On the space of players in idealized limit games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 153, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 177-190

  Qiao, Lei ^a   Yu, Haomiao ^b  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^b RYERSON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Games with traits; Idealized limit; Large games; Pure strategy Nash equilibrium; Saturated probability space; Weak closed graph property

Indexed keywords

EID: 84906537082     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.06.009     Document Type: Article

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