Informational externalities and settlements in mass tort litigations

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 241-262

  Deffains, Bruno ^a   Langlais, Eric ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PANTHÉON ASSAS   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

Author keywords

Contingent fees; Information sharing; Mass tort class action; Repeated litigation

Indexed keywords

EID: 85027922229     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10657-011-9237-8     Document Type: Article

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