Assets, attributes and ownership

International Journal of the Economics of Business

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 19-37

  Foss, Kirsten ^a   Foss, Nicolai ^a  

^a Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Economic Organization; Ownership; Property Rights

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003053314     PISSN: 13571516     EISSN: 14661829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13571510151075233     Document Type: Article

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