CEO stock options: The silent dimension of ownership

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 255-265

  McGuire, Jean ^a   Matta, Elie ^b  

^a John Molson School of Business   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037794440     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/30040618     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. 1991. Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
2. Beatty, R., & Zajac, E. J. 1994. Managerial incentives, monitoring, and risk bearing: A study of executive compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public offerings. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39: 313-336.
3. Bilimoria, D. 1997. Perspectives on corporate control: Implications for CEO compensation. Human Relotions, 50: 829-858.
4. Bryan, S., Hwang, L., & Lee, L. 2000. CEO stock-based compensation: An empirical analysis of incentive-intensity, relative mix, and economic determinants. Journal of Business, 73: 661-693.
5. Business Owner. 2000. How to use restricted stock to keep key executives. 24(6): 8-9.
6. Byrne, J. 1998. How to reward failure: Reprice stock options. BusinessWeek, October 12: 50.
7. Carpenter, J., & Remmers, B. 2001. Executive stock option exercise and inside information. Journal of Business, 74: 513-534.
8. Computerworld, 34(6): 87.
9. Conyon, M. J., & Murphy, K. J. 2000. The prince and the pauper: CEO pay in the US and UK. Economic Journal, 110: 640-671.
10. Crystal, G. 1991. In search of excess. New York: Norton.
11. Dash, J. 2000. KPMG plans IPO to retain talent. Computer-world, 34(6): 87.
12. Ederington, L., & Goh, J. 1998. Bond rating agencies and stock analysis: Who knows what when? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 33: 569-585.
13. Gogoi, P. 1999. The boss's pay - False impressions: More companies require top executives to own stock; The result isn't what everybody expected. Wall Street Journal, April 8: R3.
14. Gomez-Mejia, L. & Wiseman, R. 1997. Refraining executive compensation: An assessment and outlook, Journal of Management, 23: 291-354.
15. Guay, W. 1999. The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: An analysis of the magnitude and determinants. Journal of Financial Economics, 53: 43-71.
16. Heath, C., Huddart, S., & Lang, M. 1999. Psychological factors and stock option exercise. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114: 601-627.
17. Hemmer, T., Matsunaga, S., & Shevlin, T. 1996. The influence of risk diversification on the early exercise of employee stock options by executive officers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 21: 45-69.
18. Huddart, S., & Lang, M. 1996. Employee stock option exercises: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 21: 5-43.
19. Jensen, M., & Murphy, K. 1990. Performance and top management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98: 225-264.
20. Kahneman, D. 1992. Reference points, anchors, norms, and mixed feelings. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 51: 296-312.
21. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. 1979a. On. the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80: 237-251.
22. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. 1979b. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 46: 171-185.
23. Kay, I. 1999. Growing shareholder value: Why executive stock ownership works. Compensation and Benefits Review, 31: 32-37.
24. Levinsohn, A. 2001. A garden of stock options helps harvest talent. Strategic Finance, 82: 81-82.
25. Li, M., & Simerly, R. L. 1998. The moderating effect of environmental dynamism on the ownership and performance relationship. Strategic Management Journal, 19: 169-180.
26. Monks, R. 1995. Stock options don't work, Fortune, September 18: 230.
27. Morgenson, G. 1988. Stock options are not a free lunch, Forbes, May 18: 212-217.
28. Mueulbroek, L. 2001. The efficiency of equity-linked compensation: Understanding the full cost of awarding executive stock options. Financial Management, 30(2): 5-30.
29. Murphy, K. 1999. Executive compensation. In O. Ashen-felter & D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of labor economics: 2485-2563. Amsterdam: New Holland.
30. Ofek, E., & Yermack, D. 2000. Taking stock: Equity-based compensation and the evolution of managerial ownership. Journal of Finance, 55: 1367-1384.
31. Prevezer, M., & Ricketts, M. 1994. Corporate governance: The U.K. compared with Germany and Japan. In N. Dimsdale & M. Prevezer (Eds.), Capital markets and corporate governance: 237-256. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
32. Reingold, J. 1997. The folly of jumbo stock options. BusinessWeek, December 22: 36.
33. Reingold, J. 1998. Executive pay. BusinessWeek, April 20: 2.
34. Rich, J., & Blair, N. 1995. Facilitating stock ownership through company-sponsored stock option loans. Journal of Compensation and Benefits, 10(5): 35-40.
35. Sanders, W. G. 2001. Behavioral responses of CEOs to stock ownership and stock option pay. Academy of Management Journal, 44: 477-492.
36. Serwer, A. 1995. The big hangover in stock options. Fortune, July 24: 28.
37. Sparks, D. 1998. The mother of all stock option plans. BusinessWeek, November 23, 1998: 158.
38. St-Onge, S., Magnan, M., Thorne, L., & Raymond, S. 2001. The effectiveness of stock option plans: A field investigation of senior executives. Journal of Management Inquiry, 10: 250-266.
39. Tosi, H., & Gomez-Mejia, L. 1989. The decoupling of CEO pay and performance: An agency theory perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34: 169-189.
40. Veliyath, R. 1999. Top management compensation and shareholder return: Unravelling different models of the relationship. Journal of Management Studies, 36: 123-143.
41. Wall Street Journal. 2000. Stock-option grants cut earnings by 6% for S&P 500 firms. August 25: B2.
42. Westphal, J., & Zajac, E. 1994. Substance and symbolism in CEOs' long-term incentive plans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39: 367-390.
43. Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. 1997. Defections from the inner circle: Social exchange, reciprocity, and the diffusion of board independence in US corporations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 161-183.
44. Wiseman, R., McNamara, G., & Devers, C. 2001. CEO stock option wealth effects on firm risk and risk taking. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Washington, DC.
45. Wright, P., Ferris, S., Sarin, A., & Awasthi, V. 1996. The impact of corporate insider, blockholder, and institutional equity ownership on firm risk taking. Academy of Management Journal, 39: 441-463.
46. Yermack, D. 1995. Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively? Journal of Financial Economics, 39: 237-269.
47. Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. 1994. The costs and benefits of managerial incentives: When is more not better? Strategic Management Journal, 15 (winter special issue): 121-142.