Hope or hype: On the viability of escrow services as trusted third parties in online auction environments

Information Systems Research

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 236-249

  Hu, Xiaorui ^a   Lin, Zhangxi ^b   Whinston, Andrew B ^c   Zhang, Han ^d  

^a SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^d GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Dynamic game; Escrow service; Fraud; Numerical study; Online auction; Optimum pricing; Trusted third party

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER CRIME; CONTRACTS; FINANCE; INTERNET; MARKETING; RISKS;

DYNAMIC GAME; ESCROW SERVICES; NUMERICAL STUDY; ONLINE AUCTION; TRUSTED THIRD PARTY;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 9144229518     PISSN: 10477047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/isre.1040.0027     Document Type: Review

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