Base-rate neglect

Cognitive Illusions: Intriguing Phenomena in Judgement, Thinking and Memory

Volumn , Issue , 2016, Pages 44-61

  Pennycook, Gordon ^a   Thompson, Valerie A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85017571186     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9781315696935     Document Type: Chapter

References (24)

1. Barbey, A. K., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Base-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual processes. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 30, 241-256.
2. Bar-Hillel, M. (1980). The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments. Acta Psychologica, 44, 211-233.
3. Birnbaum, M. H. (2004). Base rates in bayesian inference. In R. F. Pohl (Ed.), Cognitive illusions: A handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and memory (pp. 43-60). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
4. De Neys, W., & Franssens, S. (2009). Belief inhibition during thinking: Not always winning but at least taking part. Cognition, 113, 45-61.
5. Eddy, D. M. (1982). Probabilistic reasoning in clinical medicine: Problems and opportunities. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 249-67). New York: Cambridge University Press.
6. Evans, J. St. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher cognition: Advancing the debate. Perspectives in Psychological Science, 8, 223-241.
7. Fischhoff, B., & Bar-Hillel, M. (1984). Focusing techniques: A shortcut to improving probability judgments? Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 34, 175-194.
8. Fong, G. T., Krantz, D. H., & Nisbitt, R. E. (1986). The effects of statistical training on thinking about everyday problems. Cognitive Psychology, 18, 253-292.
9. Gigerenzer, G., & Hoffrage, U. (1995). How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats. Psychological Review, 102, 684-704.
10. Hammerton, M. (1973). A case of radical probability estimation. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 101, 252-254.
11. Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. American Psychologist, 58, 697-720.
12. Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2005). A model of heuristic judgement. In K. J. Holyoak & R. G. Morrison (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 267-293). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80, 237-251.
14. Krosnick, J. A., Li, F., & Lehman, D. R. (1990). Conversational conventions, order of information acquisition, and the effect of base rates and individuating information on social judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 1140-1152.
15. Kurzenhäuser, S., & Lücking, A. (2004). Statistical formats in Bayesian inference. In R. F. Pohl (Ed.), Cognitive illusions: A handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and memory (pp. 61-77). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
16. Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Barr, N., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2014). Cognitive style and religiosity: The role of conflict detection. Memory & Cognition, 42, 1-10.
17. Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2012). Are we good at detecting conflict during reasoning? Cognition, 124, 101-106.
18. Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2015). What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement. Cognitive Psychology, 80, 34-72.
19. Pennycook, G., & Thompson, V. A. (2012). Reasoning with base rates is routine, relatively effortless, and context-dependent. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19, 528-534.
20. Pennycook, G., Trippas, D., Handley, S. J., & Thompson, V. A. (2014). Base-rates: Both neglected and intuitive. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40, 544-554.
21. Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 645-726.
22. Thompson, V. (2014). What intuitions are… and are not. In B. H. Ross (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (pp. 35-75). Burlington: Academic Press.
23. Thompson, V., & Johnson, S. C. (2014). Conflict, metacognition, and analytic thinking. Thinking & Reasoning, 20, 215-244.
24. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 91, 293-315.