Product market competition and optimal debt contracts: The limited liability effect revisited

European Economic Review

Volumn 44, Issue 10, 2000, Pages 1823-1840

  Faure Grimaud, Antoine ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Contract theory; Debt; Imperfect competition; Renegotiation

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; DEBT; LENDING BEHAVIOR; MARKET CONDITIONS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0033668739     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00026-4     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. The commitment value of contracts under dynamic renegotiation
2. A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting
3. Oligopoly and financial structure: The limited liability effect
4. Bankruptcy costs and the theory of oligopoly
5. Competing vertical structures: Precommitment and renegotiation
6. The structure and pricing of private placement corporate loans
7. Capital structure and product market competition: Empirical evidence from the supermarket industry
8. Do LBO supermarkets charge more? An empirical analysis of the effects of LBOs on supermarket pricing
9. Financial contracts as lasting commitments: The case of a leveraged oligopoly
10. The strategic effects of long-term debt in imperfect competition
11. Capital structure and product market rivalry: How do we reconcile theory and evidence
12. Capital structure and product market behavior: An examination of plant exit and investment decisions
13. Capital structure in repeated oligopolis
14. Financial distress and corporate performance
15. Increased debt and industry product markets: An empirical analysis
16. Oligopoly and financial structure: Comment
17. Bankruptcy resolution: Direct costs and violation of priority of claims