Coalitions among computationally bounded agents

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 94, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 99-137

  Sandholm, Tuomas W ^a   Lesser, Victor R ^b  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

^b University of Massachusetts   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Coalition formation; Distributed AI; Game theory; Multiagent systems; Negotiation; Resource bounded reasoning

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; DECISION THEORY; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING;

BOUNDED RATIONALITY; COALITION FORMATION; MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 0031191005     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0004-3702(97)00030-1     Document Type: Article

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