Modeling infinitely many agents

Theoretical Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2017, Pages 771-815

  He, Wei ^a   Sun, Xiang ^b   Sun, Yeneng ^c  

^a CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^b WUHAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

^c NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Agent space; atomless independent supplement; closed graph property; conditional atomlessness; determinateness property; Nash equilibrium; nowhere equivalence; relative saturation; Walrasian equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 85019908184     PISSN: 19336837     EISSN: 15557561     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3982/TE1647     Document Type: Article

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