On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 3-24

  Piccione, Michele ^a   Rubinstein, Ariel ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001788913     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0536     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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6. Isbell J. Finitary Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games III. 1957;Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton. p. 79-96.
7. Kuhn H. W. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. Contributions to the Theory of Games II. 1953;Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton.
8. Osborne M., Rubinstein A. A Course in Game Theory. 1994;MIT Press, Cambridge.
9. Rubinstein A. Finite Automata Play a Repeated Prisioner's Dilemma. J. Econ. Theory. 39:1986;83-96.
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11. Strotz R. H. Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization. Rev. Econ. Stud. 23:1956;165-180.