Conditional versus contingent fees

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 59, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 89-101

  Emons, Winand ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONTINGENT VALUATION; LEGISLATION; PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS;

CLUSIA (ANGIOSPERM);

EID: 33845870696     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: 14643812     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpl015     Document Type: Article

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