The Consolidation of a New Regional Élite: The Case of Omsk 1987-1995

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 619-650

  Melvin, Neil J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY; ELITE ARRANGEMENTS; REGIONAL POLITICS;

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, OMSK;

EID: 0031722126     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668139808412557     Document Type: Article

References (115)

1. A variety of scholars has placed élites at the heart of transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule. See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillipe Schmitter & Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Work on the Soviet and Russian systems suggests that élites have also played a critical role in political change. Vladimir Gel'man, 'Shakhmatnye partii rossiiskoi elity', Pro & Contra, 1, 1, Autumn 1996, pp. 22-31; Olga Kryshtanovskaya & Stephen White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 5, July 1996, pp. 711-733; and David Lane, 'The Transformation of Russia: the Role of the Political Élite', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 4, June 1996, pp. 535-549.
2. A variety of scholars has placed élites at the heart of transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule. See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillipe Schmitter & Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Work on the Soviet and Russian systems suggests that élites have also played a critical role in political change. Vladimir Gel'man, 'Shakhmatnye partii rossiiskoi elity', Pro & Contra, 1, 1, Autumn 1996, pp. 22-31; Olga Kryshtanovskaya & Stephen White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 5, July 1996, pp. 711-733; and David Lane, 'The Transformation of Russia: the Role of the Political Élite', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 4, June 1996, pp. 535-549.
3. A variety of scholars has placed élites at the heart of transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule. See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillipe Schmitter & Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Work on the Soviet and Russian systems suggests that élites have also played a critical role in political change. Vladimir Gel'man, 'Shakhmatnye partii rossiiskoi elity', Pro & Contra, 1, 1, Autumn 1996, pp. 22-31; Olga Kryshtanovskaya & Stephen White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 5, July 1996, pp. 711-733; and David Lane, 'The Transformation of Russia: the Role of the Political Élite', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 4, June 1996, pp. 535-549.
4. A variety of scholars has placed élites at the heart of transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule. See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillipe Schmitter & Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Work on the Soviet and Russian systems suggests that élites have also played a critical role in political change. Vladimir Gel'man, 'Shakhmatnye partii rossiiskoi elity', Pro & Contra, 1, 1, Autumn 1996, pp. 22-31; Olga Kryshtanovskaya & Stephen White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 5, July 1996, pp. 711-733; and David Lane, 'The Transformation of Russia: the Role of the Political Élite', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 4, June 1996, pp. 535-549.
5. The regional élite is understood here as a small self-conscious group that commands a disproportionate share of power, occupies authoritative positions in leading political, economic and cultural organisations and movements such as to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially, and enjoys a significant degree of autonomy from other social groups. See Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (NJ, Prentice Hall, 1976), and John Higley & Richard Gunther (eds), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992). The Russian regional élite does not, however, necessarily act as a single unit in all matters, indeed it might be more accurate to speak of regional élites that share some interests but only rarely form a cohesive single political bloc against the federal centre. Regional élites are, moreover, far from identical. The emergence of new sources of economic and political power - privatisation, marketisation, elections - has forced regional élites to transform themselves continually to meet new challenges. In this environment, coalitions have been formed and reformed as local interests have struggled to deploy their resources (organisations, finance and authority) in response to the new environment. The fluidity of this situation has produced a diversity of élite formations and patterns across Russia.
6. The regional élite is understood here as a small self-conscious group that commands a disproportionate share of power, occupies authoritative positions in leading political, economic and cultural organisations and movements such as to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially, and enjoys a significant degree of autonomy from other social groups. See Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (NJ, Prentice Hall, 1976), and John Higley & Richard Gunther (eds), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992). The Russian regional élite does not, however, necessarily act as a single unit in all matters, indeed it might be more accurate to speak of regional élites that share some interests but only rarely form a cohesive single political bloc against the federal centre. Regional élites are, moreover, far from identical. The emergence of new sources of economic and political power - privatisation, marketisation, elections - has forced regional élites to transform themselves continually to meet new challenges. In this environment, coalitions have been formed and reformed as local interests have struggled to deploy their resources (organisations, finance and authority) in response to the new environment. The fluidity of this situation has produced a diversity of élite formations and patterns across Russia.
7. Gavin Helf & Jeffery W. Hahn, 'Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party Elites in the Russian Regional Elections of 1990', Slavic Review, 51, 3, Fall 1992, pp. 511-530; Daniel R. Kempton, 'The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The Evolution of Centre-Regional Relations in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 4, June 1996, pp. 587-613; Mary McAuley, 'Politics, Economics, and Elite Realignment in Russia: A Regional Perspective', Soviet Economy, 8, 1, 1992, pp. 46-88; S. Medvedev, 'Post-Soviet Developments: A Regional Interpretation (A Methodological Overview)', in K. Segbers & S. De Spiegeleire (eds), Post-Soviet Puzzles. Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union, vol. II (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995); Darrell Slider, 'Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 243-264; Daniel Treisman, 'Moscow's Struggle to Control Regions Through Taxation', Transition, 20 September 1996, pp. 45-49; Daniel S. Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order', World Politics, 49, January 1997, pp. 212-249; James Hughes, 'Sub-national Élites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya and White', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 6, September 1997, pp. 1017-1036.
8. Gavin Helf & Jeffery W. Hahn, 'Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party Elites in the Russian Regional Elections of 1990', Slavic Review, 51, 3, Fall 1992, pp. 511-530; Daniel R. Kempton, 'The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The Evolution of Centre-Regional Relations in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 4, June 1996, pp. 587-613; Mary McAuley, 'Politics, Economics, and Elite Realignment in Russia: A Regional Perspective', Soviet Economy, 8, 1, 1992, pp. 46-88; S. Medvedev, 'Post-Soviet Developments: A Regional Interpretation (A Methodological Overview)', in K. Segbers & S. De Spiegeleire (eds), Post-Soviet Puzzles. Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union, vol. II (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995); Darrell Slider, 'Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 243-264; Daniel Treisman, 'Moscow's Struggle to Control Regions Through Taxation', Transition, 20 September 1996, pp. 45-49; Daniel S. Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order', World Politics, 49, January 1997, pp. 212-249; James Hughes, 'Sub-national Élites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya and White', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 6, September 1997, pp. 1017-1036.
9. Gavin Helf & Jeffery W. Hahn, 'Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party Elites in the Russian Regional Elections of 1990', Slavic Review, 51, 3, Fall 1992, pp. 511-530; Daniel R. Kempton, 'The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The Evolution of Centre-Regional Relations in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 4, June 1996, pp. 587-613; Mary McAuley, 'Politics, Economics, and Elite Realignment in Russia: A Regional Perspective', Soviet Economy, 8, 1, 1992, pp. 46-88; S. Medvedev, 'Post-Soviet Developments: A Regional Interpretation (A Methodological Overview)', in K. Segbers & S. De Spiegeleire (eds), Post-Soviet Puzzles. Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union, vol. II (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995); Darrell Slider, 'Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 243-264; Daniel Treisman, 'Moscow's Struggle to Control Regions Through Taxation', Transition, 20 September 1996, pp. 45-49; Daniel S. Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order', World Politics, 49, January 1997, pp. 212-249; James Hughes, 'Sub-national Élites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya and White', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 6, September 1997, pp. 1017-1036.
10. Gavin Helf & Jeffery W. Hahn, 'Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party Elites in the Russian Regional Elections of 1990', Slavic Review, 51, 3, Fall 1992, pp. 511-530; Daniel R. Kempton, 'The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The Evolution of Centre-Regional Relations in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 4, June 1996, pp. 587-613; Mary McAuley, 'Politics, Economics, and Elite Realignment in Russia: A Regional Perspective', Soviet Economy, 8, 1, 1992, pp. 46-88; S. Medvedev, 'Post-Soviet Developments: A Regional Interpretation (A Methodological Overview)', in K. Segbers & S. De Spiegeleire (eds), Post-Soviet Puzzles. Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union, vol. II (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995); Darrell Slider, 'Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 243-264; Daniel Treisman, 'Moscow's Struggle to Control Regions Through Taxation', Transition, 20 September 1996, pp. 45-49; Daniel S. Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order', World Politics, 49, January 1997, pp. 212-249; James Hughes, 'Sub-national Élites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya and White', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 6, September 1997, pp. 1017-1036.
11. Gavin Helf & Jeffery W. Hahn, 'Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party Elites in the Russian Regional Elections of 1990', Slavic Review, 51, 3, Fall 1992, pp. 511-530; Daniel R. Kempton, 'The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The Evolution of Centre-Regional Relations in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 4, June 1996, pp. 587-613; Mary McAuley, 'Politics, Economics, and Elite Realignment in Russia: A Regional Perspective', Soviet Economy, 8, 1, 1992, pp. 46-88; S. Medvedev, 'Post-Soviet Developments: A Regional Interpretation (A Methodological Overview)', in K. Segbers & S. De Spiegeleire (eds), Post-Soviet Puzzles. Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union, vol. II (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995); Darrell Slider, 'Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 243-264; Daniel Treisman, 'Moscow's Struggle to Control Regions Through Taxation', Transition, 20 September 1996, pp. 45-49; Daniel S. Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order', World Politics, 49, January 1997, pp. 212-249; James Hughes, 'Sub-national Élites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya and White', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 6, September 1997, pp. 1017-1036.
12. Gavin Helf & Jeffery W. Hahn, 'Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party Elites in the Russian Regional Elections of 1990', Slavic Review, 51, 3, Fall 1992, pp. 511-530; Daniel R. Kempton, 'The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The Evolution of Centre-Regional Relations in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 4, June 1996, pp. 587-613; Mary McAuley, 'Politics, Economics, and Elite Realignment in Russia: A Regional Perspective', Soviet Economy, 8, 1, 1992, pp. 46-88; S. Medvedev, 'Post-Soviet Developments: A Regional Interpretation (A Methodological Overview)', in K. Segbers & S. De Spiegeleire (eds), Post-Soviet Puzzles. Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union, vol. II (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995); Darrell Slider, 'Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 243-264; Daniel Treisman, 'Moscow's Struggle to Control Regions Through Taxation', Transition, 20 September 1996, pp. 45-49; Daniel S. Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order', World Politics, 49, January 1997, pp. 212-249; James Hughes, 'Sub-national Élites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya and White', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 6, September 1997, pp. 1017-1036.
13. Gavin Helf & Jeffery W. Hahn, 'Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party Elites in the Russian Regional Elections of 1990', Slavic Review, 51, 3, Fall 1992, pp. 511-530; Daniel R. Kempton, 'The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The Evolution of Centre-Regional Relations in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 4, June 1996, pp. 587-613; Mary McAuley, 'Politics, Economics, and Elite Realignment in Russia: A Regional Perspective', Soviet Economy, 8, 1, 1992, pp. 46-88; S. Medvedev, 'Post-Soviet Developments: A Regional Interpretation (A Methodological Overview)', in K. Segbers & S. De Spiegeleire (eds), Post-Soviet Puzzles. Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union, vol. II (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995); Darrell Slider, 'Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 243-264; Daniel Treisman, 'Moscow's Struggle to Control Regions Through Taxation', Transition, 20 September 1996, pp. 45-49; Daniel S. Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order', World Politics, 49, January 1997, pp. 212-249; James Hughes, 'Sub-national Élites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya and White', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 6, September 1997, pp. 1017-1036.
14. Gavin Helf & Jeffery W. Hahn, 'Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party Elites in the Russian Regional Elections of 1990', Slavic Review, 51, 3, Fall 1992, pp. 511-530; Daniel R. Kempton, 'The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The Evolution of Centre-Regional Relations in the Russian Federation', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 4, June 1996, pp. 587-613; Mary McAuley, 'Politics, Economics, and Elite Realignment in Russia: A Regional Perspective', Soviet Economy, 8, 1, 1992, pp. 46-88; S. Medvedev, 'Post-Soviet Developments: A Regional Interpretation (A Methodological Overview)', in K. Segbers & S. De Spiegeleire (eds), Post-Soviet Puzzles. Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union, vol. II (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995); Darrell Slider, 'Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 243-264; Daniel Treisman, 'Moscow's Struggle to Control Regions Through Taxation', Transition, 20 September 1996, pp. 45-49; Daniel S. Treisman, 'Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order', World Politics, 49, January 1997, pp. 212-249; James Hughes, 'Sub-national Élites and Post-communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya and White', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 6, September 1997, pp. 1017-1036.
15. James Hughes, 'Moscow's Bilateral Treaties Add to Confusion', Transition, 20 September 1996, pp. 39-43.
16. Some regions initially resisted elections in their area, notably Chechnya and Tatarstan in 1993, and a wide variety of local electoral arrangements have been adopted among Russia's provinces, reflecting the diversity of executive and legislative systems that have been established in the republics, kraya and oblasti. All of Russia's regions have, however, accepted the centrally imposed electoral process, including the Chechen Republic. Indeed, in some regions the local élites actually pressed for elections. In the gubernatorial elections of 1996-97 a number of incumbent governors sought to cancel the elections, although none succeeded. Laura Belin, 'All Sides Claim Victory in 1996 Gubernatorial Elections', Transition, 3, 3, 21 February 1997, pp. 25-26.
17. For an analysis of the changes in constituency boundaries across the Russian Federation between the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections see Nikolai Petrov, 'Ochevidno, ne bez umysla', Vash vybor, 1995, 3-4, pp. 35-38.
18. Hahn found evidence of support for democratic values among deputies in the Russian provinces in the early 1990s, although he notes that there may be an 'interest' in democracy in the sense that arguments about democracy were being used by those in the legislative branch in their struggle with the executive. Jeffery Hahn, 'Attitudes Toward Reform Among Provincial Russian Politicians', Post-Soviet Affairs, 9, 1, 1993, pp. 66-85.
19. Higley & Burton define a 'consensually unified' elite as (i) where members of the élite share a largely tacit consensus about rules and codes of political conduct amounting to restrained partisanship and (2) members participate in a more of less comprehensively integrated structure of interaction that provides them with relatively reliable and effective access to each other and to the most central decision-makers. Together these elements encourage members of the élite to view decisional outcomes as a 'politics-as-bargaining' game rather than a 'politics as war' game. John Higley & Michael G. Burton, 'The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns', American Sociological Review, 54, February 1989, p. 19.
20. For background on Omsk oblast' see L. V. Smirnyagin (ed.), Rossiiskie regiony nakanune vyborov-95 (Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1995), pp. 128-129, Tsentr politicheskikh tekhnologii: Omskaya oblast' (Moscow, TsPT, 1995); Ekaterina Mikhailovskaya, Rossiiskii sbornik (Moscow, Panorama, 1995), pp. 292-307; M. Makfol & N. Petrov, Politicheskii al'manakh Rossii 1995 (Moscow, Moscow Carnegie Centre, 1995), pp. 471-474.
21. For background on Omsk oblast' see L. V. Smirnyagin (ed.), Rossiiskie regiony nakanune vyborov-95 (Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1995), pp. 128-129, Tsentr politicheskikh tekhnologii: Omskaya oblast' (Moscow, TsPT, 1995); Ekaterina Mikhailovskaya, Rossiiskii sbornik (Moscow, Panorama, 1995), pp. 292-307; M. Makfol & N. Petrov, Politicheskii al'manakh Rossii 1995 (Moscow, Moscow Carnegie Centre, 1995), pp. 471-474.
22. For background on Omsk oblast' see L. V. Smirnyagin (ed.), Rossiiskie regiony nakanune vyborov-95 (Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1995), pp. 128-129, Tsentr politicheskikh tekhnologii: Omskaya oblast' (Moscow, TsPT, 1995); Ekaterina Mikhailovskaya, Rossiiskii sbornik (Moscow, Panorama, 1995), pp. 292-307; M. Makfol & N. Petrov, Politicheskii al'manakh Rossii 1995 (Moscow, Moscow Carnegie Centre, 1995), pp. 471-474.
23. For background on Omsk oblast' see L. V. Smirnyagin (ed.), Rossiiskie regiony nakanune vyborov-95 (Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1995), pp. 128-129, Tsentr politicheskikh tekhnologii: Omskaya oblast' (Moscow, TsPT, 1995); Ekaterina Mikhailovskaya, Rossiiskii sbornik (Moscow, Panorama, 1995), pp. 292-307; M. Makfol & N. Petrov, Politicheskii al'manakh Rossii 1995 (Moscow, Moscow Carnegie Centre, 1995), pp. 471-474.
24. 'Omskaya oblast': spad zamedlilsya, no do pod″ema eshche daleko', Russkaya Aziya, 14 February 1996, p. 4.
25. G. V. Bylov & A. M. Lavrov, 'Privatization', http://www.exin.ru/tacis/voll_en/chap7_1.html
26. For a description of the creation, activity and organisation of political organisations in the oblast' since the late 1980s see S. V. Novikov & A. A. Makarov, Politicheskie partii i dvizheniya Omska (spravochnik) noyabr' 1995 (Omsk, Znanie, 1995) and S. Novikov, 'Partii i obshchestvennye organizatsii Omska (Dekabr' 1993-Yanvar' 1994)', Omskii vestnik, 9 February 1994.
27. For a description of the creation, activity and organisation of political organisations in the oblast' since the late 1980s see S. V. Novikov & A. A. Makarov, Politicheskie partii i dvizheniya Omska (spravochnik) noyabr' 1995 (Omsk, Znanie, 1995) and S. Novikov, 'Partii i obshchestvennye organizatsii Omska (Dekabr' 1993-Yanvar' 1994)', Omskii vestnik, 9 February 1994.
28. Young has provided an important account of élite politics in Omsk oblast' during the early years of independence. John F. Young, 'Institutions, Elites, and Local Politics in Russia: The Case of Omsk', in Theodore H. Freidgut & Jeffery W. Hahn (eds), Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics (NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 138-161.
29. Elected in 1990, Omsk oblast' soviet had a reputation for being pro-communist. There was, however, a significant Democratic Russia faction. A. Glubotsky, 'Omskaya oblast' ', in Ekaterina Mikhailovskaya (ed.), Rossiiskii sbornik (Moscow, Panorama, 1995), pp. 292-306.
30. 'Demarsh 'Beloi gvardii' i Demsoyuza', Omskaya pravda, 7 December 1993.
31. 'Izbiratel' vsem vozdal po zaslugam', Oreol, 1993, 50 (December).
32. In the period 1991-93 an attempt was made to link the democratic movement to representatives of the emerging private sector. A number of entrepreneurs joined Russia's Choice and Shakhrai's PEA. The new entrepreneurial class in the region also supported their own individual democratic candidates including Ivan Folyak, the leader of Omsk AKKOR, and S. A. Nosovets, a former People's Deputy of the Russian Supreme Soviet. In 1993 Aleksandr Levchenko, President of the regional branch of the association Entrepreneurs for a New Russia, ran on the PEA party list and in single-mandate district 130. 'Rossii nuzhny politiki sozidateli', Omskii vestnik, 8 December 1993. The owners of small businesses were, however, unable to offer the degree of support that the managers in the oblast' could provide to the administration, and the democrats lacked the connections and organisational strength to persuade the leading economic interests in the region to support them.
33. 'Omsk poka za demokratov', Oreol, 30 December 1993-5 January 1994.
34. The Labour Party was created in 1992 by members of the leftist intelligentsia in Omsk and promoted a 'democratic socialist' ideology. The party was less reactionary than the local Communists and in December 1993 was supported by the Agrarian Party in Omsk. Novikov & Makarov, p. 20.
35. The results for district 128 were: Oleg Zharov - independent democrat (28.1%); Aleksandr Luppov - CPRF (15%); Ivan Folyak - independent democrat (12.3%); Kh. K. Sadykov - centrist (6.6%); V. F. Ivakhnenko - President of the Council of Unions of the agro-industrial complex of Bol'sherechensk (3.7%); Vladimir Seleznev - CPRF (3.2%).
36. The results for district 129 were: Viktor Lotkov - independent democrat (41.2%); Yu. V. Vinokurov - head of administration of Omsk raion (20.63%); N. I. Kutorgin - independent leftist (17%).
37. The results for the leading candidates in district 130 were: Sergei Baburin - nationalist (26.7%); Sergei Nosovets - Russia's Choice (22.5%); V. I. Zol'nikov - independent democrat (10.9%); V. A. Kozlov - the local leader of Democratic Russia (7.6%); Aleksandr Kravets - First Secretary of the local CPRF (5.5%); I. E. Diskin - Civic Union (1.1%).
38. Leonid Polezhaev, Put' k sebe: vospominaniya (Omsk, 1994).
39. For details of Polezhaev's strategy of appointing former nomenklatura personnel in 1991-92 see Young, p. 143.
40. Polezhaev sought to build ties to the opposition movement through the appointment of Aleksandr Luppov, a leading local communist, as one of his deputies in the administration.
41. As in many parts of the Russian Federation, in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union there was significant conflict between executive and legislative power in Omsk. The communist-dominated regional soviet came into conflict with the administration over issues such as privatisation. The fact that, prior to becoming chairman of the obsovet, Anatolii Leont'ev had served as head of the oblispolkom, that is Polezhaev's boss, and enjoyed good personal relations with Polezhaev was an important factor in minimising tension.
42. A critical development that brought the administration and large banks together was the effort to stop the collapse of small local banks such as Omtorbank, which was placed under the joint control of Inkombank and the administration in 1995. Omskaya pravda, 28 November 1995.
43. Of the five seats being contested two were won by representatives of the petrochemical sector (the director of AO Yuganskneftegaz; the deputy director of AO Omskshina); one from the financial sector (the director of Omskpromstroibank); and two entrepreneurs (the director of the scientific-production enterprise Mostovik and the president of the holding company Aktsiya).
44. From 1988 Vladimir Varnavsky was First Secretary of Omsk CPSU gorkom and leader of the gorsovet. He became a People's Deputy of the RSFSR in 1990, where he adopted a moderate anti-reform position. After the Omsk gorsovet was dissolved by presidential decree in 1993, he was named a deputy head of the Omsk administration. The appointment of Varnavsky indicated an attempt by Polezhaev to co-opt leading members of different political forces into his network of power.
45. 'Opposition' is understood here to include those political organisations and movements that were generally opposed to the policies of the Russian government and President. On the whole, the 'opposition' was composed of groups with a communist or national-communist orientation. In Russia's regions, as a result of hostility to centrally imposed policies the nature of opposition frequently assumed a different form from that at the centre of the federal system. For example, Andrews & Stoner-Weiss found widespread support in four Russian regions for local-level reform coupled to a strong anti-centre sentiment. Josephine Andrews & Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, 'Regionalism and Reform in Provincial Russia', Post-Soviet Affairs, 11, 4, 1995, p. 391. Significantly, in Omsk the local 'opposition' was only rarely opposed to the oblast' administration and its policies.
46. Across the Russian Federation, the regional soviet structure became the home for many of the former Soviet élite following the failure of the August putsch in 1991. Omsk was no exception. Led from 1990 by Anatolii Leont'ev, a former obkom first secretary, the soviet contained a high proportion of the deputies from the former élite. For a discussion of the soviets in the period immediately following the 1991 putsch see Jeffery Hahn, 'Attitudes Toward Reform Among Provincial Russian Politicians', Post-Soviet Affairs, 9, 1, 1993, pp. 66-85.
47. Attempts to form an alliance between leftist forces and local business failed because the administration dominated the economic life of the oblast'. For example, the firm Omsktess initially financed the paper Omskoe vremya, which became the mouthpiece of the CPRF. Later, however, funding ceased and the Communists had to establish their own paper, Krasnyi put'.
48. 'Politicheskaya palitra Omska. Kommunisticheskaya oppozitsiya Chast II', Omskaya pravda, 22 July 1994.
49. RAU was originally created at the beginning of 1992 by leftist forces following the ban on the Communist Party. The organisation was established by leading second-tier communist leaders in the oblast', notably Aleksandr Kravets, Mikhail Mashkarin and T. L. Sablina. In the second half of 1993 Russian nationalists led by Sergei Baburin seized control of the movement, creating strong resentment among the local CPRF leadership.
50. In 1989 Kazannik had vacated his seat in the USSR Supreme Soviet to allow El'tsin to become a member. Kazannik's later appointment as Chief Prosecutor was interpreted as a reward for his earlier action. Although Kazannik returned to Omsk after he left his position as Chief Prosecutor, he failed to rejoin the local democratic organisations, preferring instead to create his own centrist party (The Party of People's Conscience) in January 1995. Kazannik's organisation later merged with the Party of Workers' Self-Management. Novikov & Makarov, pp. 17-19.
51. Polezhaev and Shoikhet represented very different constituencies in the region. Young notes that Shoikhet staffed the city administration primarily with personnel who were not former members of the nomenklatura. Instead, he appointed to key positions academics and individuals successful in small businesses. Polezhaev, on the other hand, built his power base from those who had previously held important economic and political positions in the oblast'. See note 24 and Young, pp. 147-148.
52. The disintegration of the Democratic movement is described in Mikhail Oskolkov, 'Nemnogo iz zhizni politklubov: Politicheskaya palitra Omska, Chast' I', Omskaya pravda, 22 July 1994, p. 7 and S. V. Novikov, Antikommunisticheskaya oppozitsiya - 1988-91 (Omsk, 1994).
53. The disintegration of the Democratic movement is described in Mikhail Oskolkov, 'Nemnogo iz zhizni politklubov: Politicheskaya palitra Omska, Chast' I', Omskaya pravda, 22 July 1994, p. 7 and S. V. Novikov, Antikommunisticheskaya oppozitsiya - 1988-91 (Omsk, 1994).
54. 'Lish' mgnovenie ty naverkhu i stremitel'no padaesh' vniz ...', Oreol, 30 December 1993-5 January 1994.
55. In Omsk, although the electoral districts for the elections of 1995 remained broadly similar to their 1993 boundaries, there were some changes. District 128 (Bol'sherechensk) gained the rural raion of Kormilovsk which was taken from district 129 (Omsk). A number of urban raiony of Omsk were reshuffled between district 129 and district 130 (Central). However, the general character of the electoral districts was not changed. See Petrov, 'Ochevidno ...'.
56. 'Omskoe Priirtysh'e', Novoe obozrenie, 16 August 1995.
57. 'Komu spasat' selo? Zametki so s″ezda Agrosoyuza oblasti', Sibirskoe vremya, 30 June 1995.
58. After 1992 the administration and leading figures in the local agro-industrial complex developed a very close relationship based upon the pivotal role that the administration played in allocating finance to the rural areas. Control of land became central to the further success of this alliance. With the transformation of the state and collective farms into AOZT (enterprises of a closed type) the farm directors were able gradually to acquire shares held by farm labourers. The directors took control of the land 'on behalf of the peasants'. Up to 40% of the land was believed to be under the control of the directors by 1995. The administration's attitude to selling land was, therefore, central to the process of creating an economic group in the countryside that controlled the land. 'Predvybornyi blok Agrariev', Omskii vestnik, 14 July 1995. In essence, the Omsk Agrarian Movement was a rural OHR with its leadership consisting of the President of the Omsk branch of the Agrarian Party of Russia, the President of the oblast' Agro-union, the President of the obkom of the Trade Union of the Agro-industrial Complex, and the President of the oblast' Consumers Union. 'Obrashchenie soveta Agrarnogo Soyuza oblasti ko vsem izbiratelyam Omskoi oblasti', Krest'yanskoe slovo, 27 October 1995.
59. Gennadii Baranov, head of the Tyukalinsk raion administration (district 128); Valentina Sokolova, theatre director (district 129); Galina Kirilenko, director of a private company (district 130). 'Spasti Rossiyu - v sebe i cherez sebya', Vechernii Omsk, 25 November 1995 and 'Zhenshchine davno obustroit' Rossiyu', Omskaya pravda, 14 November 1995. There were also four local candidates on the OHR national party list: V. V. Tikhomirov, rector of Omsk State University; Yu. Kozhevnikov, the president of the Omsk Union of Entrepreneurs; V. Sokolova, and G. Baranov. 'Omskoe Priirtysh'e - partiinyi spisok', Omskaya pravda, 24 November 1995.
60. Valerii Syreishchikov, head of the administration of Poltavskii raion, noted that the local administration was working for 'our' candidate Gennadii Baranov, the head of administration of Tyukalinsk raion, and was active on behalf of Polezhaev in the villages. 'Oshibit'sya snova -nel'zya', Omskii vestnik, 29 November 1995.
61. Polezhaev was drawn away from the OHR movement because, to a high degree, his electoral success depended upon the manipulation of centre-region relations. First campaigning as a defender of local interests against Moscow was popular in the oblast'. Second, Polezhaev could use localist sentiments to bargain with the centre for increased resources. Interview with Polezhaev's public support committee, Omsk City Library, 10 December 1995.
62. The broad nature of support for Polezhaev can be gauged from the membership of his support committee, which included leading figures from the administration, the cultural élite, the intelligentsia, the media and economic leaders. 'Obshchestvennogo komiteta podderzhki L. Polezhaeva po vyboram glavoi administratsii Omskoi oblasti', Omskaya pravda, 24 November 1995.
63. 'Leonid Polezhaev; ne budet sporit - davaite stroit' ', Krest'yanskoe slovo, 15 December 1995.
64. 'Poltora milliona na normal'nuyu zhizn' ', Vechernii Omsk, 28 October 1995.
65. Hughes has argued that the political struggle between Moscow and Siberian leaders over power dispersion in the Russian Federation was primarily motivated by the question of control of Siberia's extensive natural resource base. Jim Hughes, 'Regionalism in Russia: The Rise and Fall of Siberian Agreement', Europe-Asia Studies, 46, 7, 1994, pp. 1133-1161.
66. The proposed Siberian Oil Company was to consist of the enterprises Omsknefteorgsintez and Omsknefteprodukt in Omsk and Tyumen'neftegazgeologiya and Noyabr'skneftegaz in Tyumen'. 'Vremya krutogo pereloma', Novoe obozrenie, 6 December 1995.
67. 'Vstrecha sibzavodovtsev s gubernatorom', Sibzavodovets, November 1995.
68. It is noteworthy that one of the leaders of Polezhaev's Electoral Support Committee was A. Grokhotov, the Director of the financial company Finenergo of the AK Omskenergo.
69. 'Kazakhstan ogranichno voshel v tkan' moego mirooshchushcheniya', Aziya, 1994, 33.
70. 'Investitsii - ekonomym', Omskii vestnik, 8 December 1995.
71. 'Pereboev ne ozhidaetsya', Omskaya pravda, 28 November 1995.
72. 'Postanovlenie glavy administratsii Omskoi oblasti o predostavlenii l'got po opiate zhil'ya kommunal'nykh uslug, topliva i transportnykh uslug ...', Omskaya pravda, 28 November 1995.
73. 'S pritselom v budushchee', Omskaya pravda, 1 November 1995.
74. The Committee had two strategic policies in this period: the creation of the company Sibstankoshinprom, uniting several local giganty and some banks, and, second, the establishment of a company to develop new energy sources for transport. 'Odnim svoim zavodom ne prozhit", Vechernii Omsk, 22 November 1995.
75. 'S chego nachinaetsya rodina ...', Vechernii Omsk, 2 December 1995 and Valerii Roshchupkin, Osnovnye napravleniya razvitiya g. Omska (Omsk, 1995).
76. The leadership of the agro-industrial complex was active in support of Polezhaev because of the administration's opposition to private land. 'V podderzhku kandidatov na post gubernatora', Omskaya pravda, 3 November 1995. A long list of small and medium businesses also lined up to support Polezhaev's candidacy. 'Pochemu doveryayut kandidatu?', Omskaya pravda, 14 November 1995.
77. With the exception of the newspapers Sibirskoe vremya and Omskoe vremya, which supported Sergei Baburin's political movement, and the small circulation paper of the Federation of Omsk Trades Unions, Pozitsiya, which supported CPRF candidates, the Duma elections were not a priority for the local media. Instead, print and electronic media were focused upon the elections for governor and mayor. Aware of the critical role of the local media in the formation of public opinion, the oblast' administration issued a number of decrees prior to the elections concerning the mass media. Most important was a decree that created the Omsk Regional Commission for Broadcasting under the chairmanship of V. F. Budkov, the President of the Information Committee of the oblast' administration, with significant powers of censorship. In addition, beginning from August the oblast' administration began to conduct a series of seminars with the local media designed to provide 'instructional' information on how to cover the electoral campaign. Vladimir Yashin, 'Omskaya oblast' ', in Monitoring dekabr' 1995 (Moscow, IGPI, 1995).
78. As a result of the disorganisation of the democrats, there were even two democratic candidates in district 130: Aleksandr Minzhurenko (DCR) and Vladimir Gavel' (Yabloko). On the eve of the election, Gavel' was persuaded to withdraw from the contest. The once powerful Kazannik also attempted to run in the district but was barred because it was illegal to be simultaneously an independent local candidate and a candidate on a national party list (Svyatoslav Fedorov's Party of Workers Self-Management). 'Vlast' i Kazannik ne lyubyat drug druga', Vechernii Omsk, 15 November 1995.
79. Folyak was the leader of the private farmers organisation AKKOR in the oblast'. There were only 8104 private farmers in Omsk and they faced considerable pressure, not least because of the administration's opposition to the privatisation of agricultural land. 'Pravo sobstvennosti na zemlyu pravo na zhizn' ', Vechernii Omsk, 30 November 1995.
80. Viktor Lotkov had originally been the co-president of the Republican Party.
81. 'Segodnya pri vlasti bol'she podletsov', Oreol, 30 November 1995.
82. Zakharchenko had been a Soviet military officer, but in the late perestroika period he became concerned about damage to the environment from the MIC and he established the local green movement 'Green town'. 'Radikal'nyi demokrat idet na glavu oblasti', Novoe obozrenie, 6 December 1995.
83. 'Zhit' dostoino!', Vechernii Omsk, 2 December 1995.
84. 'Mikhail Poltoranin - kto on: odinets sotsial'nyi chelnok ili prosto svoi, sibirskii muzhik?', Vechernii Omsk, 16 November 1995.
85. 'Eshche ne stav deputatom, Mikhail Poltoranin reshaet krupnye nakazy oblasti', Vechernii Omsk, 30 November 1995.
86. 'Poltoranin vstretilsya s oboronshchikami', Omskaya pravda, 24 November 1995.
87. 'V. Ispravnikov ubedit' sudei ne smog', Vechernii Omsk, 11 November 1995.
88. The nature of this alliance was, however, confused by the fact that Nikolaev (the leader of FOTU) was first on the Congress of Russian Communities (CRC) regional list. Omsk CRC was led by Leonid Gorynin, a prominent member of Baburin's movement.
89. 'Eshche odin kandidat v gubernatory', Omskaya pravda, 31 October 1995.
90. 'Mikhail Penkin: u etikh reform budushchego net', Vechernii Omsk, 16 November 1995.
91. Public meeting of the CPRF in Omsk, 11 December 1995.
92. 'Oleg Smolin: kto s kem? Kto protiv kogo ili eshche raz ob omskikh kandidatakh na el'tsinskuyu premiyu', Sibirskoe vremya, 1 December 1995.
93. Gorynin had twice been a People's Deputy in the city soviet, then a deputy in the oblast' soviet which was finally dissolved in March 1994. Gorynin became a deputy in the Legislative Assembly. With the approach of the elections, Gorynin was appointed leader of the Omsk branch of the Congress of Russian Communities (CRC), and was third on the CRC regional party list in December 1995. 'Ya - za russkii narod', Sibirskoe vremya, 8 December 1995.
94. 'Vysokoe imya', Vechernii Omsk, 15 November 1995.
95. 'Etu reformu povernut' litsom k cheloveku nel'zya', Omskaya pravda, 22 November 1995.
96. See for example 'Svoyu sud'bu vyberem sami', Vechernii Omsk, 29 November 1995; 'Nikolai Afanaseev 'V dumu - kak v narodnoe opolchenie! ...', Omskaya pravda, 29 November 1995; 'Ego zvezda - tvorit' zakony', Vechernii Omsk, 6 December 1995; 'Prishla pora vrachevat' dushi lyudei', Vechernii Omsk, 9 November 1995; 'Ya ne mogu davat' pustykh obeshchanii', Vechernii Omsk, 28 November 1995.
97. See for example 'Svoyu sud'bu vyberem sami', Vechernii Omsk, 29 November 1995; 'Nikolai Afanaseev 'V dumu - kak v narodnoe opolchenie! ...', Omskaya pravda, 29 November 1995; 'Ego zvezda - tvorit' zakony', Vechernii Omsk, 6 December 1995; 'Prishla pora vrachevat' dushi lyudei', Vechernii Omsk, 9 November 1995; 'Ya ne mogu davat' pustykh obeshchanii', Vechernii Omsk, 28 November 1995.
98. See for example 'Svoyu sud'bu vyberem sami', Vechernii Omsk, 29 November 1995; 'Nikolai Afanaseev 'V dumu - kak v narodnoe opolchenie! ...', Omskaya pravda, 29 November 1995; 'Ego zvezda - tvorit' zakony', Vechernii Omsk, 6 December 1995; 'Prishla pora vrachevat' dushi lyudei', Vechernii Omsk, 9 November 1995; 'Ya ne mogu davat' pustykh obeshchanii', Vechernii Omsk, 28 November 1995.
99. See for example 'Svoyu sud'bu vyberem sami', Vechernii Omsk, 29 November 1995; 'Nikolai Afanaseev 'V dumu - kak v narodnoe opolchenie! ...', Omskaya pravda, 29 November 1995; 'Ego zvezda - tvorit' zakony', Vechernii Omsk, 6 December 1995; 'Prishla pora vrachevat' dushi lyudei', Vechernii Omsk, 9 November 1995; 'Ya ne mogu davat' pustykh obeshchanii', Vechernii Omsk, 28 November 1995.
100. See for example 'Svoyu sud'bu vyberem sami', Vechernii Omsk, 29 November 1995; 'Nikolai Afanaseev 'V dumu - kak v narodnoe opolchenie! ...', Omskaya pravda, 29 November 1995; 'Ego zvezda - tvorit' zakony', Vechernii Omsk, 6 December 1995; 'Prishla pora vrachevat' dushi lyudei', Vechernii Omsk, 9 November 1995; 'Ya ne mogu davat' pustykh obeshchanii', Vechernii Omsk, 28 November 1995.
101. 'Nuzhno vosstanovit' avtoritet armii', Vechernii Omsk, 9 November 1995.
102. and 'Uspekh dela reshayut professionaly', Omskaya pravda, 17 November 1995.
103. 'LDPR za spravedlivoe obshchestvo bez dikogo kapitalizma', Vechernii Omsk, 25 November 1995.
104. and 'Sud'ba Rossii v vashikh rukakh', Vechernii Omsk, 18 November 1995.
105. Moser has noted how the different elements of Russia's electoral system have established different incentives for individuals and parties and also produced significantly different outcomes. Robert G. Moser, 'The Impact of Parliamentary Electoral Systems in Russia', Post-Soviet Affairs, 13, 3, 1997, p. 289.
106. The particular competition that candidates chose to focus upon was closely related to the structure of incentives provided by the strength of particular national parties. The candidates running with the Power to the People! movement knew there was little chance of being elected on the movement's party list and so focused their attention and resources on the single-mandate competitions. The communist candidates, on the other hand, were aware that their chances of being elected through the national list were high. In 1993 the local CPRF ensured that its leading members were on the CPRF national list of candidates. 'Chto den' gryadushchii im gotovit?', Molodoi Sibiryak, 27 November 1993. First Secretary of the Omsk CPRF, Aleksandr Kravets, was first on the West Siberian CPRF regional list and was eventually elected to the Duma through this list.
107. The collapse of the democratic movement in the region was caused by a number of factors. The linkage made by many voters between social and economic hardship and the policies promoted by the leading national figures in the democratic movement certainly had an important impact upon electoral outcomes. Nevertheless, it should be noted that democratic organisations scored well in Omsk in the 1993 elections and El'tsin gained 30.8% of the vote in Omsk during the first round of the 1996 presidential contest (Zyuganov 36.9%), and 46.2% in the second round (Zyuganov 47.5%). The electoral failure of the democrats, therefore, clearly involved more than simply a lack of support. Rather, the Omsk democrats faced three problems that prevented them transforming their support into a consolidated political grouping linked to a significant social constituency. First, the democrats lacked the internal discipline and organisation to prevent wasteful electoral competition among themselves. Second, the movement was unable to develop an alliance with the most powerful economic interests in the region, aiming instead to gain support from entrepreneurs and small businesses. Finally, the democrats failed to concentrate their attention on a single arena of electoral contest (local elections, party list or single-member districts). Instead, the democrats sought to compete equally at all levels and their resources and organisation were challenged by powerful local groups focused primarily on one particular electoral competition.
108. While not all of Russia's sub-national élite formations have been built around control of the local executive, this was an important element in the majority of regions. Critical to the development of such a regional regime was the timing of the election for the post of governor. The first experiment with governorship elections was made in April 1993, when eight regional elections were held. The defeat of seven of the incumbents and a desire to use local leaders appointed by Moscow to push through reform in the regions after the October 1993 confrontation between the president and parliament led to postponement of further elections until 1995. In the intervening period many local executive heads were able to entrench powerful political and economic networks through the power of appointment and via the exercise of the extensive powers of patronage available to the local administration. The governorship election in Omsk in December 1995 formed part of the second wave of elections for regional leaders. Elections were conducted in 12 regions where the incumbents were expected to win. In all cases, the local governors, parliaments and presidential representatives were in agreement that the election should be held. Ten of the 12 incumbents were re-elected. Marc Zlotnik, 'Russia's Governors: All the President's Men', Problems of Post-Communism, November/ December 1996, pp. 26-34.
109. In September 1995, El'tsin identified Omsk as one of the handful of regions to hold an election for the governorship in December. The head of Omsk administration, Leonid Polezhaev, exerted considerable pressure on El'tsin to be granted the right to be elected. He believed that changing from a system of appointment by the President to one of election would greatly increase his independence from the centre.
110. While the case of Omsk is generally supportive of the correction to Kryshtanovskaya & White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura ...', provided by Hughes, 'Sub-national elites ...' (indeed Omsk oblast' was one of the areas surveyed in his study), it also highlights an important weakness in the latter study. Based upon a sociological analysis of recruitment into regional assemblies in seven regions, Hughes identifies the consolidation of a regional élite on the basis of the interlocking of two dominant groupings: political-administrative and business. Hughes offers a 'marble cake' interpretation of élite structure in contrast to the 'bifurcated' (political and economic) élite form identified by Kryshtanovskaya & White. The case of Omsk suggests, however, that Hughes' focus on occupation and recruitment into local assemblies for identifying sub-national élites can only provide a partial picture of the nature and significance of regional élites. In particular, reliance on data from regional assemblies leads Hughes to ignore the interrelationship of local and national élite formation within each region. The current study suggests that Russia's provinces should be viewed as arenas for a number of simultaneous and interlinked political contests. As a result of these contests, it is frequently problematic to draw a clear distinction between central and local élites. The case of Omsk suggests that while the dominant group of the regional élite may be composed of the fusion of administrative and economic interests, significant politically defined groups have developed powerbases in the region as a means to catapult local figures up to the national level. The core element of the regional élite is forced to coexist and even co-operate with the leading minority political groups.
111. A number of theorists of democratic development have argued that pacts between political élites that explicitly define the rules of the political game are fundamental to a successful transition from authoritarianism to democracy. See Terry Lynn Karl, 'Dilemmas of democratization in Latin America', Comparative Politics, 23, 1990, pp. 1-21 and Guillermo O'Donnell & Phillipe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracy (Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Zhang has argued that in former totalitarian societies the lack of developed institutional systems makes the key conditions of pacting, namely exclusion of the mass from the transition process and enforcement of the pacts on the mass, impossible. Baohui Zhang, 'Corporatism, Totalitarianism, and Transitions to Democracy', Comparative Political Studies, 27, 1, April 1994, pp. 108-136. The case of Omsk suggests, however, that informal agreements on rules of the game, which have served a similar function to a formal pact, have emerged from the electoral process.
112. A number of theorists of democratic development have argued that pacts between political élites that explicitly define the rules of the political game are fundamental to a successful transition from authoritarianism to democracy. See Terry Lynn Karl, 'Dilemmas of democratization in Latin America', Comparative Politics, 23, 1990, pp. 1-21 and Guillermo O'Donnell & Phillipe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracy (Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Zhang has argued that in former totalitarian societies the lack of developed institutional systems makes the key conditions of pacting, namely exclusion of the mass from the transition process and enforcement of the pacts on the mass, impossible. Baohui Zhang, 'Corporatism, Totalitarianism, and Transitions to Democracy', Comparative Political Studies, 27, 1, April 1994, pp. 108-136. The case of Omsk suggests, however, that informal agreements on rules of the game, which have served a similar function to a formal pact, have emerged from the electoral process.
113. A number of theorists of democratic development have argued that pacts between political élites that explicitly define the rules of the political game are fundamental to a successful transition from authoritarianism to democracy. See Terry Lynn Karl, 'Dilemmas of democratization in Latin America', Comparative Politics, 23, 1990, pp. 1-21 and Guillermo O'Donnell & Phillipe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracy (Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Zhang has argued that in former totalitarian societies the lack of developed institutional systems makes the key conditions of pacting, namely exclusion of the mass from the transition process and enforcement of the pacts on the mass, impossible. Baohui Zhang, 'Corporatism, Totalitarianism, and Transitions to Democracy', Comparative Political Studies, 27, 1, April 1994, pp. 108-136. The case of Omsk suggests, however, that informal agreements on rules of the game, which have served a similar function to a formal pact, have emerged from the electoral process.
114. Analysis of a single region cannot provide a comprehensive explanation of the political dynamics that have operated in the Russian Federation since 1991. Research on the electoral process in other regions suggests, however, that Omsk displayed many of the tendencies found in other parts of Russia. See Darrell
115. Case has argued that semi-democratic systems can produce stable regimes and represent one of the most important alternatives for societies moving away from an authoritarian political system. Within semi-democratic systems, élites, while abandoning their former monolithic unity, stop short of disunity and instead adopt an 'off-centre equilibrium'. Participation rather than electoral contest is contained through a carefully structured political system and elements of the political élite compete peacefully, although not equally. Within such a system, elections have a critical role as mechanisms for venting grievances, for reinforcing the position of all elements of the élite and providing 'feedback', but not for 'turning the rascals out'. William F. Case, 'Can the "Halfway House" Stand? Semidemocracy and Elite Theory in Three Southeast Asian Countries', Comparative Politics, 28, 4, July 1996, pp. 437-464.