Generating realistic data sets for combinatorial auctions

Proceedings - IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce, CEC 2003

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 331-338

  Bonaccorsi, A ^a   Codenotti, B ^b   Dimitri, N ^c   Leoncini, M ^d   Resta, G ^e   Santi, P ^e  

^a SCUOLA SUPERIORE SANT ANNA   (Italy)

^b THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SIENA   (Italy)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MODENA AND REGGIO EMILIA   (Italy)

^e CNR   (Italy)

Author keywords

Algorithm design and analysis; Application software; Computer science; Consumer products; Cost accounting; Frequency; Guidelines; Marketing and sales; Power generation economics; Testing

Indexed keywords

APPLICATION PROGRAMS; BUDGET CONTROL; COMPUTER SCIENCE; CONSUMER PRODUCTS; COST ACCOUNTING; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; PRODUCT DESIGN; SOFTWARE TESTING; TESTING;

ALGORITHM DESIGN AND ANALYSIS; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; COMPUTATIONAL FRAMEWORK; FREQUENCY; GUIDELINES; POWER GENERATION ECONOMICS; REAL-WORLD SCENARIO; SCIENCE COMMUNITY;

COMMERCE;

EID: 9444288925     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/COEC.2003.1210268     Document Type: Conference Paper

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