The economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting

Public Choice

Volumn 95, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 117-129

  Parker, Glenn R ^a   Parker, Suzanne L ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032375595     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004938413319     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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