Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 74, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 266-296

  Nyarko, Yaw ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031161416     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.2254     Document Type: Article

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