Erratum: Playing it safe low conditional fees versus being insured by high contingent fees (American Law and Economics Review (2006) vol.8 (N1) (20-32) 10.1093/aler/ahj002);Playing it safe with low conditional fees versus being insured by high contingent fees

American Law and Economics Review

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 20-32

  Emons, Winand ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646181470     PISSN: 14657252     EISSN: 14657260     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahl008     Document Type: Erratum

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