US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: Agency problems and the supply of legal services

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 379-385

  Emons, Winand ^a   Garoupa, Nuno ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

^b NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS   (Portugal)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646165408     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1269     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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