Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 3-29

  Bonanno, Giacomo ^a   Nehring, Klaus ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Descision making; Incomplete information; Non Bayesian models; Truth Axiom

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039165821     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00006-7     Document Type: Article

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