Searching for symptoms of political shirking: Congressional foreign travel

Public Choice

Volumn 110, Issue 1-2, 2002, Pages 173-191

  Parker, Glenn R ^a   Powers, Stephen C ^b  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Tallahassee Community College   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036101427     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1013013815906     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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