How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 409-434

  Bonanno, Giacomo ^a   Nehring, Klaus ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Common belief; Common prior; Harsanyi consistency; Truth axiom

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033453461     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050117     Document Type: Article

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