Elites in post-communist Russia: A changing of the guard?

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 52, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 413-432

  Rivera, Sharon Werning ^a  

^a HAMILTON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001647732     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/713663069     Document Type: Review

References (106)

1. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, translated by Hannah D. Kahn (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939), pp. 65-69.
2. 'Traditional elites' are regionally based politicians prominent before the 1964 military coup, who exercised power through personalised, clientelistic networks. Frances Hagopian, The Compromised Consolidation: The Political Class in the Brazilian Transition', in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell & J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 243-293 at 246-248.
3. Brian Loveman, '¿Misión Cumplida? Civil Military Relations and the Chilean Political Transition', Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 33, 3, Fall 1991, pp. 35-74.
4. Valerie Bunce, 'Regional Differences in Democratization: The East Versus the South', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14, 3, 1998, pp. 187-211.
5. M. Steven Fish, 'The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World', East European Politics and Societies, 12, 1, Winter 1998, pp. 31-78.
6. David Lane, 'Transition under Eltsin: The Nomenklatura and Political Elite Circulation', Political Studies, 45, 1997, pp. 855-874.
7. Donald Searing demonstrates that some social background factors are more useful in predicting elite attitudes than others. He also shows that the relative importance of similar background categories for elite attitudes varies widely from one political system to another. Donald D. Searing, 'The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization', Comparative Political Studies, 1, 4, January 1969, pp. 471-500. This is supported by Samuel Eldersveld's research on local elites, which finds that socioeconomic status is correlated with beliefs about economic equality in Sweden, but less so in the Netherlands and not at all in the USA. Samuel J. Eldersveld, Lars Strömberg & Wim Derksen, Local Elites in Western Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Urban Political Leaders in the U.S., Sweden, and The Netherlands (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995), pp. 196-197. Donald Matthews reports that the linkages between the social backgrounds of legislators and their policy preferences in several settings are generally weak. Donald R. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers', in Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson & Malcolm E. Jewell (eds), Handbook of Legislative Research (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 17-55 at 24-26. Robert Putnam suggests that social background may play a greater role than post-recruitment socialisation in developing countries because 'new or unstable institutions are less able to inculcate distinctive norms in their members'. Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 98. On the other hand, periods of high uncertainty when institutions and rules are in flux may in fact disorganise societal interests and hence behaviour based on them. Valerie Bunce & Mária Csanádi, 'Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary', East European Politics and Societies, 7, 2, Spring 1993, pp. 240-275. And indeed, studies of the voting behaviour of Russian parliamentarians arrive at contradictory conclusions about the sturdiness of the relationship between individuals' social backgrounds and their voting decisions. Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (New York, Routledge, 1993), p. 61; David Lane & Cameron Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites', in David Lane (ed.), Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality (New York, Longman, 1995), pp. 52-75. See also David Lane & Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin (New York, St Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 129-134.
8. Donald Searing demonstrates that some social background factors are more useful in predicting elite attitudes than others. He also shows that the relative importance of similar background categories for elite attitudes varies widely from one political system to another. Donald D. Searing, 'The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization', Comparative Political Studies, 1, 4, January 1969, pp. 471-500. This is supported by Samuel Eldersveld's research on local elites, which finds that socioeconomic status is correlated with beliefs about economic equality in Sweden, but less so in the Netherlands and not at all in the USA. Samuel J. Eldersveld, Lars Strömberg & Wim Derksen, Local Elites in Western Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Urban Political Leaders in the U.S., Sweden, and The Netherlands (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995), pp. 196-197. Donald Matthews reports that the linkages between the social backgrounds of legislators and their policy preferences in several settings are generally weak. Donald R. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers', in Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson & Malcolm E. Jewell (eds), Handbook of Legislative Research (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 17-55 at 24-26. Robert Putnam suggests that social background may play a greater role than post-recruitment socialisation in developing countries because 'new or unstable institutions are less able to inculcate distinctive norms in their members'. Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 98. On the other hand, periods of high uncertainty when institutions and rules are in flux may in fact disorganise societal interests and hence behaviour based on them. Valerie Bunce & Mária Csanádi, 'Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary', East European Politics and Societies, 7, 2, Spring 1993, pp. 240-275. And indeed, studies of the voting behaviour of Russian parliamentarians arrive at contradictory conclusions about the sturdiness of the relationship between individuals' social backgrounds and their voting decisions. Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (New York, Routledge, 1993), p. 61; David Lane & Cameron Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites', in David Lane (ed.), Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality (New York, Longman, 1995), pp. 52-75. See also David Lane & Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin (New York, St Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 129-134.
9. Donald Searing demonstrates that some social background factors are more useful in predicting elite attitudes than others. He also shows that the relative importance of similar background categories for elite attitudes varies widely from one political system to another. Donald D. Searing, 'The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization', Comparative Political Studies, 1, 4, January 1969, pp. 471-500. This is supported by Samuel Eldersveld's research on local elites, which finds that socioeconomic status is correlated with beliefs about economic equality in Sweden, but less so in the Netherlands and not at all in the USA. Samuel J. Eldersveld, Lars Strömberg & Wim Derksen, Local Elites in Western Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Urban Political Leaders in the U.S., Sweden, and The Netherlands (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995), pp. 196-197. Donald Matthews reports that the linkages between the social backgrounds of legislators and their policy preferences in several settings are generally weak. Donald R. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers', in Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson & Malcolm E. Jewell (eds), Handbook of Legislative Research (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 17-55 at 24-26. Robert Putnam suggests that social background may play a greater role than post-recruitment socialisation in developing countries because 'new or unstable institutions are less able to inculcate distinctive norms in their members'. Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 98. On the other hand, periods of high uncertainty when institutions and rules are in flux may in fact disorganise societal interests and hence behaviour based on them. Valerie Bunce & Mária Csanádi, 'Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary', East European Politics and Societies, 7, 2, Spring 1993, pp. 240-275. And indeed, studies of the voting behaviour of Russian parliamentarians arrive at contradictory conclusions about the sturdiness of the relationship between individuals' social backgrounds and their voting decisions. Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (New York, Routledge, 1993), p. 61; David Lane & Cameron Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites', in David Lane (ed.), Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality (New York, Longman, 1995), pp. 52-75. See also David Lane & Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin (New York, St Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 129-134.
10. Donald Searing demonstrates that some social background factors are more useful in predicting elite attitudes than others. He also shows that the relative importance of similar background categories for elite attitudes varies widely from one political system to another. Donald D. Searing, 'The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization', Comparative Political Studies, 1, 4, January 1969, pp. 471-500. This is supported by Samuel Eldersveld's research on local elites, which finds that socioeconomic status is correlated with beliefs about economic equality in Sweden, but less so in the Netherlands and not at all in the USA. Samuel J. Eldersveld, Lars Strömberg & Wim Derksen, Local Elites in Western Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Urban Political Leaders in the U.S., Sweden, and The Netherlands (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995), pp. 196-197. Donald Matthews reports that the linkages between the social backgrounds of legislators and their policy preferences in several settings are generally weak. Donald R. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers', in Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson & Malcolm E. Jewell (eds), Handbook of Legislative Research (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 17-55 at 24-26. Robert Putnam suggests that social background may play a greater role than post-recruitment socialisation in developing countries because 'new or unstable institutions are less able to inculcate distinctive norms in their members'. Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 98. On the other hand, periods of high uncertainty when institutions and rules are in flux may in fact disorganise societal interests and hence behaviour based on them. Valerie Bunce & Mária Csanádi, 'Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary', East European Politics and Societies, 7, 2, Spring 1993, pp. 240-275. And indeed, studies of the voting behaviour of Russian parliamentarians arrive at contradictory conclusions about the sturdiness of the relationship between individuals' social backgrounds and their voting decisions. Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (New York, Routledge, 1993), p. 61; David Lane & Cameron Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites', in David Lane (ed.), Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality (New York, Longman, 1995), pp. 52-75. See also David Lane & Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin (New York, St Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 129-134.
11. Donald Searing demonstrates that some social background factors are more useful in predicting elite attitudes than others. He also shows that the relative importance of similar background categories for elite attitudes varies widely from one political system to another. Donald D. Searing, 'The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization', Comparative Political Studies, 1, 4, January 1969, pp. 471-500. This is supported by Samuel Eldersveld's research on local elites, which finds that socioeconomic status is correlated with beliefs about economic equality in Sweden, but less so in the Netherlands and not at all in the USA. Samuel J. Eldersveld, Lars Strömberg & Wim Derksen, Local Elites in Western Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Urban Political Leaders in the U.S., Sweden, and The Netherlands (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995), pp. 196-197. Donald Matthews reports that the linkages between the social backgrounds of legislators and their policy preferences in several settings are generally weak. Donald R. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers', in Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson & Malcolm E. Jewell (eds), Handbook of Legislative Research (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 17-55 at 24-26. Robert Putnam suggests that social background may play a greater role than post-recruitment socialisation in developing countries because 'new or unstable institutions are less able to inculcate distinctive norms in their members'. Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 98. On the other hand, periods of high uncertainty when institutions and rules are in flux may in fact disorganise societal interests and hence behaviour based on them. Valerie Bunce & Mária Csanádi, 'Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary', East European Politics and Societies, 7, 2, Spring 1993, pp. 240-275. And indeed, studies of the voting behaviour of Russian parliamentarians arrive at contradictory conclusions about the sturdiness of the relationship between individuals' social backgrounds and their voting decisions. Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (New York, Routledge, 1993), p. 61; David Lane & Cameron Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites', in David Lane (ed.), Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality (New York, Longman, 1995), pp. 52-75. See also David Lane & Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin (New York, St Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 129-134.
12. Donald Searing demonstrates that some social background factors are more useful in predicting elite attitudes than others. He also shows that the relative importance of similar background categories for elite attitudes varies widely from one political system to another. Donald D. Searing, 'The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization', Comparative Political Studies, 1, 4, January 1969, pp. 471-500. This is supported by Samuel Eldersveld's research on local elites, which finds that socioeconomic status is correlated with beliefs about economic equality in Sweden, but less so in the Netherlands and not at all in the USA. Samuel J. Eldersveld, Lars Strömberg & Wim Derksen, Local Elites in Western Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Urban Political Leaders in the U.S., Sweden, and The Netherlands (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995), pp. 196-197. Donald Matthews reports that the linkages between the social backgrounds of legislators and their policy preferences in several settings are generally weak. Donald R. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers', in Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson & Malcolm E. Jewell (eds), Handbook of Legislative Research (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 17-55 at 24-26. Robert Putnam suggests that social background may play a greater role than post-recruitment socialisation in developing countries because 'new or unstable institutions are less able to inculcate distinctive norms in their members'. Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 98. On the other hand, periods of high uncertainty when institutions and rules are in flux may in fact disorganise societal interests and hence behaviour based on them. Valerie Bunce & Mária Csanádi, 'Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary', East European Politics and Societies, 7, 2, Spring 1993, pp. 240-275. And indeed, studies of the voting behaviour of Russian parliamentarians arrive at contradictory conclusions about the sturdiness of the relationship between individuals' social backgrounds and their voting decisions. Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (New York, Routledge, 1993), p. 61; David Lane & Cameron Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites', in David Lane (ed.), Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality (New York, Longman, 1995), pp. 52-75. See also David Lane & Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin (New York, St Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 129-134.
13. Donald Searing demonstrates that some social background factors are more useful in predicting elite attitudes than others. He also shows that the relative importance of similar background categories for elite attitudes varies widely from one political system to another. Donald D. Searing, 'The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization', Comparative Political Studies, 1, 4, January 1969, pp. 471-500. This is supported by Samuel Eldersveld's research on local elites, which finds that socioeconomic status is correlated with beliefs about economic equality in Sweden, but less so in the Netherlands and not at all in the USA. Samuel J. Eldersveld, Lars Strömberg & Wim Derksen, Local Elites in Western Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Urban Political Leaders in the U.S., Sweden, and The Netherlands (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995), pp. 196-197. Donald Matthews reports that the linkages between the social backgrounds of legislators and their policy preferences in several settings are generally weak. Donald R. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers', in Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson & Malcolm E. Jewell (eds), Handbook of Legislative Research (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 17-55 at 24-26. Robert Putnam suggests that social background may play a greater role than post-recruitment socialisation in developing countries because 'new or unstable institutions are less able to inculcate distinctive norms in their members'. Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 98. On the other hand, periods of high uncertainty when institutions and rules are in flux may in fact disorganise societal interests and hence behaviour based on them. Valerie Bunce & Mária Csanádi, 'Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary', East European Politics and Societies, 7, 2, Spring 1993, pp. 240-275. And indeed, studies of the voting behaviour of Russian parliamentarians arrive at contradictory conclusions about the sturdiness of the relationship between individuals' social backgrounds and their voting decisions. Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (New York, Routledge, 1993), p. 61; David Lane & Cameron Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites', in David Lane (ed.), Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality (New York, Longman, 1995), pp. 52-75. See also David Lane & Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin (New York, St Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 129-134.
14. Donald Searing demonstrates that some social background factors are more useful in predicting elite attitudes than others. He also shows that the relative importance of similar background categories for elite attitudes varies widely from one political system to another. Donald D. Searing, 'The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization', Comparative Political Studies, 1, 4, January 1969, pp. 471-500. This is supported by Samuel Eldersveld's research on local elites, which finds that socioeconomic status is correlated with beliefs about economic equality in Sweden, but less so in the Netherlands and not at all in the USA. Samuel J. Eldersveld, Lars Strömberg & Wim Derksen, Local Elites in Western Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Urban Political Leaders in the U.S., Sweden, and The Netherlands (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995), pp. 196-197. Donald Matthews reports that the linkages between the social backgrounds of legislators and their policy preferences in several settings are generally weak. Donald R. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers', in Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson & Malcolm E. Jewell (eds), Handbook of Legislative Research (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 17-55 at 24-26. Robert Putnam suggests that social background may play a greater role than post-recruitment socialisation in developing countries because 'new or unstable institutions are less able to inculcate distinctive norms in their members'. Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 98. On the other hand, periods of high uncertainty when institutions and rules are in flux may in fact disorganise societal interests and hence behaviour based on them. Valerie Bunce & Mária Csanádi, 'Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary', East European Politics and Societies, 7, 2, Spring 1993, pp. 240-275. And indeed, studies of the voting behaviour of Russian parliamentarians arrive at contradictory conclusions about the sturdiness of the relationship between individuals' social backgrounds and their voting decisions. Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (New York, Routledge, 1993), p. 61; David Lane & Cameron Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites', in David Lane (ed.), Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality (New York, Longman, 1995), pp. 52-75. See also David Lane & Cameron Ross, The Transition from Communism to Capitalism: Ruling Elites from Gorbachev to Yeltsin (New York, St Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 129-134.
15. Martin Malia, 'From Under the Rubble, What?' Problems of Communism, 41, 1-2, January -April 1992, pp. 89-106 at 92.
16. On the Komsomol, see Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaya, 'Novaya Sovetskaya biznes-elita', unpublished manuscript, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1992; Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1998). On the National Sports Fund, see Jonas Bernstein, 'Victim's Tape Reveals Kremlin Corruption', Moscow Times, 10 July 1996, p. 3.
17. On the Komsomol, see Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaya, 'Novaya Sovetskaya biznes-elita', unpublished manuscript, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1992; Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1998). On the National Sports Fund, see Jonas Bernstein, 'Victim's Tape Reveals Kremlin Corruption', Moscow Times, 10 July 1996, p. 3.
18. On the Komsomol, see Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaya, 'Novaya Sovetskaya biznes-elita', unpublished manuscript, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1992; Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1998). On the National Sports Fund, see Jonas Bernstein, 'Victim's Tape Reveals Kremlin Corruption', Moscow Times, 10 July 1996, p. 3.
19. Ella Pamfilova, 'Our Worst Nightmare', Moscow Times, 15 February 1995, p. 8. See also the perspectives on 'nomenklatura capitalism' in Yurii Burtin, 'Novyi stroi: vidy na budushchee', Moskovskie novosti, 6-13 November 1994, p. 9; K. I. Mikul'skii et al., Rossiiskaya elita: opyt sotsiologicheskogo analiza-Chast' III (Moscow, 1997), pp. 35, 51.
20. Ella Pamfilova, 'Our Worst Nightmare', Moscow Times, 15 February 1995, p. 8. See also the perspectives on 'nomenklatura capitalism' in Yurii Burtin, 'Novyi stroi: vidy na budushchee', Moskovskie novosti, 6-13 November 1994, p. 9; K. I. Mikul'skii et al., Rossiiskaya elita: opyt sotsiologicheskogo analiza-Chast' III (Moscow, 1997), pp. 35, 51.
21. Ella Pamfilova, 'Our Worst Nightmare', Moscow Times, 15 February 1995, p. 8. See also the perspectives on 'nomenklatura capitalism' in Yurii Burtin, 'Novyi stroi: vidy na budushchee', Moskovskie novosti, 6-13 November 1994, p. 9; K. I. Mikul'skii et al., Rossiiskaya elita: opyt sotsiologicheskogo analiza-Chast' III (Moscow, 1997), pp. 35, 51.
22. John R. Hibbing & Samuel C. Patterson, 'Public Trust in the New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe', Political Studies, 42, 1994, pp. 570-592 at 583.
23. Guillermo O'Donnell & Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 19.
24. Olga Kryshtanovskaya & Stephen White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Élite', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 5, 1996, pp. 711-733. See also Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaya, 'Transformatsiya staroi nomenklatury v novuyu rossiiskuyu elitu', Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost', 1995, 1, pp. 51-65.
25. Olga Kryshtanovskaya & Stephen White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Élite', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 5, 1996, pp. 711-733. See also Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaya, 'Transformatsiya staroi nomenklatury v novuyu rossiiskuyu elitu', Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost', 1995, 1, pp. 51-65.
26. Eric Hanley, Natasha Yershova & Richard Anderson, 'Russia-Old Wine in a New Bottle? The Circulation and Reproduction of Russian Elites, 1983-1993', Theory and Society, 24, 5, October 1995, pp. 639-668.
27. Gennadii Ashin, 'Pravyashchaya elita i obshchestvo', Svobodnaya mysl', 1993, 7 (May), pp. 58-69 at 68. However, other studies of a similar nature have found much more continuity. For example, Mawdsley & White report that 99 of the 412 members of the last CPSU Central Committee (elected in 1990) are listed in a 1993 edition of Kto est' kto v Rossii i blizhnem zarubezh'e. Evan Mawdsley & Stephen White, The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000). I thank an anonymous reviewer for calling this to my attention.
28. Gennadii Ashin, 'Pravyashchaya elita i obshchestvo', Svobodnaya mysl', 1993, 7 (May), pp. 58-69 at 68. However, other studies of a similar nature have found much more continuity. For example, Mawdsley & White report that 99 of the 412 members of the last CPSU Central Committee (elected in 1990) are listed in a 1993 edition of Kto est' kto v Rossii i blizhnem zarubezh'e. Evan Mawdsley & Stephen White, The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000). I thank an anonymous reviewer for calling this to my attention.
29. Lane & Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites', p. 75.
30. David Lane & Cameron Ross, 'The Russian Political Elites, 1991-95: Recruitment and Renewal', in John Higley, Jan Pakulski & Włodzimierz Wesołowski (eds), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe (New York, St Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 34-66.
31. T. H. Rigby, 'New Top Elites for Old in Russian Politics', British Journal of Political Science, 29, 2, April 1999, pp. 323-343.
32. Kryshtanovskaya & White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Élite', pp. 727-728.
33. James Hughes, 'Sub-national Élites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya & White', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 6, 1997, pp. 1017-1036. Darrell Slider comes to the same conclusion about the predominance of administrative officials, enterprise managers and chairmen of collective/state farms in regional assemblies in 'Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 243-264. For additional information on regional elites, see Nikolai Petrov, 'Politicheskie elity v tsentre i na mestakh', Rossiiskii monitor: arkhiv sovremennoi politiki, 1995, 5, pp. 41-63; Neil J. Melvin, 'The Consolidation of a New Regional Élite: The Case of Omsk 1987-1995', Europe-Asia Studies, 50, 4, 1998, pp. 619-650.
34. James Hughes, 'Sub-national Élites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya & White', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 6, 1997, pp. 1017-1036. Darrell Slider comes to the same conclusion about the predominance of administrative officials, enterprise managers and chairmen of collective/state farms in regional assemblies in 'Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 243-264. For additional information on regional elites, see Nikolai Petrov, 'Politicheskie elity v tsentre i na mestakh', Rossiiskii monitor: arkhiv sovremennoi politiki, 1995, 5, pp. 41-63; Neil J. Melvin, 'The Consolidation of a New Regional Élite: The Case of Omsk 1987-1995', Europe-Asia Studies, 50, 4, 1998, pp. 619-650.
35. James Hughes, 'Sub-national Élites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya & White', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 6, 1997, pp. 1017-1036. Darrell Slider comes to the same conclusion about the predominance of administrative officials, enterprise managers and chairmen of collective/state farms in regional assemblies in 'Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 243-264. For additional information on regional elites, see Nikolai Petrov, 'Politicheskie elity v tsentre i na mestakh', Rossiiskii monitor: arkhiv sovremennoi politiki, 1995, 5, pp. 41-63; Neil J. Melvin, 'The Consolidation of a New Regional Élite: The Case of Omsk 1987-1995', Europe-Asia Studies, 50, 4, 1998, pp. 619-650.
36. James Hughes, 'Sub-national Élites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya & White', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 6, 1997, pp. 1017-1036. Darrell Slider comes to the same conclusion about the predominance of administrative officials, enterprise managers and chairmen of collective/state farms in regional assemblies in 'Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 243-264. For additional information on regional elites, see Nikolai Petrov, 'Politicheskie elity v tsentre i na mestakh', Rossiiskii monitor: arkhiv sovremennoi politiki, 1995, 5, pp. 41-63; Neil J. Melvin, 'The Consolidation of a New Regional Élite: The Case of Omsk 1987-1995', Europe-Asia Studies, 50, 4, 1998, pp. 619-650.
37. Kryshtanovskaya & White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Élite', pp. 724-728.
38. Lane, 'Transition under Eltsin: The Nomenklatura and Political Elite Circulation', p. 861.
39. In one of the few exceptions (the 1993 cross-national survey that provides the basis for several articles on post-communist elite transformation), nomenklatura slots at the level of the communist parties' central committees are the standard. See the description of the study in Jakub Karpinski, 'Sociologists Compare Nomenklatura Members and Contemporary Elites', Transition, 2, 11, 31 May 1996, pp. 36-37.
40. This is one of the indicators used to measure elite continuity in Anton Steen, Between Past and Future: Elites, Democracy and the State in Post-Communist Countries - A Comparison of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Brookfield, Ashgate, 1997), pp. 35-38.
41. Lane & Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites'; Lane & Ross, 'The Russian Political Elites: 1991-95'. There is yet another complication with respect to measuring the degree of elite continuity - the time periods selected to represent the 'old' and 'new' regimes. In fact, Lane and Ross point out that ' "a nomenklatura post" is often attributed to positions begun when the Soviet system was disintegrating or had disintegrated'. Lane & Ross, 'The Russian Political Elites, 1991-95', p. 54.
42. Elites in the survey are overwhelmingly male, highly educated and middle-aged. Specifically, 95.2% of all national elites and 89.8% of all regional elites in the sample are male; 98.8% and 98.0% respectively have at least a university degree; and the mean age for both groups is 49.1 years and 47.7 years respectively.
43. On the use of the reputational method in the Russian context, see David Lane, 'The Gorbachev Revolution: The Role of the Political Elite in Regime Disintegration', Political Studies, 44, 1996, pp. 4-23; David Lane, 'Political Elites Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin in the Early Period of Transition: A Reputational and Analytical Study', in Timothy J. Colton & Robert C. Tucker (eds), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995), pp. 29-47; Sharon Werning Rivera, 'Tendentsii formirovaniya sostava postkommunisticheskoi elity Rossii: reputatsionnyi analiz', Politicheskie issledovaniya, 1995, 6, pp. 61-66, and 1996, 3, pp. 156-157.
44. On the use of the reputational method in the Russian context, see David Lane, 'The Gorbachev Revolution: The Role of the Political Elite in Regime Disintegration', Political Studies, 44, 1996, pp. 4-23; David Lane, 'Political Elites Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin in the Early Period of Transition: A Reputational and Analytical Study', in Timothy J. Colton & Robert C. Tucker (eds), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995), pp. 29-47; Sharon Werning Rivera, 'Tendentsii formirovaniya sostava postkommunisticheskoi elity Rossii: reputatsionnyi analiz', Politicheskie issledovaniya, 1995, 6, pp. 61-66, and 1996, 3, pp. 156-157.
45. On the use of the reputational method in the Russian context, see David Lane, 'The Gorbachev Revolution: The Role of the Political Elite in Regime Disintegration', Political Studies, 44, 1996, pp. 4-23; David Lane, 'Political Elites Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin in the Early Period of Transition: A Reputational and Analytical Study', in Timothy J. Colton & Robert C. Tucker (eds), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995), pp. 29-47; Sharon Werning Rivera, 'Tendentsii formirovaniya sostava postkommunisticheskoi elity Rossii: reputatsionnyi analiz', Politicheskie issledovaniya, 1995, 6, pp. 61-66, and 1996, 3, pp. 156-157.
46. Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam & Bert A. Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981).
47. In the Russian case, I count first deputy ministers and deputy ministers as constituting one level.
48. Thanks to its status as an autonomous republic (ASSR) in the Soviet era, Tatarstan had its own ministerial apparatus under the Soviet system. This has continued into the present era, and there has also been a presidential apparatus since Mintimer Shaimiev's election as president of the Republic of Tatarstan in 1991. Although, in a formal sense, the staff members of the presidential apparatus are not precisely equivalent in function to the department heads interviewed in Nizhny Novgorod and Moscow, I believe that they do not differ markedly from the aforementioned 'bureaucrats proper'.
49. Robert D. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973), p. 15. See also Peter McDonough, Power and Ideology in Brazil (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 253; Aberbach et al., Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies, p. 26; Sidney Verba et al., Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden, and the United States (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 280-281.
50. Robert D. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973), p. 15. See also Peter McDonough, Power and Ideology in Brazil (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 253; Aberbach et al., Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies, p. 26; Sidney Verba et al., Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden, and the United States (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 280-281.
51. Robert D. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973), p. 15. See also Peter McDonough, Power and Ideology in Brazil (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 253; Aberbach et al., Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies, p. 26; Sidney Verba et al., Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden, and the United States (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 280-281.
52. Robert D. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973), p. 15. See also Peter McDonough, Power and Ideology in Brazil (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 253; Aberbach et al., Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies, p. 26; Sidney Verba et al., Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden, and the United States (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 280-281.
53. See the demands of membership in the party rules listed in Jerry F. Hough & Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union Is Governed (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 320-322.
54. These numbers are virtually unaffected by the age of the respondents. That is to say, only seven of the 133 respondents were under 35 years of age, meaning that all of the rest could have been party members in 1988 (considering that party membership was generally conferred in one's mid to late 20s).
55. A 1993 survey of Russia's foreign policy elite reports an average former party membership rate of 85%. Vserossiiskii tsentr izucheniya obshchestvennogo mneniya & SINUS Moskva, Vneshnyaya politika Rossii - 1993: analiz politikov i ekspertov (Moscow, 1993), pp. 14-15. In the 1993 Szelényi study of economic, political and cultural elites, 77% of all respondents and 83% of all political elites were former party members. Boris Golovachev, Larisa Kosova & Lyudmila Khakhulina, ' "Novaya" rossiiskaya elita: starye igroki na novom pole?', Segodnya, 14 February 1996, p. 5; Karpinski, 'Sociologists Compare Nomenklatura Members and Contemporary Elites', pp. 36-37. Two surveys of national-level economic, political, military, academic and media leaders involved in foreign policy conducted in 1992-93 and 1995 show prior membership rates of 70.2% and 74.4% respectively. See William Zimmerman, 'Markets, Democracy and Russian Foreign Policy', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 2, April-June 1994, pp. 103-126, for a description of the data set used to compute these figures. The only exception to this general pattern is the Lane & Ross analysis of 145 top government leaders working in the El'tsin administration between June 1991 and October 1993, which reports that only 47.6% of that group were former party members. It may be that underreporting is at work here, or alternatively, that the highest echelons in El'tsin's administrations during the early 'post-revolutionary' period were recruited from a decidedly different pool than those who occupied less visible positions in the government and society. Lane & Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites', p. 71.
56. A 1993 survey of Russia's foreign policy elite reports an average former party membership rate of 85%. Vserossiiskii tsentr izucheniya obshchestvennogo mneniya & SINUS Moskva, Vneshnyaya politika Rossii - 1993: analiz politikov i ekspertov (Moscow, 1993), pp. 14-15. In the 1993 Szelényi study of economic, political and cultural elites, 77% of all respondents and 83% of all political elites were former party members. Boris Golovachev, Larisa Kosova & Lyudmila Khakhulina, ' "Novaya" rossiiskaya elita: starye igroki na novom pole?', Segodnya, 14 February 1996, p. 5; Karpinski, 'Sociologists Compare Nomenklatura Members and Contemporary Elites', pp. 36-37. Two surveys of national-level economic, political, military, academic and media leaders involved in foreign policy conducted in 1992-93 and 1995 show prior membership rates of 70.2% and 74.4% respectively. See William Zimmerman, 'Markets, Democracy and Russian Foreign Policy', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 2, April-June 1994, pp. 103-126, for a description of the data set used to compute these figures. The only exception to this general pattern is the Lane & Ross analysis of 145 top government leaders working in the El'tsin administration between June 1991 and October 1993, which reports that only 47.6% of that group were former party members. It may be that underreporting is at work here, or alternatively, that the highest echelons in El'tsin's administrations during the early 'post-revolutionary' period were recruited from a decidedly different pool than those who occupied less visible positions in the government and society. Lane & Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites', p. 71.
57. A 1993 survey of Russia's foreign policy elite reports an average former party membership rate of 85%. Vserossiiskii tsentr izucheniya obshchestvennogo mneniya & SINUS Moskva, Vneshnyaya politika Rossii - 1993: analiz politikov i ekspertov (Moscow, 1993), pp. 14-15. In the 1993 Szelényi study of economic, political and cultural elites, 77% of all respondents and 83% of all political elites were former party members. Boris Golovachev, Larisa Kosova & Lyudmila Khakhulina, ' "Novaya" rossiiskaya elita: starye igroki na novom pole?', Segodnya, 14 February 1996, p. 5; Karpinski, 'Sociologists Compare Nomenklatura Members and Contemporary Elites', pp. 36-37. Two surveys of national-level economic, political, military, academic and media leaders involved in foreign policy conducted in 1992-93 and 1995 show prior membership rates of 70.2% and 74.4% respectively. See William Zimmerman, 'Markets, Democracy and Russian Foreign Policy', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 2, April-June 1994, pp. 103-126, for a description of the data set used to compute these figures. The only exception to this general pattern is the Lane & Ross analysis of 145 top government leaders working in the El'tsin administration between June 1991 and October 1993, which reports that only 47.6% of that group were former party members. It may be that underreporting is at work here, or alternatively, that the highest echelons in El'tsin's administrations during the early 'post-revolutionary' period were recruited from a decidedly different pool than those who occupied less visible positions in the government and society. Lane & Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites', p. 71.
58. A 1993 survey of Russia's foreign policy elite reports an average former party membership rate of 85%. Vserossiiskii tsentr izucheniya obshchestvennogo mneniya & SINUS Moskva, Vneshnyaya politika Rossii - 1993: analiz politikov i ekspertov (Moscow, 1993), pp. 14-15. In the 1993 Szelényi study of economic, political and cultural elites, 77% of all respondents and 83% of all political elites were former party members. Boris Golovachev, Larisa Kosova & Lyudmila Khakhulina, ' "Novaya" rossiiskaya elita: starye igroki na novom pole?', Segodnya, 14 February 1996, p. 5; Karpinski, 'Sociologists Compare Nomenklatura Members and Contemporary Elites', pp. 36-37. Two surveys of national-level economic, political, military, academic and media leaders involved in foreign policy conducted in 1992-93 and 1995 show prior membership rates of 70.2% and 74.4% respectively. See William Zimmerman, 'Markets, Democracy and Russian Foreign Policy', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 2, April-June 1994, pp. 103-126, for a description of the data set used to compute these figures. The only exception to this general pattern is the Lane & Ross analysis of 145 top government leaders working in the El'tsin administration between June 1991 and October 1993, which reports that only 47.6% of that group were former party members. It may be that underreporting is at work here, or alternatively, that the highest echelons in El'tsin's administrations during the early 'post-revolutionary' period were recruited from a decidedly different pool than those who occupied less visible positions in the government and society. Lane & Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites', p. 71.
59. A 1993 survey of Russia's foreign policy elite reports an average former party membership rate of 85%. Vserossiiskii tsentr izucheniya obshchestvennogo mneniya & SINUS Moskva, Vneshnyaya politika Rossii - 1993: analiz politikov i ekspertov (Moscow, 1993), pp. 14-15. In the 1993 Szelényi study of economic, political and cultural elites, 77% of all respondents and 83% of all political elites were former party members. Boris Golovachev, Larisa Kosova & Lyudmila Khakhulina, ' "Novaya" rossiiskaya elita: starye igroki na novom pole?', Segodnya, 14 February 1996, p. 5; Karpinski, 'Sociologists Compare Nomenklatura Members and Contemporary Elites', pp. 36-37. Two surveys of national-level economic, political, military, academic and media leaders involved in foreign policy conducted in 1992-93 and 1995 show prior membership rates of 70.2% and 74.4% respectively. See William Zimmerman, 'Markets, Democracy and Russian Foreign Policy', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 2, April-June 1994, pp. 103-126, for a description of the data set used to compute these figures. The only exception to this general pattern is the Lane & Ross analysis of 145 top government leaders working in the El'tsin administration between June 1991 and October 1993, which reports that only 47.6% of that group were former party members. It may be that underreporting is at work here, or alternatively, that the highest echelons in El'tsin's administrations during the early 'post-revolutionary' period were recruited from a decidedly different pool than those who occupied less visible positions in the government and society. Lane & Ross, 'The Changing Composition and Structure of the Political Elites', p. 71.
60. T. H. Rigby & Bohdan Harasymiw, Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia (Boston, George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 3; Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Mosca and Moscow: Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union', in Moshe M. Czudnowski (ed.), Does Who Governs Matter? Elite Circulation in Contemporary Societies (DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 1982), pp. 265-292 at 284-285.
61. T. H. Rigby & Bohdan Harasymiw, Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia (Boston, George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 3; Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Mosca and Moscow: Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union', in Moshe M. Czudnowski (ed.), Does Who Governs Matter? Elite Circulation in Contemporary Societies (DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 1982), pp. 265-292 at 284-285.
62. Kryshtanovskaya, 'Transformatsiya staroi nomenklatury v novuyu rossiiskuyu elitu', p. 53.
63. Hedrick Smith, The Russians, revised edition (New York, Ballantine Books, 1976), p. 55. See also Mikhail Voslensky, Nomenklatura: gospodstvuyushchii klass Sovetskogo Soyuza (Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya and Oktyabr', 1991), pp. 267-352.
64. Hedrick Smith, The Russians, revised edition (New York, Ballantine Books, 1976), p. 55. See also Mikhail Voslensky, Nomenklatura: gospodstvuyushchii klass Sovetskogo Soyuza (Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya and Oktyabr', 1991), pp. 267-352.
65. See Ian McAllister, Stephen White & Richard Rose, 'Communists, Privilege, and Postcommunism in Russia', International Politics, 34, March 1997, pp. 79-95. However, as Michael Kennedy points out with respect to Poland, political power did not translate well into prestige because it was held with such low legitimacy. Rather, prestige was accorded to occupations that were of service to society, required certain educational levels or professional knowledge, or demanded sacrifice, responsibility or exertion on the part of the individual. On the whole, material rewards and political power were much less important criteria of occupational prestige. Michael D. Kennedy, Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland: A Critical Sociology of Soviet-Type Society (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 243-248.
66. See Ian McAllister, Stephen White & Richard Rose, 'Communists, Privilege, and Postcommunism in Russia', International Politics, 34, March 1997, pp. 79-95. However, as Michael Kennedy points out with respect to Poland, political power did not translate well into prestige because it was held with such low legitimacy. Rather, prestige was accorded to occupations that were of service to society, required certain educational levels or professional knowledge, or demanded sacrifice, responsibility or exertion on the part of the individual. On the whole, material rewards and political power were much less important criteria of occupational prestige. Michael D. Kennedy, Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland: A Critical Sociology of Soviet-Type Society (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 243-248.
67. Bohdan Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (New York, St Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 10-13.
68. Lane & Ross, 'The Russian Political Elites, 1991-95'. It should also be noted that this conceptualisation of the Soviet political elite is close to the approach adopted by Kenneth C. Farmer, who defines it as 'those who control nomenklatura lists' in The Soviet Administrative Elite (New York, Praeger, 1992), pp. 76-77.
69. Sources used to make these determinations were the following: Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union, pp. 160-173; Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 2, 4, December 1969, pp. 493-512; Farmer, The Soviet Administrative Elite, pp. 78-81; Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (New York, Vintage Books, 1958), pp. 62-67; Nomenklatura dolzhnostei TsK KPSS: po sostoyaniyu na 10 avgusta 1988 g., mimeo; Harasymiw, 'Mosca and Moscow: Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union', pp. 284-285.
70. Sources used to make these determinations were the following: Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union, pp. 160-173; Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 2, 4, December 1969, pp. 493-512; Farmer, The Soviet Administrative Elite, pp. 78-81; Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (New York, Vintage Books, 1958), pp. 62-67; Nomenklatura dolzhnostei TsK KPSS: po sostoyaniyu na 10 avgusta 1988 g., mimeo; Harasymiw, 'Mosca and Moscow: Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union', pp. 284-285.
71. Sources used to make these determinations were the following: Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union, pp. 160-173; Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 2, 4, December 1969, pp. 493-512; Farmer, The Soviet Administrative Elite, pp. 78-81; Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (New York, Vintage Books, 1958), pp. 62-67; Nomenklatura dolzhnostei TsK KPSS: po sostoyaniyu na 10 avgusta 1988 g., mimeo; Harasymiw, 'Mosca and Moscow: Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union', pp. 284-285.
72. Sources used to make these determinations were the following: Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union, pp. 160-173; Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 2, 4, December 1969, pp. 493-512; Farmer, The Soviet Administrative Elite, pp. 78-81; Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (New York, Vintage Books, 1958), pp. 62-67; Nomenklatura dolzhnostei TsK KPSS: po sostoyaniyu na 10 avgusta 1988 g., mimeo; Harasymiw, 'Mosca and Moscow: Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union', pp. 284-285.
73. Sources used to make these determinations were the following: Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union, pp. 160-173; Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 2, 4, December 1969, pp. 493-512; Farmer, The Soviet Administrative Elite, pp. 78-81; Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (New York, Vintage Books, 1958), pp. 62-67; Nomenklatura dolzhnostei TsK KPSS: po sostoyaniyu na 10 avgusta 1988 g., mimeo; Harasymiw, 'Mosca and Moscow: Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union', pp. 284-285.
74. There was occasionally some confusion about the meaning of this question. Several respondents interpreted 'an elected party post' to mean a secretary of a party committee, rather than merely an elected member of a party committee. Thus, there may have been slight underreporting at work here.
75. The most important schools were the Academy of Social Sciences and the Higher Party School, both of which were attached to the CPSU Central Committee. There were also a substantial number of higher party schools on the inter-oblast' and republic levels (as well as the Higher Komsomol School). Study in these schools required a recommendation from a party committee and was reserved for those already in party or state careers and targeted for advancement in the party apparatus. For example, if an aspiring cadre was promoted from a full-time party secretaryship at a large enterprise to the medium or upper ranks of the party apparatus, he would often study at a higher party school for a period of time. In addition to these two and four-year programmes of study, the higher party schools also offered short intensive seminars. There were also courses offered on the republic and oblast' levels for lower-level party workers. (Courses taken at institutes of Marxism-Leninism were excluded from this analysis because they were not part of the separate system of party schools explicitly designed to recruit and train future party leaders). Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, revised edition (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 242-245; Geoffrey Hosking, The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within, 2nd edition (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 379; 'Ob Institute obshchestvennykh nauk pri TsK KPSS', Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, 5, pp. 128-130.
76. The most important schools were the Academy of Social Sciences and the Higher Party School, both of which were attached to the CPSU Central Committee. There were also a substantial number of higher party schools on the inter-oblast' and republic levels (as well as the Higher Komsomol School). Study in these schools required a recommendation from a party committee and was reserved for those already in party or state careers and targeted for advancement in the party apparatus. For example, if an aspiring cadre was promoted from a full-time party secretaryship at a large enterprise to the medium or upper ranks of the party apparatus, he would often study at a higher party school for a period of time. In addition to these two and four-year programmes of study, the higher party schools also offered short intensive seminars. There were also courses offered on the republic and oblast' levels for lower-level party workers. (Courses taken at institutes of Marxism-Leninism were excluded from this analysis because they were not part of the separate system of party schools explicitly designed to recruit and train future party leaders). Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, revised edition (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 242-245; Geoffrey Hosking, The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within, 2nd edition (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 379; 'Ob Institute obshchestvennykh nauk pri TsK KPSS', Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, 5, pp. 128-130.
77. The most important schools were the Academy of Social Sciences and the Higher Party School, both of which were attached to the CPSU Central Committee. There were also a substantial number of higher party schools on the inter-oblast' and republic levels (as well as the Higher Komsomol School). Study
78. Another validation of this conclusion is the fact that relatively few elites in the sample received their post-secondary education in elite establishments such as Moscow State University, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Leningrad State University or the Plekhanov Institute of Economics. Of those with higher education, the percentages with an elite education are: federal bureaucrats - 21.1%, Duma deputies - 18.2%, Nizhny Novgorod and Tatarstan elites - 0%.
79. One study reports that the current elite stratum in Russia is not staffed by those from the highest echelons of the nomenklatura but rather by its lower-level 'reserves'. About 49% of political, economic and cultural elites interviewed in 1993 had constituted the 'nomenklatura reserve' in 1988, meaning they were persons slated to move up the hierarchy when vacancies occurred. Only 16% had never held any kind of managerial position. Golovachev et al., ' "Novaya" rossiiskaya elita: starye igroki na novom pole?', p. 5. See also Iván Szelényi & Szonja Szelényi, 'Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe: Introduction', Theory and Society, 24, 5, October 1995, pp. 615-638 at 622-624.
80. One study reports that the current elite stratum in Russia is not staffed by those from the highest echelons of the nomenklatura but rather by its lower-level 'reserves'. About 49% of political, economic and cultural elites interviewed in 1993 had constituted the 'nomenklatura reserve' in 1988, meaning they were persons slated to move up the hierarchy when vacancies occurred. Only 16% had never held any kind of managerial position. Golovachev et al., ' "Novaya" rossiiskaya elita: starye igroki na novom pole?', p. 5. See also Iván Szelényi & Szonja Szelényi, 'Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe: Introduction', Theory and Society, 24, 5, October 1995, pp. 615-638 at 622-624.
81. William Zimmerman, 'Mobilized Participation and the Nature of the Soviet Dictatorship', in James R. Millar (ed.), Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR: A Survey of Former Soviet Citizens (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 332-353 at 340-343.
82. All but one of the deputies who mentioned previous active involvement in the CPSU also reported activity in other parties, usually the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.
83. In fact, party affiliation among Russian civil servants is extremely low in general. Only 52.6% of all bureaucrats could (or would) name a party that best expressed their views. Often they selected the pro-governmental party, Our Home Is Russia, simply because they knew they 'should'. The following exchange is typical (G-100): Interviewer: What party or movement best expresses your views? I mean, at the present moment? Bureaucrat: Oh they're all politically immature. Interviewer: Well, what would you say? Bureaucrat: You know that party, Chernomyrdin's, what's it called? Interviewer: NDR, right? Our Home Is Russia. Bureaucrat: Yes. I work in the government, after all. Our Home Is Russia!
84. Though even descriptive efforts are complicated by the absence of empirical standards for defining what constitutes 'a significant amount' of change.
85. See description of the study in Karpinski, 'Sociologists Compare Nomenklatura Members and Contemporary Elites', p. 37. For former party membership rates of MPs in Russia, Ukraine, Hungary and the Czech Republic (holding office at the end of 1994), see William L. Miller, Stephen White & Paul Heywood, Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe (New York, St Martin's, 1998), p. 179.
86. See description of the study in Karpinski, 'Sociologists Compare Nomenklatura Members and Contemporary Elites', p. 37. For former party membership rates of MPs in Russia, Ukraine, Hungary and the Czech Republic (holding office at the end of 1994), see William L. Miller, Stephen White & Paul Heywood, Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe (New York, St Martin's, 1998), p. 179.
87. Steen, Between Past and Future, p. 36. As with all comparisons, one must be cognisant that the definition and identification of the 'political elite' vary across studies.
88. Cited in John Higley, Judith Kullberg & Jan Pakulski, 'The Persistence of Postcommunist Elites', Journal of Democracy, 7, 2, April 1996, pp. 133-147 at 135-136.
89. The data for Hungary and Poland were collected before parliamentary elections that returned communist successor parties to power - in May 1994 and September 1993 respectively.
90. One might object that in the former Soviet Union the soviets were meaningless because -owing to the monopoly of power held by the Communist Party - they had no real policy-making power. While this may be an apt characterisation of the function of the soviets, it is not true with respect to the status of many of those who 'ran' for deputy slots in the soviets, i.e. they were key figures in party and state organs. One bureaucrat in my sample explained the process this way (G-070): 'When you had a higher rank, after you had grown in stature, then you would run for a deputy slot and so forth. That was the kind of system it was. We were very high-ranking bureaucrats, well-paid and so on. We traveled abroad, which at that time was considered to be the height of good fortune. Therefore a person in the nomenklatura simply had to grow in stature, and at the appointed moment he would run for election somewhere and would begin to climb the ladder'.
91. By way of contrast, one study computes that less than 5% of Hungary's communist legislature was re-elected in the country's first free parliamentary elections. Ákos Róna-Tas, 'The Selected and the Elected: The Making of the New Parliamentary Elite in Hungary', East European Politics and Societies, 5, 3, Fall 1991, pp. 357-393 at 360. On the early post-communist parliamentary elite in Hungary, see also Rudolf L. Tökés, 'Hungary's New Political Elites: Adaptation and Change, 1989-90', Problems of Communism, 39, November-December 1990, pp. 44-65.
92. By way of contrast, one study computes that less than 5% of Hungary's communist legislature was re-elected in the country's first free parliamentary elections. Ákos Róna-Tas, 'The Selected and the Elected: The Making of the New Parliamentary Elite in Hungary', East European Politics and Societies, 5, 3, Fall 1991, pp. 357-393 at 360. On the early post-communist parliamentary elite in Hungary, see also Rudolf L. Tökés, 'Hungary's New Political Elites: Adaptation and Change, 1989-90', Problems of Communism, 39, November-December 1990, pp. 44-65.
93. Salustiano del Campo, José Félix Tezanos & Walter Santin, 'The Spanish Political Elite: Permanency and Change', in Moshe M. Czudnowski (ed.), Does Who Governs Matter? Elite Circulation in Contemporary Societies (DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 1982), pp. 125-153 at 134-143.
94. Del Campo et al., 'The Spanish Political Elite: Permanency and Change', pp. 137-138.
95. Lewis J. Edinger, 'Post-Totalitarian Leadership: Elites in the German Federal Republic', American Political Science Review, 54, 1, March 1960, pp. 58-82.
96. Ibid., p. 72.
97. Eva Fodor, Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski & Natasha Yershova, 'The New Political and Cultural Elite', Theory and Society, 24, 5, October 1995, pp. 783-800 at 789. However, contrary to expectations, the circulation of elites was greater and faster in Hungary than in Poland, where the counter-elite was more institutionalised. Szelényi & Szelényi, 'Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe', pp. 619-621.
98. Eva Fodor, Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski & Natasha Yershova, 'The New Political and Cultural Elite', Theory and Society, 24, 5, October 1995, pp. 783-800 at 789. However, contrary to expectations, the circulation of elites was greater and faster in Hungary than in Poland, where the counter-elite was more institutionalised. Szelényi & Szelényi, 'Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe', pp. 619-621.
99. Helga A. Walsh, 'Dealing with the Communist Past: Central and East European Experiences after 1990', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 3, 1996, pp. 413-428 at 415. See also Thomas A. Baylis, 'Plus Ça Change? Transformation and Continuity Among East European Elites', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 27, 3, 1994, pp. 315-328 at 320-321; Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land: Facing Europe's Ghosts After Communism (New York, Random House, 1995).
100. Helga A. Walsh, 'Dealing with the Communist Past: Central and East European Experiences after 1990', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 3, 1996, pp. 413-428 at 415. See also Thomas A. Baylis, 'Plus Ça Change? Transformation and Continuity Among East European Elites', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 27, 3, 1994, pp. 315-328 at 320-321; Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land: Facing Europe's Ghosts After Communism (New York, Random House, 1995).
101. Helga A. Walsh, 'Dealing with the Communist Past: Central and East European Experiences after 1990', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 3, 1996, pp. 413-428 at 415. See also Thomas A. Baylis, 'Plus Ça Change? Transformation and Continuity Among East European Elites', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 27, 3, 1994, pp. 315-328 at 320-321; Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land: Facing Europe's Ghosts After Communism (New York, Random House, 1995).
102. Sharon Werning Rivera, 'Historical Cleavages or Transition Mode? Influences on the Emerging Party Systems in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia', Party Politics, 2, 2, 1996, pp. 177-208;
103. Louisa Vinton, 'Poland Goes Left', RFE/RL Research Report, 2, 8 October 1993, pp. 21-23 at 21;
104. Edith Oltay, 'Hungarian Socialists Prepare for Comeback', RFE/RL Research Report, 3, 4 March 1994, pp. 21-26 at 21.
105. For an argument suggesting that the transformation of communist successor parties into 'credibly pro-reform social democracies' is a promising strategy mainly in countries with reasonable prospects for economic and political integration with Europe, see Mitchell Orenstein, 'A Genealogy of Communist Successor Parties in East-Central Europe and the Determinants of their Success', East European Politics and Societies, 12, 3, Fall 1998, pp. 472-499.
106. Thomas Baylis points to yet another explanatory factor that differentiates the extent of elite turnover in the former German Democratic Republic from that in the former Czechoslovakia: the import of West German elites to fill critical positions. Thomas A. Baylis, 'Elite Change after Communism: Eastern Germany, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia', East European Politics and Societies, 12, 2, Spring 1998, pp. 265-299.