Self-Policing in Politics: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REPUTATIONAL CONTROLS ON POLITICIANS

Self-Policing in Politics: The Political Economy of Reputational Controls on Politicians

Volumn , Issue , 2021, Pages 1-182

  Parker, Glenn R ^a  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85193394305     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

References (161)

1. Agrawal, Anup, and Charles R. Knoeber. 2001. “Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?” Journal of Law and Economics 64:179-198.
2. Akerlof, George H. 1970. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 74:488-500.
3. Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.” American Economic Review 62:777795.
4. Alford, John, Holly Teeters, Daniel S. Ward, and Rick Wilson. 1994. “Overdraft: The Political Cost of Congressional Malfeasance.” Journal of Politics 56:788-801.
5. Allen, Franklin. 1984. “Reputation and Product Quality.” Rand Journal of Economics 15:311-327.
6. Barro, Robert J. 1973. “The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model.” Public Choice 14:19-42.
7. Beard, Edmund, and Stephen Horn. 1975. Congressional Ethics. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
8. Beatty, R. P., and J. R. Ritter. 1986. “Investment Banking, Reputation, and Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings.” Journal of Financial Economics 15:213-232.
9. Becker, Gary S. 1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 76:169-217.
10. Becker, Gary S., and George J. Stigler. 1974. “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers.” Journal of Legal Studies 3:1-18.
11. Bianco, William T. 1994. Trust. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
12. Born, Richard. 1990. “The Shared Fortunes of Congress and Congressmen: Members May Run from Congress, but They Can’t Hide.” Journal of Politics 52:1223-1241.
13. Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
14. Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. 1987. The Personal Vote. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
15. Carmines, Edward G., and Richard A. Zeller. 1979. Reliability and Validity Assessment. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
16. Coase, Ronald H. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3:1-44.
17. Coase, Ronald H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4:386-405.
18. Commission on Administrative Review, U.S. House of Representatives. 1977. Final Report, 95th Congress, 1st session, H. Doc. 95-272.
19. Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate. 1973. Confidence and Concern: Citizens View American Government, 93rd Congress, 1st Session.
20. Congressional Ethics. 1992. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
21. Congressional Quarterly. 1997. Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1996. Alexandria, Va.: Congressional Quarterly Staff Directories.
22. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1997. “Filing Complaints in House: Now for Members Only?” September 20, 1997: 2199-2200.
23. Cook, Thomas D., and Donald T. Campbell. 1979. Quasi-Experimentation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
24. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan. Berkeley: University of California Press.
25. Crain, W. Mark, and Brian Goff. 1986. “Televising Legislatures: An Economic Analysis.” Journal of Law and Economics 29:405-421.
26. Crain, W. Mark, Donald R. Leavens, and Robert D. Tollison. 1986. “Final Voting in Legislatures.” American Economic Review 76:833-841.
27. Davis, Michael L., and Michael Ferrantino. 1996. “Towards a Positive Theory of Political Rhetoric: Why Do Politicians Lie?” Public Choice 88:1-13.
28. DeAlessi, Louis, and Robert J. Staaf. 1994. “What Does Reputation Really Assure? The Relationship of Trademarks to Expectations and Legal Remedies.” Economic Inquiry 32:477-485.
29. Dimock, Michael, and Gary C. Jacobson. 1995. “Checks and Choices: The House Bank Scandal’s Impact on Voters in 1992.” Journal of Politics 57:1143-1159.
30. Dougan, William R., and Michael C. Munger. 1989. “The Rationality of Ideology.” Journal of Law and Economics 32:119-142.
31. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
32. Erikson, Robert S. 1990. “Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: A Review of the Macrolevel Evidence.” American Journal of Political Science 34:373-399.
33. Erikson, Robert S. 1976. “Is There Such a Thing as a Safe Seat?” Polity 9:623632.
34. Fama, Eugene F. 1980. “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.” Journal of Political Economy 88:288-307.
35. Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. 1983. “Agency Problems and Residual Claims.” Journal of Law and Economics 26:327-349.
36. Fearon, James D. 1999. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance.” In Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, 55-97. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
37. Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1996. Senators on the Campaign Trail. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
38. Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1982. The United States Senate: A Bicameral Perspective. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.
39. Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1978. Home Style. Boston: Little, Brown.
40. Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown.
41. Ferejohn, John. 1999. “Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability.” In Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, 131-153. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
42. Ferejohn, John. 1986. “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control.” Public Choice 50:5-25.
43. Figlio, David W. 2000. “Political Shirking, Opponent Quality, and Electoral Support.” Public Choice 103:271-284.
44. Fiorina, Morris P. 1978. “Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections: A Micro Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 22:426-443.
45. Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
46. Fiorina, Morris P., and Roger Noll. 1979. “Majority Rule Models and Legislative Elections.” Journal of Politics 41:1081-1104.
47. Fombrun, Charles, and Mark Shanley. 1990. “What’s in a Name? Reputation Building and Corporate Strategy.” Academy of Management Journal 33:233258.
48. Fowler, Linda L., and Robert D. McClure. 1989. Political Ambition: Who Decides to Run for Congress. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
49. Frey, Bruno S. 1993. “Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? The Rivalry with Trust and Loyalty.” Economic Inquiry 31:663-670.
50. Goldenberg, Edie N., and Michael W. Traugott. 1984. Campaigning for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
51. Groseclose, Timothy, and Keith Krehbiel. 1994. “Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks, and Strategic Retirements from the 102nd House.” American Journal of Political Science 38:75-99.
52. Hall, Richard L., and Robert Van Houweling. 1995. “Avarice and Ambition: Representatives’ Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House.” American Political Science Review 89:121-136.
53. Hays, William L. 1973. Statistics for the Social Sciences. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
54. Heal, Geoffrey. 1976. “Do Bad Products Drive Out Good?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 95:499-502.
55. Hinich, Melvin J., and Michael C. Munger. 1996. Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
56. Holmstrom, Bengt. 1978. “Moral Hazard and Observability.” Bell Journal of Economics 10:74-91.
57. Ippolito, Pauline M. 1990. “Bonding and Nonbonding Signals of Product Quality.” Journal of Business 63:41-60.
58. Jacobson, Gary C. 1990a. “Does the Economy Matter in Midterm Elections?” American Journal of Political Science 34:400-404.
59. Jacobson, Gary C. 1990b. The Electoral Origins of Divided Government. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
60. Jacobson, Gary C. 1987. The Politics of Congressional Elections, 2d ed. Boston: Little, Brown.
61. Jacobson, Gary C., and Michael Dimock. 1994. “Checking Out: The Effects of Bank Overdrafts on the 1992 House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 38:601 -624.
62. Jarrell, Gregg, and Sam Peltzman. 1985. “The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers.” Journal of Political Economy 93:512-536.
63. Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3:305-360.
64. Johannes, John R., and John C. McAdams. 1981. “The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is It Casework, Policy Compatibility, or Something Else? An Examination of the 1978 Election.” American Journal of Political Science 25:512-542.
65. Kalt, Joseph P., and Mark A. Zupan. 1990. “The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislatures: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions.” Journal of Law and Economics 33:103-131.
66. Kalt, Joseph P., and Mark A. Zupan. 1984. “Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics.” American Economic Review 74:279-300.
67. Karpoff, Jonathan M., and John R. Lott. 1993. “The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud.” Journal of Law and Economics 36:757-802.
68. Kau, James B., and Paul H. Rubin. 1979. “Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting.” Journal of Law and Economics 22:365-384.
69. Klein, Benjamin, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian. 1978. “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process.” Journal of Law and Economics 21:297-326.
70. Klein, Benjamin, and Keith B. Leffler. 1981. “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance.” Journal of Political Economy 89:615641.
71. Klein, Daniel B., ed. 1997. Reputation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
72. Klein, Daniel B. 1997. “Trust for Hire: Voluntary Remedies for Quality and Safety.” In Reputation, edited by Daniel B. Klein, 97-133. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
73. Korin, Basil P. 1975. Statistical Concepts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers.
74. Kostroski, Warren E. 1973. “Party and Incumbency in Post War Senate Elections: Trends, Patterns, and Models.” American Political Science Review 67:1213-1234.
75. Kotowitz, Yehuda, and Frank Mathewson. 1979. “Advertising, Consumer Information, and Product Quality.” Bell Journal of Economics 10:566-588.
76. Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. “Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964.” American Political Science Review 65:131-143.
77. Krasno, Jonathan S. 1994. Challengers, Competition, and Reelection. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
78. Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson. 1982. “Reputation and Imperfect Information.” Journal of Economic Theory 27:253-279.
79. Laband, David N., and Bernard F. Lentz. 1985. “Favorite Sons: Intergenera-tional Wealth Transfers Among Politicians.” Economic Inquiry 23:395-414.
80. Landes, William M., and Richard A. Posner. 1975. “The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective.” Journal of Law and Economics 18:875901.
81. Larson, Stephanie Greco. 1990. “Information and Learning in a Congressional District: A Social Experiment.” American Journal of Political Science 34:1102-1118.
82. Leland, Hayne E. 1979. “Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards.” Journal of Political Economy 87:1328-1346.
83. Lipsey, R. G., and Kelvin Lancaster. 1955. “The General Theory of Second Best.” Review of Economic Studies 23:11-32.
84. Lott, John R. 1990. “Attendance Rates, Political Shirking, and the Effect of Post-Elective Office Employment.” Economic Inquiry 28:133-150.
85. Lott, John R., Jr. 1987. “Political Cheating.” Public Choice 52:169-186.
86. Lott, John R., Jr. 1986. “Brand Names and Barriers to Entry in Political Markets.” Public Choice 51:87-92.
87. Lott, John R., and Michael Davis. 1992. “A Critical Review and an Extension of the Political Shirking Literature.” Public Choice 74:461-484.
88. Lott, John R., and Robert W. Reed. 1989. “Shirking and Sorting in a Political Market with Finite-lived Politicians.” Public Choice 61:75-96.
89. Mann, Thomas E. 1978. Unsafe at Any Margin. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
90. Markus, Gregory B. 1979. Analyzing Panel Data. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
91. Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
92. McChesney, Fred S. 1987. “Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation.” Journal of Legal Studies 16:101 -118.
93. McCurley, Carl, and Jeffery J. Mondak. 1995. “Inspected by #1184063113: The Influence of Incumbents’ Competence and Integrity in U.S. House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 39:864-885.
94. Merry, Sally Engle. 1997. “Rethinking Gossip and Scandal.” In Reputation, edited by Daniel B. Klein, 47-74. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
95. Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. 1986. “Relying on the Information of Interested Parties.” Rand Journal of Economics 17:18-32.
96. Miller, Ross M., and Charles R. Plott. 1985. “Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets.” Econometrica 53:837-872.
97. Miller, Warren E., Donald R. Kinder, and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1993. American National Election Study, 1992: Pre-and Post-Election Survey. Center for Political Studies, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan.
98. Mitchell, Mark L. 1989. “The Impact of External Parties on Brand-Name Capital: The 1982 Tylenol Poisonings and Subsequent Cases.” Economic Inquiry 27:601-618.
99. Mitchell, Mark L., and Michael Maloney. 1989. “Crisis in the Cockpit? The Role of Market Forces in Promoting Air Travel Safety.” Journal of Law and Economics 32:329-355.
100. Moe, Terry M. 1984. “The New Economics of Organization.” American Journal of Political Science 28:739-777.
101. Mondak, Jeffery J. 1995. “Competence, Integrity, and the Electoral Success of Congressional Incumbents.” Journal of Politics 57:1043-1069.
102. National Archives and Records Administration. 1965-1996. The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vols. 1-31. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register.
103. Nelson, Douglas, and Eugene Silberberg. 1987. “Ideology and Legislator Shirking.” Economic Inquiry 25:15-25.
104. Nelson, Phillip. 1976. “Political Information.” Journal of Law and Economics 19:315-336.
105. Nelson, Phillip. 1974. “Advertising as Information.” Journal of Political Economy 82:729-754.
106. Nelson, Phillip. 1970. “Information and Consumer Behavior.” Journal of Political Economy 78:311-329.
107. Niskanan, William A. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Rand McNally.
108. Nye, J. S. 1967. “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis.” American Political Science Review 61:417-427.
109. Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
110. Ornstein, Norman J., Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin. 1996. Vital Statistics on Congress 1995-1996. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.
111. Parker, Glenn R. 1996. Congress and the Rent-Seeking Society. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
112. Parker, Glenn R. 1992. Institutional Change, Discretion, and the Making of Modern Congress: An Economic Interpretation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
113. Parker, Glenn R. 1989. “The Role of Constituent Trust in Congressional Elections.” Public Opinion Quarterly 53:175-196.
114. Parker, Glenn R. 1986. Homeward Bound: Explaining Changes in Congressional Behavior. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
115. Parker, Glenn R. 1981. “Incumbent Popularity and Electoral Success.” In Congressional Elections, edited by Joseph Cooper and L. Sandy Maisel, 249-279. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
116. Parker, Glenn R., and Roger H. Davidson. 1979. “Why Do Americans Love Their Congressmen So Much More Than Their Congress?” Legislative Studies Quarterly 4:53-61.
117. Parker, Glenn R., and Suzanne Parker. 1998a. “The Economic Organization of Legislatures and How It Affects Congressional Voting.” Public Choice 60: 117-129.
118. Parker, Glenn R., and Suzanne Parker. 1998b. “Public Trust in Political Leaders.” Paper prepared for presentation at the Hendricks Symposium on “Public Dissatisfaction with Government,” University of Nebraska, Lincoln. October 8-11, 1998.
119. Parker, Glenn R., and Stephen Powers. 2002. “Searching for Symptoms of Political Shirking: Congressional Foreign Travel.” Public Choice 110:173-191.
120. Parker, Suzanne, and Glenn R. Parker. 1993. “Why Do We Trust Our Congressman?” Journal of Politics 55:442-453.
121. Parker, Kimberly, and Claudia Deane. 1997. “Ten Years of the PEW News Interest Index.” The Pew Research Center for The People and the Press. February 28, 2000 .
122. Peltzman, Sam. 1984. “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting.” Journal of Law and Economics 27:181-210.
123. Peters, John G., and Susan Welch. 1980. “The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections.” American Political Science Review 74:697-708.
124. Peters, John G., and Susan Welch. 1978. “Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions and a Theory.” American Political Science Review 72:974-984.
125. Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives.” American Political Science Review 62:144-168.
126. Ragsdale, Lynn. 1996. Vital Statistics on the Presidency. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
127. Ray, Bruce. 1980. “Federal Spending and the Selection of Committee Assignments in the U.S. House of Representatives.” American Journal of Political Science 23:494-510.
128. Rogow, Arnold A., and Harold Lasswell. 1963. Power, Corruption and Rectitude. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
129. Romero, David W. 1996. “The Case of the Missing Reciprocal Influence: Incumbent Reputation and the Vote.” Journal of Politics 58:1198-1207.
130. Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. Corruption and Government. New York: Cambridge University Press.
131. Rubin, Paul H., R. Dennis Murphy, and Gregg Jarrell. 1988. “Risky Products, Risky Stocks.” Regulation 12:35-39.
132. Rundquist, Barry S., Gerald S. Strom, and John C. Peters. 1977. “Corrupt Politicians and Their Electoral Support: Some Experimental Observations.” American Political Science Review 71:954-963.
133. Saloma, John S., III. 1969. Congress and the New Politics. Boston: Little, Brown.
134. Schmalensee, Richard. 1978. “A Model of Advertising and Product Quality.” Journal of Political Economy 86:485-503.
135. Sears, David O., and Jack Citrin. 1985. Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
136. Shapiro, Carl. 1983. “Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98:659-679.
137. Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. “The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power.” American Political Science Review 81:85-104.
138. Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1984. “Political Solutions to Market Problems.” American Political Science Review 78:417-434.
139. Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1981. “Structure-induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice.” Public Choice 37: 503-519.
140. Smith, Adam. 1997. “Lecture on the Influence of Commerce on Manners.” In Reputation, edited by Daniel B. Klein, 17-20. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
141. Spence, Michael. 1973. “Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 77:355-374.
142. Stigler, George J. 1972. “Economic Competition and Political Competition.” Public Choice 13:91-106.
143. Stigler, George J. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2:137-146.
144. Stigler, George J. 1962. “Information in the Labor Market.” Journal of Political Economy 70:49-73.
145. Stigler, George J. 1961. “The Economics of Information.” Journal of Political Economy 69:213-225.
146. Stokes, Donald E., and Warren E. Miller. 1962. “Party Government and the Saliency of Congress.” Public Opinion Quarterly 26:531-546.
147. Telser, Lester G. 1980. “A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements.” Journal of Business 22:27-44.
148. Telser, Lester G. 1964. “Advertising and Competition.” Journal of Political Economy 72:537-562.
149. Tuckman, Bruce W. 1972. Conducting Educational Research. New York: Har-court, Brace, Jovanovich.
150. Tufte, Edward R. 1978. Political Control of the Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
151. Tullock, Gordon. 1981. “Why So Much Stability?” Public Choice 37:189-202.
152. Vanbeek, James R. 1991. “Does the Decision to Retire Increase the Amount of Political Shirking?” Public Finance Quarterly 19:444-456.
153. Wattenberg, Martin P. 1998. The Decline of American Political Parties, 19521996. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
154. Weingast, Barry R. 1988. “The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent Perspective (with applications to the SEC).” Public Choice 44:147-191.
155. Weingast, Barry R., and William J. Marshall. 1988. “The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 96:132-163.
156. Welch, Susan, and John R. Hibbing. 1997. “The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections, 1982-1990.” Journal of Politics 59:226-239.
157. Williamson, Oliver E. 1981. “The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes.” Journal of Economic Literature 19:1537-1568.
158. Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free Press.
159. Wright, Gerald C., Jr., and Michael B. Berkman. 1986. “Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections.” American Political Science Review 80:567-588.
160. Yiannakis, Diana Evans. 1982. “House Members’ Communication Styles: Newsletters and Press Releases.” Journal of Politics 43:1049-1071.
161. Zupan, Mark A. 1990. “The Last-Period Problem in Politics: Do Congressional Representatives Not Subject to a Reelection Constraint Alter Their Voting Behavior?” Public Choice 65:167-180.