Dynamic adverse selection and debt

European Economic Review

Volumn 45, Issue 9, 2001, Pages 1773-1792

  Chemla, Gilles ^a,b,c   Faure Grimaud, Antoine ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^b CNRS   (France)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^d LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Debt; Dynamic adverse selection; Renegotiation

Indexed keywords

DEBT; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0034811836     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00080-5     Document Type: Article

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