Non-cooperative games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 455-492

  Khan, M Ali ^a   Sun, Yeneng ^b  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Loeb spaces; Nash equilibria; Non cooperative games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007225675     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(98)00031-7     Document Type: Article

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