Political shirking, opponent quality, and electoral support

Public Choice

Volumn 103, Issue 3-4, 2000, Pages 271-284

  Figlio, David N ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034396330     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005051613015     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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