124 (20 June 1994); Interview, September 1994; and Rebecca Johnson and Sean Howard, 'A Comprehensive Test Ban Within Reach', Acronym, no.1 (May 1994). One explanation is that formal no-first-use statements will help reinforce the norm of non-use among the nuclear weapons states. Another charitable view is that Chinese officials genuinely believe no-first-use statements will help morally to stigmatize nuclear weapons, thus reducing their status and security value among non-nuclear states. This would certainly not be inconsistent with a learning explanation, since it is precisely status and security that motivated China's acquisition of nuclear weapons in the first place. An alternative view is that the no-first-use proposal may be used to delay the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, because none of the other nuclear powers officially supports an unconditional pledge.
110. For the Chinese position on peaceful nuclear explosions see CD/NTB/WP.167 (23 August 1994); Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, 'Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control: Nascent Security Interdependence?', International Security, vol.20, no.3 (Winter 1995/96); Interview December 1994; Acronym, no.3 (September 1994); Nuclear Proliferation News, no. 12 (30 September 1994); and 'NPT Update # 16, Nuclear Proliferation News, no.25 (25 May 1995).
111. For the Chinese position on peaceful nuclear explosions see CD/NTB/WP.167 (23 August 1994); Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, 'Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control: Nascent Security Interdependence?', International Security, vol.20, no.3 (Winter 1995/96); Interview December 1994; Acronym, no.3 (September 1994); Nuclear Proliferation News, no. 12 (30 September 1994); and 'NPT Update # 16, Nuclear Proliferation News, no.25 (25 May 1995).
112. For the Chinese position on peaceful nuclear explosions see CD/NTB/WP.167 (23 August 1994); Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, 'Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control: Nascent Security Interdependence?', International Security, vol.20, no.3 (Winter 1995/96); Interview December 1994; Acronym, no.3 (September 1994); Nuclear Proliferation News, no. 12 (30 September 1994); and 'NPT Update # 16, Nuclear Proliferation News, no.25 (25 May 1995).
113. For the Chinese position on peaceful nuclear explosions see CD/NTB/WP.167 (23 August 1994); Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, 'Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control: Nascent Security Interdependence?', International Security, vol.20, no.3 (Winter 1995/96); Interview December 1994; Acronym, no.3 (September 1994); Nuclear Proliferation News, no. 12 (30 September 1994); and 'NPT Update # 16, Nuclear Proliferation News, no.25 (25 May 1995).
114. For the Chinese position on peaceful nuclear explosions see CD/NTB/WP.167 (23 August 1994); Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, 'Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control: Nascent Security Interdependence?', International Security, vol.20, no.3 (Winter 1995/96); Interview December 1994; Acronym, no.3 (September 1994); Nuclear Proliferation News, no. 12 (30 September 1994); and 'NPT Update # 16, Nuclear Proliferation News, no.25 (25 May 1995).
115. On China's positions on verification, see 'Working Paper on the CTBT Verification', CD/NTB/WP.78 (2 June 1994); and Nuclear Proliferation News, no.32 (8 September 1995). Most other conference delegates accept some role for national technical means as long as these are not used in a discriminatory way.
116. On China's positions on verification, see 'Working Paper on the CTBT Verification', CD/NTB/WP.78 (2 June 1994); and Nuclear Proliferation News, no.32 (8 September 1995). Most other conference delegates accept some role for national technical means as long as these are not used in a discriminatory way.
117. The Conference on Disarmament meets three times a year for negotiations. After the fall session ended in September 1995, China opposed technical negotiations prior to the opening of the next session in February 1996. A US government official argued that the Chinese delegation was worried the negotiations were moving too quickly, and that the inter-agency process on the Comprehensive Test Ban in Beijing needed more time to figure out what the implications of the evolving treaty were for China's nuclear modernization program (Interview, October 1995).
118. There is some suggestion that China wants to develop MIRVs, a new generation of mobile ICBMs, cruise missiles and a new generation of SLBMs. All of these require reduced weight-to-yield ratios. In addition, the Chinese want to develop one-point safety mechanisms to reduce the chance of accidental detonation.
119. Nuclear Proliferation News, no.33 (September 1995); Interview, October 1995.
120. Nuclear Proliferation News, no.33 (September 1995); Interview, October 1995.
121. A number of developing states have been circumspectly critical of China's position on peaceful nuclear explosions, its opposition to five-power strategic nuclear arms control, and its nuclear testing program. See, for instance, 'NPT Update # 18, Nuclear Proliferation News, no.25 (24 May 1995); 'ASEAN Slams France', Nuclear Proliferation News, no.31 (21 August 1995). Clearly, there are opportunities to sharpen contradictions between China and these other states.
122. A number of developing states have been circumspectly critical of China's position on peaceful nuclear explosions, its opposition to five-power strategic nuclear arms control, and its nuclear testing program. See, for instance, 'NPT Update # 18, Nuclear Proliferation News, no.25 (24 May 1995); 'ASEAN Slams France', Nuclear Proliferation News, no.31 (21 August 1995). Clearly, there are opportunities to sharpen contradictions between China and these other states.
123. There are plans to expand the full-time arms control community at the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics ten-fold, up to around 50 people. (Interview, 11 October 1995).
124. The PLA General Staff Department was apparently the main proponent behind dropping the 50 per cent reductions figure from China's position on strategic arms control in 1986. COSTIND, as the manager of nuclear weapons development, apparently also set the parameters of China's Comprehensive Test Ban position.
125. Mendelson, 'Internal Battles and External Wars'. Some learning theorists suggest that only massive policy failure forces decision-makers to reconsider basic strategies. Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy', pp.28-9. Russell Leng shows, however, that policy failures in ongoing disputes tend to reinforce prior realpolitik strategies. Russell Leng, 'When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises', Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.27, no.3 (1983), pp.379-419.
126. Mendelson, 'Internal Battles and External Wars'. Some learning theorists suggest that only massive policy failure forces decision-makers to reconsider basic strategies. Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy', pp.28-9. Russell Leng shows, however, that policy failures in ongoing disputes tend to reinforce prior realpolitik strategies. Russell Leng, 'When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises', Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.27, no.3 (1983), pp.379-419.
127. Mendelson, 'Internal Battles and External Wars'. Some learning theorists suggest that only massive policy failure forces decision-makers to reconsider basic strategies. Tetlock, 'Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy', pp.28-9. Russell Leng shows, however, that policy failures in ongoing disputes tend to reinforce prior realpolitik strategies. Russell Leng, 'When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises', Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.27, no.3 (1983), pp.379-419.
128. At different times Chinese leaders constructed different, even contradictory identities. But the predominant theme in state identity construction, especially apparent with the collapse of socialist ideology in the 1980s, pictures China as an independent great power deserving more status and respect from other major powers with a history of bullying and coercing China. For important explorations of identity construction in China, see the essays in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (eds), China's Quest for National Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).