Calibrated Forecasting and Merging

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 151-169

  Kalai, Ehud ^a   Lehrer, Ehud ^a,b   Smorodinsky, Rann ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011530965     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0608     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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