Incentive structures for class action lawyers

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 102-124

  Klement, Alon ^a   Neeman, Zvika ^b  

^a Radziner School of Law   (Israel)

^b BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344603672     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewh025     Document Type: Review

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