What is learned from experience in a probabilistic environment?

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 213-229

  Edgell, Stephen E ^a   Isaiah Harbison, J ^a   Neace, William P ^b   Nahinsky, Irwin D ^a   Scott Lajoie, A ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE   (United States)

^b PACIFIC INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH AND EVALUATION   (United States)

^c Christine M Kleinert Institute of Hand Surgery   (United States)

^d CHRISTINE M KLEINERT INSTITUTE FOR HAND AND MICROSURGERY   (United States)

Author keywords

Conditional probabilities; Confusion of the inverse; Decision making; Direct experience

Indexed keywords

EID: 8744276197     PISSN: 08943257     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.471     Document Type: Article

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