Optimal debt contracts with renegotiation

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 755-776

  Usman, Murat ^a  

^a KOÇ UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 9344262878     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00031.x     Document Type: Review

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