“Leaky” Rationality: How Research on Behavioral Decision Making Challenges Normative Standards of Rationality

Perspectives on Psychological Science

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 162-180

  Keys, Daniel J ^a   Schwartz, Barry ^b  

^a Cornell University ^*  (United States)

^b SWARTHMORE COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84993790782     PISSN: 17456916     EISSN: 17456924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2007.00035.x     Document Type: Article

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